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Executive summaryThis report examines the Netherlands contribution to the humanitarian response to theSyrian crisis and the impact on neighbouring countries in the period 15 March 2011 to31 December 2014. Data and other types of information used for the analysis are actualuntil 31 December.The study addresses the key question To what extent and how has the central objective of
the Netherlands’ humanitarian assistance policy, i.e. to provide humanitarian assistance in
an effective way, been realised? The scope of this study is dominated by the SyriaHumanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) within Syria and the Syria RegionalResponse Plan (RRP) in neighbouring countries, coordinated respectively by the UnitedNations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) and the UnitedNations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), which received the bulk ofNetherlands humanitarian funding.Netherlands humanitarian policy, although not deliberately serving political objectives,is analyzed in the context of broader foreign, asylum and resettlement policyconsideration. The Netherlands foreign policy response to the Syrian crisis was largelyconsistent and principled, and based on international law, human rights andhumanitarian principles. For instance, Netherlands support for EU sanctions isconsistent with its principled stand on the Syrian regime’s human rights violations. Onthe other hand, the Netherlands offers asylum and resettlement to only a very smallproportion of Syrian refugees and in comparison with more welcoming asylum andresettlement policies of Germany and Sweden. The Netherlands government’s policythat Syrian refugees are best hosted in the region, and that it supports the main refugeehosting countries in the region with humanitarian assistance underscores theimportance of supporting host countries’ sustained ability to meet the needs of Syrianrefugees, and of humanitarian agencies delivering aid.From 2012 until the end of 2014, the Netherlands government contributed in total
€104.05 million in assistance to help address the growing humanitarian needs in Syriaand in neighbouring countries. The Netherlands also significant amounts of global corefunding to UN agencies and other international humanitarian agencies. It can be arguedthat overall the Netherlands meets its ‘fair share’ in carrying the international burden ofthe humanitarian consequences of the Syria crisis. Netherlands financial resources forhumanitarian purposes were made available in a relatively timely manner whenmeasured against UN agencies’ appeals. On the other hand, while SHARP and RRPappeals between the end of 2012 and 2015 combined increased by more than seven-fold, Netherlands financial allocations in that same period less than doubled.Furthermore, given the Netherlands emphasis on UN coordinated assistance, thetimeliness of the Netherlands humanitarian response strongly correlates with that of theUN. Due to mainly political factors beyond the remit of humanitarian agencies, thiscaused significant delays and poor access especially in the case of SHARP.UN-OCHA launched SHARP in 2012 appealing for US$ 348 million to US$ 2.9 billion atthe end of 2014. UN agencies and partners in Syria responded relatively slowly as theyfailed to negotiate immediate access with a reluctant Syrian regime. SHARP fundingrequests since December 2012 more than doubled while the growth in total needs(measured in number of persons in need) in that same period more than tripledindicating that UN agencies and partners struggled to respond proportionately to therapidly worsening scope of the crisis. In terms of reported numbers of people reached,the response under SHARP was most successful in food, health and WASH. In contrast, inmost other clusters and sectors assistance fell significantly short of existing needs.Opposition controlled territories within Syria have been relatively under-serviced
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compared to regime-held areas despite UN Security Council authorization of cross-border assistance without gaining prior permission from the Syrian government. Thedelivery of sufficient humanitarian assistance within Syria encountered organizational,funding, security and administrative obstacles for organizations operating fromDamascus and those involved in cross-border aid alike. These obstacles have had adetrimental effect on the timeliness and effectiveness of aid delivery, but they alsochallenged agencies’ ability to deliver according to humanitarian principles.While opposition-held areas remained relatively under-serviced by agencies operatingunder SHARP, cross-border assistance provided by a growing number of INGOs,especially from southern Turkey, gained significance. Recognizing this, the Dutchgovernment in December 2013 issued a tender for cross-border humanitarianassistance to hard-to-reach areas in Syria and for unregistered Syrian refugees inLebanon and Jordan. Four Dutch NGOs were awarded, two of them in a consortium withexperienced international NGOs. At the time of writing their results were not yetreported, but a preliminary assessment of their performance against key tenderrequirements suggests that Netherlands funding for cross-border assistance into Syria ismaking an important contribution despite facing significant security and administrativechallenges. Overall, however, cross-border assistance generally has not been sufficientto meet the large and growing needs in areas under opposition control as serious needsgaps remain.Humanitarian challenges have also mounted in Syria’s neighbouring countries receivinga large influx of Syrian refugees, especially in Lebanon and Jordan. Overall, the UNHCR-led response under the RRP has been effective and is generally considered to besuccessful. The Netherlands government contributions to the RRP helped UNHCR and itspartners to meet needs of the most vulnerable Syrian refugees and to effectivelycoordinate the response. Despite some shortcomings, RRP targets when measured interms of outputs, coverage and quality were largely achieved, particularly whenanalysing the protection, shelter and basic sectors. The overall strong endorsements byits operating and implementing partners indicate that UNHCR successfully createdconditions in terms of funding, coordination and advocating authorities, and it enabledits partners to deliver humanitarian services and ensure the protection of the refugeesboth in Lebanon and in Jordan. However, there are indications of a widening gapbetween outputs and outcomes, suggesting that factors outside the control of UNHCR(including host government policies and funding levels) are starting to take their tollamong the Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan.The delivery of relatively high standards of services seems no longer feasible givendwindling donor resources. The dire situation in which most refugees find themselves isexacerbated by continuously contracting protection space due to Lebanese andJordanian Government policies driven by security concerns and the socio-economicimpact on host communities. In response, the system is now adopting a resilience andstabilization approach. Yet especially in the case of Lebanon limited capabilities in termsof governance and institutional capacity raise important question marks over theviability of this strategy shift, however prompted by donor realities. Concerns are thatessential humanitarian assistance in a context of continuing or even rising needs will benegatively affected. Against this background, a number of existing challenges in thedelivery of assistance (largely due to underfunding) risk being magnified whileprotection space is increasingly narrowing, especially in Jordan. These challengesincluded continued problems in providing adequate shelter especially during harshwinter conditions and sub-optimal coverage of assistance especially to those livingoutside camps.
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The experience with humanitarian assistance in Syria and neighbouring countries, andthe Netherlands’ significant contribution to it, points up to a number of observationsthat are immediately relevant for future policy-making by donors and humanitarianagencies generally. Firstly, and given the relatively delayed humanitarian response atthe onset of the Syrian crisis, donors need to consider complementary ways, such as byNGO financing, to allow for access to those in need while the UN develops coordinationplatforms especially at the onset of major humanitarian emergencies. Secondly, arelative dearth of reliable data on the impact of humanitarian assistance imply thatUNHCR and other UN agencies should be requested and better enabled to providecomprehensive and reliable data on project outcomes and aid impact. Fourthly, andgiven the protracted nature of the Syrian crisis, humanitarian agencies will need tocontinue to focus on providing humanitarian assistance to people in need in Syria,Lebanon and Jordan, and be enabled to do so by donors. Resilience and otherdevelopment agendas should be financed from non-humanitarian facilities such as theWorld Bank and UNDP programmes.More specifically for the Netherlands’ humanitarian policy, our preliminary assessmentof the experience with NGOs’ cross-border assistance into Syria warrants furtheremphasis on supporting such activities especially as long as UN-agencies’ servicing ofopposition-held areas continues to falls short in meeting urgent and expanding needs.Such stepped up efforts would have to be accompanied by support for the improvementof coordination mechanisms for Damascus based UN-agencies, UN-OCHA in southernTurkey and cross-border NGOs. Concerning the refugee-hosting countries and given thegradual contraction of protection space, the Netherlands should continue, and wherepossible strengthen, diplomacy in collaboration with other (European) donors toprovide political leverage to UNHCR when it critically engages with officials in Lebanonand Jordan.Finally, and given the importance of impact evaluations for accountability, lessonslearned and continued public support for its humanitarian policies, the Netherlandsshould consider making funding conditional to impact evaluations of any sizeable grant.
IOB Country Study Syria Crisis 1
1 Introduction
1.1 Syria in CrisisSince mid-2011 Syria and neighbouring countries witnessed a humanitarian crisis ofunprecedented proportions and intensity. At the end of March 2011 protestors acrossSyria challenged nearly 50 years of authoritarian rule by the Ba’ath party and regimeelites centred around President Bashar al-Assad and his relatives. Popular discontentwas at least partly fuelled by the regime’s selective economic reforms since the early2000s that alienated key regime constituencies especially in the countryside. SinceBashar al-Assad’s succession of his father Hafez, who died in 2000, a small elite reapedthe fruits of selective economic reforms due to privileged access to resources as theregime tried to reconstitute its support base by way of a dependent and politically docilebusiness community. Corruption and general government neglect also hampered aneffective response to severe drought affecting the agricultural sector since 2006, andcausing rising poverty and displacement in much of Syria’s countryside.The Syrian regime responded with heavy force, ultimately undermining protestors’resolve to use only peaceful means as some took up arms to protect their communitieswith the help of defecting soldiers, becoming loosely organized under the umbrella ofthe Free Syrian Army (FSA) by the autumn of 2011. The militarization of the Syrianuprising coincided with a decidedly sectarian turn of an increasingly violent conflict. Theregime rallied its supporters primarily within the Alawite minority by highlighting anexistential threat by the largely Sunni Arab protestors to whom it attributed crudesectarian motives. Protestors and newly formed armed groups increasingly framed theircause in sectarian terms especially as extremist Islamist ideology began to inform andjustify an armed struggle to bring down the regime and annihilate its supporters.Meanwhile, and largely for tactical reasons, the regime made concessions to thecountry’s Kurdish community, first by granting citizenship to stateless Kurds, and thenby allowing the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)-aligned Democratic Union Party (PYD)to effectively control parts of Kurdish-majority areas in the northeast of the country.When the uprising went into its second year, many Islamist Jihadist insurgents and avariety of armed ‘popular committees’ supporting the regime emerged. The regimeescalated its indiscriminate use of heavy weaponry, and insurgency groups embarkedon an increasingly aggressive campaign to ‘liberate’ Syrian territories from regimecontrol. Civilians became the prime target as regime forces pounded entire towns,neighbourhoods and villages suspected of sympathizing with or supporting insurgencygroups. More limited weaponry available to rebel groups did not prevent them fromresponding in kind as they targeted Alawite, Christian and Shi’ite communities whocame to depend on the regime for their survival.All sides in the conflict received foreign support as the Syrian crisis came to be firmlyplaced at the intersection of the region’s sectarian fold lines. By early 2013 Lebanese,Iranian and Iraqi Shi’ite armed groups and fighters reinforced the regime’s militarycapabilities while Muslim volunteers from all over the world joined various Islamistarmed groups, most notably Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda offshoot established in January2012, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a group of Iraqi-led Jihadistsoriginating from the insurgency against the US occupation of Iraq. The two groups fellout over competing leadership claims, prompting Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, to lead ISIS’aggressive campaign in both Iraq and Syria. Due to its superior capabilities and
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resources, in combination with its extremist appeal, ISIS attracted most of the foreignfighters away from Jabhat al-Nusra and other Jihadist groups.By early 2014, the Syrian conflict had mutated into a complex, multi-layered warbetween regime forces and insurgents, FSA groups against extremist Islamist groups,and ISIS versus more moderate Syrian Islamist groups and Jabhat al-Nusra. Civilianswere caught in the middle of these conflicts as they endured the repression andbrutality of the groups controlling the areas in which they lived while being targeted,besieged and starved from the outside for ‘hosting’ them.
Figure 1.1: Syria’s Fragmentation and Violence, December 2014
Source: U.S. Department of State, Humanitarian Information Unit, January 2015Under these conditions, millions of Syrians moved to other areas in the country or fledto neighbouring countries and beyond, placing a growing burden on host communitiesand becoming entangled in, and accentuating, their hosts’ own internal differences andconflicts.International perceptions shifted in the course of the Syrian conflict from viewing theSyrian uprising as an opportunity for a more inclusive or democratic regime to a moredefensive strategy when realizing that this scenario was unlikely to materialize soon,and fearing regional and international implications of an aggressive ISIS in both Syriaand Iraq. International responses included EU anti-regime sanctions and US calls on theSyrian President Bashar al-Assad to step down, UN-brokered cease fires, a jointUN/Arab League monitoring mission to Syria in early 2012, international support to aSyrian opposition platform, the Syrian National Council (SNC) based in Istanbul, aninternational effort led by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons(OPCW) to dismantle Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal and capabilities following theuse of chemical weapons against civilians in August 2013, and a UN-organised peaceconference in Montreux and Geneva in January and February 2014. Yet from the start of
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the conflict, sharp international differences, exemplified by Russia’s and China’srepeatedly vetoing UN Security Council resolutions, caused most of these initiatives tofail in ending the conflict.Concerns heightened in June 2014 when ISIS captured key Iraqi cities of Mosul andTikrit adjacent to the border with Syria, linking the group’s control of territories on eachside, coinciding with the threat of radicalized volunteers returning to their homecountries. A broad US-led coalition emerged in September 2014 to counter ISISadvances and attack its military and terrorist capabilities, with air strikes in Iraq andSyria. Although by early 2015 this helped to drive out ISIS fighters from the Kurdish-dominated area in and around Kobane (‘Ayn al-Arab) in northern Syria, expectations arethat it will be much more difficult to dislodge the group from other areas in Syria due tothe lack of potent Syrian allies providing ground support.Syria entered a cycle of violence due to the conflict’s multiple drivers, the regime’sresilience, the opposition’s fragmentation, the crisis’ links with armed conflict in Iraq,and regional stakes combined with ongoing international differences over how toresolve it. Likewise, the challenges to meet the vast humanitarian needs evolving fromthe crisis look increasingly difficult to resolve in the foreseeable future.
1.2 Goals, Scope and Structure of the StudyThis study examines the Netherlands contribution to the humanitarian response to theSyrian crisis and its impact on neighbouring countries. As the bulk of Netherlandshumanitarian funding is channelled through UN-led humanitarian programmes initiatedfor Syria, the Syria Humanitarian Assistance response Plan (SHARP), and forneighbouring countries, the Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP), both programmes arethe main scope of this evaluation study. The current study presents an assessment of theNetherlands’ humanitarian assistance (HA) policy development, its implementation, andwhether the envisaged results were achieved. It identifies lessons learned fromexperiences pertaining to the implementation of humanitarian assistance in the contextof the Syrian crisis.The central evaluation question is:1
To what extent and how has the central objective of the Netherlands’
humanitarian assistance policy, i.e. to provide humanitarian assistance in an
effective way, been realised?The report first describes and assesses the full range of Netherlands foreign policypositions and activities in relation to the Syrian crisis, including diplomatic efforts andSyria-related funding. More specifically, Chapter 2 assesses the timeliness andresponsiveness of Netherlands humanitarian policies relevant to the Syrian crisis.Chapter 3 describes and explores the evolution and features of the crisis since the startof the uprising in 2011. It identifies growing humanitarian needs, key humanitarianactors, their coordination mechanisms, and assesses the results humanitarian assistanceachieved in terms of meeting needs. Special attention is given to cross-border and cross-line humanitarian assistance, including the efforts of Netherlands-funded NGOs. Thechapter concludes by listing key obstacles and challenges faced by humanitarian actorsin Syria.
1 Terms of reference for the consultancy for the country study Syria (see appendix 1).
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Chapters 4 and 5 provide an overview of the humanitarian response (assistance andprotection) provided to Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan respectively. As theNetherlands humanitarian policy favours UN-coordinated mechanisms, this part of thestudy focuses on the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its partners. Thetwo chapters seek to contribute to a better understanding of the effectiveness andsustainability of the Netherlands government’s support. Chapter 6 concludes ouranalysis, discusses future prospects, and considers implications for further Netherlandshumanitarian policy development.
1.3 Approach and LimitationsWe used three methodologies for collecting data and qualitative information including:
 briefings and interviews with relevant staff members of the Ministry of ForeignAffairs and DSH in The Hague;
 a literature review, and;
 field visits to southern Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.Our analysis is a triangulation of findings from these methodologies and sources. Whenwe obtained information during our briefings in The Hague we sought to confirm ourfindings with counterparts at regional headquarters in southern Turkey, Lebanon andJordan, and again at field-office level within these countries. Accordingly, and wherepossible, we triangulated data obtained from Netherlands government officials, UNHCRstaff and partners, UN-Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) staff,civil society representatives, local government officials and refugees during home visitsor in focus groups.The large scope of the study caused us to rely on available literature, mostly operationalreports and updates, in addition to third-party evaluations and other analyses. Likewise,the analysis of the humanitarian situation and response in Syria is heavily reliant on ourreview of the literature, as we had no access to Syria for interviews.In the refugee hosting countries we focused on the coordination platforms: UNHCR inJordan and Lebanon, and NGO cross-border coordination platforms and that of OCHA inTurkey. In Lebanon and Jordan we concentrated on partner perspectives on eachelement of the UNHCR project cycle. We chiefly engaged at the operational level,meaning that we spent most of our time in the field speaking to both UNHCR operativesand partners.Although we believe that the current study provides accurate data and useful insightsinto the Netherlands humanitarian response to the Syria crisis, a number of limitationsaffected our preparations. Most importantly, we were unable to visit Syria, as theNetherlands government does not currently maintain diplomatic relations with thegovernment in Damascus, which made it impossible to conduct an official mission. Wewere also unable to visit areas under the control of various opposition forces, primarilybecause of deteriorating security conditions in these areas. Although the Syrian crisisaffected all neighbouring countries, the current report does not cover developments inTurkey and Iraq.UNHCR, UN-OCHA and Syria ALNAP web-portals2 were the starting point of ourliterature and data review. Although ample information is available, and is mostly well
2 http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php, http://www.unocha.org/syria andhttp://www.syrialearning.org
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organised, we did not come across sufficiently detailed data and analysis on outcomesand impact. This evidently hampered our efforts at more robust analysis.At the time this report was being prepared, the four Netherlands-funded NGOs involvedin assistance to unregistered refugees and cross-border assistance had not yet reportedthe results of their programmes, so this reports only contains a preliminary assessmentof the degree to which they met key requirements set by the Netherlands governmenttender of January 2014.Both SHARP and the RRP periodically reported estimates of the number of especiallyvulnerable persons reached with humanitarian assistance. Such data were important toassess the results of the humanitarian effort. Yet these data were not available for theentire period of the scope of the study. Data on ‘people reached’ mostly did not specifyby what regularity assistance was provided or whether the needs of those reached weresufficiently met. It also remained unclear whether and how double-counting by multipleagencies involved in the same aid deliveries was avoided. Data are collected in differentformats making aggregation very difficult or even impossible. For all these reasons,references in the current report to humanitarian agencies’ data need to be interpretedwith a degree of caution.
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2. The Netherlands Response to the Syria CrisisThis chapter provides an overview of the Netherlands response to the Syrian crisis.These include foreign, humanitarian policy, asylum and resettlement policies. Itspecifically assesses the extent to which Netherlands foreign policies related tohumanitarian policies, whether humanitarian assistance was proportionate, timely andresponsive to growing needs.
2.1. Foreign Policy ResponseNetherlands foreign policy via-a-vis the Syrian crisis pursued a set of prioritiescategorized along four main tracks: a) support for an inclusive political transition(political track); b) encouraging early recovery and reconstruction (development track);c) supporting security and regional stability by containing spill-over effects (securitytrack), and; d) countering impunity (accountability track).3The political track translated into strong support for sanctions on the regime imposedby the EU from the start of the conflict. The Netherlands government took an active rolein the gradual increasing of EU sanctions, starting on 10 May 2011. It pressed forsanctions against a growing number of Syrian regime incumbents and –supporters.Netherlands suggestions also prompted the Council to make provisions for those whosevered their ties with the regime, in order to encourage defections.4 In June 2012,Netherlands authorities collaborated with the British government in returning a Russianarms shipment, destined for Syria, when the vessel passed the Netherlands coast.5On 18 August the Netherlands declared that it considered President Bashar al-Assad nolonger fit to rule and called for him to step down, in alignment with other EU memberstates. Netherlands Foreign Minister Uri Rosenthal also called on the UN SecurityCouncil to instruct the International Criminal Court to initiate Syrian regime war crimesinvestigations in preparation for possible referrals and prosecutions.6 Diplomatic effortsby others included an Arab League monitoring mission in late December 2011, and theestablishment of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) followingUN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2043 (21 April 2012). These initiatives failedto curb the escalating violence in Syria and with evidence amassing of regime atrocities,in March 2012 the Netherlands government closed its embassy in Damascus due to “theworsening security situation and in order to send a political message to Syria”.7 Threemonths later, the Netherlands and Belgian governments jointly declared the Syrianambassador to both countries, as persona non grata.8 The Syrian government retaliatedshortly after by expelling the highest-ranking Netherlands diplomat in Syria, charge
d’affaires Janet Alberda, who operated from the EU Delegation headquarters inDamascus following the closure of the Netherlands embassy.The Netherlands joined the The Friends of Syria (FoS) group --an internationaldiplomatic initiative aiming to negotiate diplomatic solutions outside the UN SecurityCouncil-- during its first meeting on 24 February 2012 in Tunis. The group includedmainly Western and Arab Gulf countries and functioned as platform to call on moderate
3 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (13 January 2014).4 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (19 April 2012).5 Boon (19 June 2012).6 ANP (18 August 2011).7 Rijksoverheid (14 March 2012).8 As the Syrian ambassador continued to represent his country with the EU institutions, and no EU decisionfollowed to expel him, he remained in Brussels.
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Syrian opposition groups to “improve their collaboration, inclusiveness andrepresentativeness”, and support the Syrian opposition in pursuing these ends.9 TheNetherlands also participated in the FoS economic recovery and sanctions committeesestablished in April 2012.10 On 20 September 2012, the Netherlands, with Tunisia andCanada, co-hosted a meeting of the FoS sanctions committee in The Hague, discussingways to effectively enforce sanctions against the Syrian regime and counter any evasionattempts.11 The EU formally recognized the Syrian National Council, established inOctober 2011, as “a legitimate representative of Syrians seeking democratic change.”12The Netherlands recognised the SNC by sending Janet Alberda to Istanbul, the seat ofmany Syrian opposition groups and activists. Netherlands representation in Istanbulwas upgraded from “special advisor” to “special envoy for Syria”, at ambassador level,with the appointment of Marcel Kurpershoek, in August 2013.13In November 2012, the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) was established to bring underone umbrella the various Syrian opposition groups and activists, including the SyrianNational Council. Following France’s recognition of the SNC, the Netherlands, Belgiumand Luxembourg recognized it as “the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.”14At a gathering of the FoS in Marrakech on 12 December 2012, around 130 countriesfollowed suit. Meanwhile, the Netherlands government reiterated its insistence on apeaceful, political solution for the Syrian conflict by supporting Kofi Annan, the joint UN/ Arab League envoy for Syria, and his six-point peace plan launched in March 2012. Itseconded a Netherlands military officer to the Geneva-based team of analysts advisingAnnan’s United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), established on 21 April2012. The Netherlands government also offered personnel to liaise between UNSMISoffices in Geneva and Damascus15 and co-financed the UN Department of PoliticalAffairs, which provides advisory and administrative support to the UN special envoy forSyria, and coordinates post-conflict planning with other UN agencies.Netherlands and other FoS members’ position was that the SNC represent the Syrianopposition in a negotiated political transition in Syria that would end the violence. Whenthe Annan Plan collapsed, the Action Group for Syria, including the EU, designed thenegotiation parameters in the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012.16 In anticipation oftalks, and on request of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Clingendael -Netherlands Institute for International Relations provided negotiation and diplomacytraining to SNC delegates preparing them for talks in Montreux and Geneva hosted bythe UN following an agreement between the U.S. and Russia, and attended byrepresentatives of the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad, between 22 until 31January 2014.17 In tandem with these initiatives, the Netherlands Special Envoy for Syria(SAS) oversees the ‘SAS Fund’, designed to finance “flexible” and “quick impact” projectsin Syria and neighbouring countries. The Istanbul team assessed many civil societyinitiatives not exceeding €25,000 and outside the realm of humanitarian assistance. TheDirectorate for Stability and Humanitarian Assistance (DSH) approved a number ofprojects with a total of €500,000. In the first year these included support to a magazine,
9 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (28 February 2012).10 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Raad Algemene Zaken en Raad Buitenlandse Zaken (16 April 2012).11 “Statement by the Friends of the Syrian People International Working Group on Sanctions,” (20 September2012).12 Council of the European Union (27 February 2012).13 In January 2015 Kurpershoek was succeeded by Nikolaos van Dam.14 “Benelux-Message at Group of Friends-Meeting Marrakech,” (12 December 2012)..15 UNSMIS eventually did not need the extra Netherlands assistance. Tweede Kamer de Staten-Generaal, RaadAlgemene Zaken en Raad Buitenlandse Zaken (18 juni 2012).16 “Action Group for Syria: Final communique,” (30 June 2012).17 Clingendael (17 September 2014).
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a centre for civilian participation and debate, and hospital supplies. The Special Envoyfor Syria requested the fund to continue for a second year with the same amount.The Netherlands position on the dual imperative of a political transition and respect forhuman rights in Syria was echoed in its voting behaviour in key international forumsincluding the UN General Assembly (see Table 2.2) denouncing the Syrian regime and itsforces’ human rights violations and brutality.
Table 2.2: Netherlands voting in the UN General Assembly on Syriares. 66/176,19/12/2011 “Expressing concern about the continuing lack of commitment by the Syrianauthorities to fully and immediately implement the Plan of Action” by the ArabLeague. The Netherlands votes with 132other member states in favour,out of a total of 193 memberstates.res. 66/253A,16/02/2012 “Strongly condemns the continued widespread and systematic violations of humanrights and basic freedoms by the Syrian authorities”; “stresses again the importanceof ensuring accountability and the need to end impunity.” The Netherlands votes with 136other member states in favour.res. 66/253B,03/08/2012 “Expressing grave concern” at the escalation of violence, “in particular thewidespread and systematic gross violations of human rights and the continued useof heavy weapons by the Syrian authorities against the Syrian population”;“expressing grave concern at the threat by the Syrian authorities to use chemical orbiological weapons.’
The Netherlands votes with 132other member states in favour.
res. 67/183,20/12/2012 “Strongly condemning” military attacks by Syrian armed forces into neighbouringcountries; expressing “grave concern” at the escalation of violence in Syria. The Netherlands votes with 134other member states in favour.res. 67/262,15/05/2013 Expressing “outrage at the rapidly increasing death toll” and denouncing Syrianauthorities for failing to prosecute “crimes against humanity”; “concern” at thevulnerable positions of children and women in the conflict. The Netherlands votes with 106other member states in favour.res. 68/182,18/12/2013 Expressing “outrage at the continuing escalation of violence” in Syria and humanrights violations; expressing “alarm at the failure of the [Syrian authorities] toprotect its population”; expressing “grave concern at the spread of extremism andextremist groups”; “strongly condemning” the use of chemical weapons.
The Netherlands votes with 126other member states in favour.
The Netherlands government took the position that crimes against humanity committedin Syrian need to be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC), based in TheHague. It repeatedly expressed dismay over disagreements within the UN SecurityCouncil preventing Syria’s referral, including in Foreign Minister Timmermans’ speechat the UN General Assembly meeting after the regime’s alleged use of chemical weaponson 21 August 2013.18 To prepare for future referral, the Netherlands governmentprovides financial support to the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC), based inThe Hague and staffed by Syrian and international human rights experts.19 TheNetherlands also supported initiatives highlighting Syrian women’s rights.20In response to the use of chemical weapons in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascuson 21 August 2013, Netherlands Foreign Minister Timmermans stated that “if it will beconfirmed that chemical weapons have been used, then there should beconsequences”.21 Unlike the U.S. government that threatened to carry out immediate airstrikes against regime targets in Syria, the Netherlands government declared that UNweapons inspectors needed to be given time to investigate the attack while anyprospective action should be authorised multilaterally.22 Three weeks later,Timmermans welcomed the US- and Russian-led initiative to dismantle chemicalweapons in Syria while expressing hope that the agreement “will lay the basis for peace
18 NOS (16 September 2013).19 The SJAC works to “ensure that human rights violations in Syria are comprehensively documented andpreserved for transitional justice and peace-building.” http://syriaaccountability.org/about/20 See “Side event Inclusive Transition: The role of women in political transition in the MENA-region,” (n.d.) andUN Women (13 January 2014).21 Van den Dool (28 August 2013).22 Ibid.
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negotiations involving all parties to the conflict.”23 The Netherlands hosts theheadquarters of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),which on 27 September 2013 was mandated to oversee and monitor the Framework forElimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons. In addition, it provides personnel andlogistical support to OPCW Special Coordinator Sigrid Kaag and her team working onSyria.24The Netherlands government opposes military support to opposition groups, insteadinsisting on diplomatic and political means, and arguing that “sending arms to the regionwill not bring a solution to the conflict any closer.”25 At the same time “it understandsthat, in case of reduced legitimacy of the incumbent regime and increased legitimacy ofthe armed opposition, the principle of non-intervention will come under pressure.”26Disagreements over sending arms to the Syrian opposition threatened to undermineconsensus in the European Council as United Kingdom and France favoured providingmilitary support to the SNC and the FSA. On 28 February 2013, the Council agreed thatan exception was to be made to the EU ban by allowing the supply of non-lethal militaryequipment to Syria provided that the SNC would be its sole recipient and that this wouldbe only used to protect civilians.27 The Netherlands government helped broker a furthercompromise that formally ended the EU arms embargo but deferred the actual dispatchof weaponry.28 On 27 May 2013 the European Council declared that it allowed individualmember states to send arms to the SNC, provided that adequate safeguards againstmisuse were put in place while noting that “member states will not export militarytechnology and equipment” until a review due before 1 August 2013.29Netherlands refusal for military support to Syrian opposition groups continued whileextremist jihadist groups strengthened their positions on the battlefield. When Kurdishforces and ISIS engaged in Kobane (‘Ayn al-‘Arab), northern Syria, at the end of 2014, theNetherlands government reiterated its policy. It explained that while military supportfor Kurdish Peshmerga forces in northern Iraq was made possible by an agreement withthe Iraqi government, such provisions were not possible in Syria.30 However, inDecember 2014, the Netherlands Foreign Minister stated that the Netherlands considersnon-military support to groups within the FSA.31In January 2013, on the request of the Turkish government, the Netherlands Ministry ofDefence contributed to the Netherlands Syrian crisis policies by sending Patriot anti-missile units and 270 accompanying military personnel to Adana, Turkey, to confrontthe threat of Syrian ballistic surface-to-surface missiles, used by Syrian forces a monthearlier. On 15 November 2013, the Netherlands government decided to extend thedeployment until January 2015 after which it recalled them as the threat was reduced.Since the end of September 2014, Netherlands fighter jets have participated in US-led airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq. The Netherlands government decided against joining airstrikes in Syria, with Netherlands Foreign Minister Timmermans citing internationallegal support and lacking international consensus.32
23 Cited in Posthumus (14 September 2013).24 In December Sigrid Kaag left her position at the OPCW when she was appointed UN Special Representative toLebanon.25 Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, Brief aan de Tweede Kamer (4 June 2013).26 Ibid.27 European Union (1 March 2013).28 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Raad Algemene Zaken en Raad Buitenlandse Zaken (4 June 2013).29 Council of the European Union (27 May 2013). The review did not occur.30 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (20 November 2014).31 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (15 December 2014).32 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (20 November 2014).
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The Netherlands continues to provide two staff officers to the United NationsDisengagement Force (UNDOF), and 12 observers to the United Nations TruceSupervision Organization (UNTSO).33 UNDOF was involved in belligerent incidents inMarch 2013, and when a number of UNDOF peacekeepers were briefly abducted bymilitants in August 2014.Guided by its development assistance policies the Netherlands contributed €2 million tothe Syria Recovery Trust Fund, a multi-donor initiative by the FoS to finance earlyrecovery projects and essential services within Syria in sectors such as water, health,electricity, education, food security, solid waste removal, justice agriculture,transportation, telecommunication, public enterprise, and housing.34 Also within theframework of the FoS, the Netherlands contributed €6 million to the Access to Justiceand Community Security Project (AJACS).35 Lebanon’s Syrian Crisis Trust Fund,established by the World Bank in collaboration with the Lebanese government insupport of host communities, received €2.5 million Netherlands funding.36
2.2. Humanitarian ResponseThe Netherlands government aims to meet its ‘fair share’ of humanitarian assistance inSyria and neighbouring countries. The Netherlands participated in two internationalpledging conferences in Kuwait City (30 January 2013 and 15 January 2014), and in theBerlin conference on Syrian refugees on 28 October 2014. Netherlands Minister forForeign Trade and Development Cooperation Lilianne Ploumen visited Syrian refugeesin Lebanon in April 2013, and again in Lebanon and Jordan in September 2013, andrefugee camps in southern Turkey in June 2014.The Netherlands government consistently declared that humanitarian principles lead itsaid effort, and that the Syrian situation in this respect will be no exception, separating itfrom other policy objectives and an “integrated approach” toward the Syrian crisisotherwise:
Humanitarian assistance is not part of this integrated approach because
humanitarian aid has other leading principles (neutrality, independence and
impartiality). Furthermore, humanitarian assistance is not primarily aimed at
stability in a country, but at alleviating human suffering. Yet many conflict
situations are also humanitarian emergencies, and humanitarian assistance [inthese contexts] can contribute to stabilization of a conflict.37From 2012 until the end of 2014, the Netherlands government contributed in total
€104.05 million in assistance to help address the growing humanitarian needs in Syriaand neighbouring countries.38 Table 2.3 present an overview of these contributions.
Table 2.3: Netherlands Humanitarian Allocations and the Syrian Crisis
Organisation Contribution EUR (million) Total
2012 2013 2014
33 UNDOF oversees the 1974 cease-fire between Israel and Syria. UNTSO is attached to UNDOF and observes andreports on the situation in the Golan Heights.34 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (7 November 2014); “Syria Recovery Trust Fund,” (n.d.).35 The AJACS program seeks to support the development of security and justice systems in opposition controlledSyria.36 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (14 October 2014).37 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (13 januari 2014).38 Minsterie van Buitenlandse Zaken (7 November 2014).
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WFP 2 2 4 8
UNHCR 17 24 14 55
UNICEF 0.5 3 3.5
UNRWA 2.5 2.5
Netherlands Red Cross (to SARC) 3.3 3.75 7.05
IFRC 2 2
SVW 1 1 2
Save the Children 1 1
Amendment-Voordewind 23 23
23.8 37.25 43 104.05Source: Directorate for Stability and Humanitarian Assistance (DSH)In addition, the Netherlands contributes annual core funding to the UN CentralEmergency Response Fund (CERF), the World Food Programme (WFP), the UNHCR, theUN Relief and World Agency (UNRWA), and the International Committee of the RedCross (ICRC).39 These funds help finance humanitarian action worldwide including inSyria and in neighbouring countries.In September 2014 Minister Ploumen announced the establishment of a special ReliefFund for the period 2014-17, allocating €570 million on top of Netherlands regularexpenditures on humanitarian assistance and emergency aid worldwide.40 Assistancefrom the Emergency Fund is reserved for humanitarian organisations and -facilitiesincluding the CERF, UN agencies, the ICRC and NGOs meeting European Commissionquality standards and signatories of the EU’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protectiondepartment (ECHO) Framework Partnership Agreement.41 The Netherlands Relief Fundwas created in response to the growing needs resulting from the world’s five largesthumanitarian emergencies including in Syria. Minister Ploumen indicated that for theremainder of 2014 additional €30 million will be directed to the WFP, UNHCR andUNICEF (€23 million) for their Syria crisis programmes and to various NGOs (€7million, see below) conducting cross-border assistance and providing aid to non-registered refugees.42Agency specific allocations make up around 75 percent of Netherlands contributions forthe Syria crisis between 2012 and the end of 2014 as these were earmarked to variousagencies working within the UN system and to the International Federation of Red Crossand Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).43 CERF allocations allow UN-OCHA to decide whichfunding is directed to UN agencies for Syria-related activities while competing for suchallocations with humanitarian crises worldwide.44 As in other major humanitarianemergencies, the Netherlands government has argued that this multilateral approachhas a number of advantages.
In an international context the government aims at maximum aid effectiveness by
way of better coordination. This implies, among other things, giving non-
earmarked contributions where ever possible, so that the coordinating
39 CERF: €55 million in 2014, WFP: €36 million in 2014, UNHCR:€33 million in 2014, UNRWA: €13 million in2014, and ICRC: €25 million in 2014.40 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (19 september 2014).41 These NGOs currently are: Doctors Without Borders, Cordaid, ICCO, NRC, Oxfam Novib, Save the Children,Terre des Hommes, War Child, World Vision, and ZOA.42 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken (30 September 2014).43 Netherlands contributions are allocated to these agencies’ programmes directly, and are not in response totheir appeals including SHARP and RRP.44 For 2014 the Netherlands is ranked the fourth largest donor to the CERF worldwide. UNOCHA (20 November2014).
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organisation will determine on the ground where needs are highest, and in order
to prevent duplication and lacunas in assistance.45By implication, the Netherlands places large confidence in the UN system to deliver interms of adequate needs assessments, coordination and aid effectiveness: UN-OCHA inSyria and UNHCR in the neighbouring countries. In addition, the Netherlandsgovernment allocated significant funding to the international Red Cross and RedCrescent Movement, through the Netherlands Red Cross, the IFRC and the ICRC, whoimplement these allocations directly or via the Syrian Arab Red Crescent Society (SARC).The Netherlands government became increasingly concerned that multilateralassistance failed to reach all areas in Syria. In early 2013, the Netherlands governmentintended to financially support the Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU), of the SNC.46However, the ACU and the SNC more generally proved incapable to upholdaccountability standards, causing the support to be withdrawn. While access by UNagencies to rebel-held areas within Syria remained limited, on 13 November 2013 theNetherlands Parliament adopted an amendment (Amendment Voordewind) calling forthe release of funds for cross-border assistance by NGOs.47 Whereas the amendmentwas mainly motivated by concerns over persecuted Christian communities in Syria,48the Netherlands government announced a €7 million tender for Netherlands registeredNGOs to submit their proposals for cross-border assistance (€4 million) irrespective ofintended beneficiaries ethnic or sectarian affiliation, and to non-registered Syrianrefugees (€3 million) who were assumed to not being able to access UN-led assistance.49Four Netherlands NGOs were awarded based on the merits of their proposals. Cross-border assistance within Syria proposals were awarded a total of €6 million comparedto €1 million for non-registered refugees. In September 2014, with the establishment ofthe new Emergency Fund, cross-border programme was extended with an additionalother €7 million. Activities of the Netherlands-funded NGOs are discussed in Chapter 3and 4.
2.3. Asylum and Resettlement ResponseThe Netherlands responded to Syrian refugee crisis on the premise that enablingneighbouring countries to better cope with the refugee crisis is preferable to receivingSyrian refugees outside the region, including in the Netherlands.50 Cost efficiencyconsiderations are cited to support this approach.51 Given the rapidly growing numberof Syrian refugees, and the strained capacities of neighbouring countries to host them,pressures mounted also on the Netherlands to allow more Syrian refugees to settle here.Syrians currently constitute the largest group of asylum-seekers in the European Unionwith a total of 174,650 applicants from April 2011 to November 2014.52
Figure 2.1: Syrian asylum applications in the EU
45 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (6 December 2012).46 Nieuwsbericht Rijksoverheid (6 maart 2013).47 Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (13 November 2013).48 Christen Unie (12 February 2014).49 Ministerie voor Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (5 December 2013).50 See e.g.: Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2 augustus 2012).51 Secretary of State for Security and Justice F. Teeven in: Tweede Kamer de Staten-Generaal (29 October 2013).52 Data are from Eurostat: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/home
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Source: Eurostat
Figure 2.2: Syrian asylum applications in the Netherlands
source: EurostatThese figures would be considerably higher if Syrian refugees did not face so manyobstacles throughout their journeys to Europe, which cause fewer numbers to enter,often illegally and at great risk to their lives.53 In the same period a total of 12,375Syrians applied for asylum in the Netherlands,54 in addition to a growing number ofstateless Palestinians coming from Syria.55 The Netherlands authorities have shownsome flexibility in terms of application documentation (including birth certificates)passports or identification cards. The Netherlands government also seeks ways toovercome such obstacles within the framework of the EU.56 A large majority of Syrianapplicants were granted individual asylum status as they were able to demonstrategrounds to fear persecution.57The Netherlands government has pledged to accept 500 Syrian refugees, to be identifiedby the UNHCR, for resettlement in the Netherlands within the quota set for 2013 and
53 Amnesty International (13 December 2013), pp. 5-9.54 Eurostat: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/home55 Between September 2013 and September 2014, 2,185 stateless individuals applied for asylum in theNetherlands. Most originated from Syria. Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst, Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie(September 2014).56 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (14 October 2014); Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (25 August 2014).57 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (14 October 2014). In 2013 83 percent of Syrian applications for asylumwere honoured, and mostly in a very short time. Bocker et.al. (2014), p. 45.
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2014. 58 To date, a total of 331 Syrians resettled in the Netherlands where, in contrastwith regular asylum seekers, they receive immediately private housing and are allowedto work. By the end of 2014, the UNHCR received worldwide a total of pledges toresettle 67,638 Syrian refugees, or 2 percent of total registered Syrian refugees.59
2.4. Analysis
2.4.1 Foreign PolicyThe Netherlands foreign policy response to the Syrian crisis is largely consistent andprincipled. The Netherlands emphasis on international law and human rights arecomplementary to humanitarian principles as the framework for addressing the needsof civilians affected by the violence. However, the decision to break relations with theSyrian government meant that it could no longer be engaged diplomatically, therebyarguably reducing opportunities to contribute to a political solution for the crisis.60 Oneyear into the Syrian crisis Netherlands Foreign Minister Uri Rosenthal appeared to beaware of this emerging problem, and suggested a negotiated exit from power inexchange for immunity from prosecution.61 Although pragmatic and solution focussed,this new policy would have been at odds with the position on Syria’s referral to the ICC.Netherlands support for EU sanctions is consistent with its principled stand on theregime’s human rights violations. However, the sanctions may have destabilized theregime’s repression and counter-insurgency campaign,62 but it ultimately failed to bedecisive as the regime received sufficient support from Russia and Iran to continue itspolicies. The sanctions strengthened an illicit economy that disproportionally benefitedleading elements among pro-regime groups.63 Sanctions also worsened the socio-economic conditions for ordinary citizens, due to inflation and depreciation of the Syriancurrency. Expectations that sanctions and asset freezes against individual regimesupporters would prompt significant defections did not materialize.The SNC welcomed Netherlands support but also expressed frustration over its refusalto provide military support to the Free Syrian Army. The debate about arming theopposition is still inconclusive, as the possibility that arms may fall into the hands ofextremist groups lingers. On the other hand, it is argued that depriving moderateopposition groups of arms undermined their efforts to create a unified command,diminished their role in the uprising, and caused them to lose ground to more extremegroups. The policy also excluded the Netherlands from the ‘core group’ of countrieswithin the Friends of Syria whose members do not rule out military assistance.
2.4.2 Humanitarian ResponseThe question of sufficient and proportionate humanitarian assistance from theNetherlands was subject of an appraisal of countries’ “fair share” in humanitarianassistance in Syria and its neighbouring countries, prepared by Oxfam. Its 2014 “FairShare Analysis”, found the Netherlands to fall short of meeting its “fair share” by 32percent, being outperformed by many other European and Arab Gulf countries.64
58 The Netherlands government declined to add the 250 Syrians for 2014 to the already accepted annualNetherlands quota of 500 resettled refugees worldwide. Tweede Kamer der Staten-generaal (24 November2014).59 UNHCR (11 December 2014).60 Interview with Nikolaos van Dam in Bakker (3 September 2013).61 ANP (16 juni 2012); Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (30 May 2012).62 Friberg Lyme (2012), p. 13.63 Ibid.64 Oxfam (9 September 2014).
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Responding in Netherlands Parliament to the report findings, Minister Ploumen notedthat Oxfam failed to include sizeable non-earmarked contributions to CERF and UNHCRwhich may have been drawn on to finance Syria-related humanitarian activities. 65 Theadditional €30 million allocated for the remainder of 2014 from the new Relief Fundwill cause the Netherlands to be within Oxfam’s “green zone” of countries that exceed 90percent of their “fair share”.66However, undifferentiated core funding to multilateral agencies also challenges visibilityand, to some extent, accountability. Syrian members of the SNC approached NetherlandsForeign Affairs officials wondering about the Netherlands’ stated support to andsolidarity with the Syrian people, and Lebanese and Jordanian government officialssimilarly questioned Netherlands diplomats whether the Netherlands is sincere aboutits commitments to assist their countries in dealing with the Syrian refugee crisis.67From a strictly humanitarian perspective, this lack of visibility may be of secondaryimportance or even desirable, as “placing stickers on aid” imperils the neutrality,impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian assistance.68Non-earmarked multilateral funding also complicates attribution of responsibility for(under-)performance. In the Syrian crisis this has prompted some specific dilemmas.For instance, in the context of the UN’s mixed record in terms of access inside Syria,including to rebel-held territories, SNC officials have called on the Netherlandsgovernment to stop prioritizing UN agencies in receiving financial contributions andlook for alternative ways to deliver aid.69We observe that financial resources for humanitarian purposes were made available in arelatively timely manner when measured against UN agencies’ appeals. As detailed intable 3.1 and in chapters 4 and 5, UN agencies presented their first SHARP and RRPappeals for Syria and neighbouring countries in December 2012; and in this light theNetherlands contributions totalling €23.8 million in 2012, excluding core contributionsto UN agencies and the CERF, point up to a timely response. Yet especially at the onset ofthe humanitarian crisis in Syria the volume of the early Netherlands response wasrather modest in comparison with the large amount of the first revised SHARP appealfor 2013.Given the Netherlands emphasis on UN coordinated assistance, the timeliness of theNetherlands humanitarian response strongly correlates with that of the UN. Especiallyin the case of SHARP, this was far from optimal (see 3.5.1). In order to mitigate againstthis, possible alternative avenues, such as NGOs, should receive larger emphasis. Aninternationally coordinated response takes time to organise, especially within Syriawhere numerous factors beyond the control of UN agencies worked against this.Furthermore, while UN-led coordination may well be viewed as a price worth paying forits assumed superior effectiveness, it underscores the importance of presentingevidence for this assumption.
65 Since the start of the Syrian crisis until the end of 2013, CERF allocated US$134 million to Syrian andneighbouring countries affected by the crisis, thereby making Syria the top recipient of CERF funding. CERF-OCHA (December 2013).66 On the other hand, and beyond the CERF allocations, there are no data to establish what portion of Netherlandscore contributions to UN agencies have been allocated to the Syrian crisis.67 To increase awareness of Netherlands humanitarian assistance, the Netherlands embassy in Lebanon releaseda brochure detailing the Netherlands response. Kingdom of the Netherlands (January 2015).68 Telephone interview with Netherlands Foreign Affairs Ministry official, 17 December 2014.69 Abrahim Miro (Economy and Finance Minister for the Syrian Interim Government) cited in: Deira (4 June2014).
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From 2012 onwards to date the Netherlands has made significant financial allocationsfor humanitarian assistance involving the Syrian crisis and recently increased itscontributions further. Yet while combined SHARP and RRP appeals between the end of2012 and 2015 (see Chapter 3.1 and 4.2.1) increased by more than seven-fold,Netherlands financial allocations in that same period less than doubled (see Table 2.3),indicating that the increase of Netherlands allocations (as of most donor countrycontributions) did not keep pace with humanitarian needs as assessed by the UNagencies and partners.70
2.4.3 Asylum and ResettlementLike most other EU member states the Netherlands is criticized for offering asylum andresettlement to only a very small number of Syrian refugees, compared to the scope ofthe crisis and the under-funded response, and in comparison with more welcomingasylum and resettlement policies of Germany and Sweden.71 The Netherlandsgovernment responds to these criticisms by pointing out that Syrian refugees are besthosted in the region, and that it supports the main refugee hosting countries in theregion Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey) with humanitarian assistance.72 These argumentsunderline the importance of supporting host countries’ sustained ability to meet theneeds of Syrian refugees, and of humanitarian agencies delivering aid.
70 SHARP and RRP appeals combined: $598 million (end 2012), $4.4 billion (end 2014). Dutch allocations: €23.8million (2012), €43 million (2014).71 In the last three years, Germany and Sweden together received 64 percent of all Syrian asylum applications inthe EU. Germany offered 82 percent of the EU’s total resettlement places for Syrians. Amnesty International (1December 2014), p. 9.72 For a discussion see Botje and Alberts (5 September 2013).
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3. Humanitarian Assistance in SyriaThis chapter describes the rapidly rising humanitarian needs within Syria, key sectors ofhumanitarian concern, the main humanitarian actors involved in the aid effort, theresources at their disposal, and formal coordination mechanisms. The second partassesses timeliness and responsiveness, the number and proportion of people-in-needreached, and the nature and width of remaining needs-response gaps. It analyses cross-line and cross-border assistance, including by Netherlands-funded NGOs and concludeswith an assessment of the adequacy of overall funding, humanitarian principles, access,and coordination challenges.
3.1. OverviewAs the Syrian crisis entered its fifth year, an estimated 212,000 people are killed,73 morethan 520,000 are wounded or maimed74 and 950,000 persons “forcibly disappeared”.75The conflict caused an estimated total loss to the Syrian economy amounting to morethan US$ 140 billion, or more than double its GDP in 2010.76 The country’s keyinfrastructure, industrial assets, the agricultural sector and much of its housing stockhave suffered extensive devastation.
Figure 3.1: Displacement in Syria
Source: IDMC (21 October 2014)UN-OCHA estimates that the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance grewfrom one million in June 2012 to 12.2 million. People in need include an estimated 7.6million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), half of whom have been displaced morethan once.77 More than 4.8 million people are especially in need as they reside in 287hard to reach areas. By November 2014, an estimated 212,000 people were trapped inbesieged cities, towns and villages, and were largely cut-off from the most essentialsupplies for months, and sometimes for nearly two years. 78
73 Price, Gohdes, and Ball (August 2014). Updated by estimates from Violations Documentation Centre in Syria(VDC), http://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/74 OCHA, REACH and SNAP (28 October 2014).75 Syrian Network for Human Rights (1 January 2015).76 ESCWA (September 2014).77 UNSC (21 November 2014); UNOCHA (18 December 2014); OCHA, REACH and SNAP (28 October 2014).78 UNSC (21 November 2014).
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Women, children and the elderly consistently stand out as being particularlyvulnerable.79 Children in Syria are exposed to numerous protection concerns, includingchild labour, forced recruitment into armed groups, and high levels of violence, tortureand trauma. UNICEF in March 2014 estimated that at least 10,000 Syrian children havebeen killed;80 an unprecedented level in the region. Syria’s 440,000 Palestinians,registered with UNRWA and residing in nine camps affected by the conflict81 (half ofthem are internally displaced) are also of special concern.In response to the needs, at the end of 2012, UN-OCHA-launched SHARP, which includesseveral UN entities and their humanitarian partners, appealing for US$ 348 million. Itsubsequently revised it up several times as the crisis worsened and the needs grew.82The SHARP appeal for 2015, announced in December 2014, called for US$ 2.9 billion.
3.2 Key Sectors of Humanitarian ConcernIn their Syria Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA), UN-OCHA, REACH and the SyriaNeeds Assessment Project (SNAP) identified the highest needs in the Water, Sanitationand Hygiene sector (WASH).83 Rebel-held areas have become particularly deprived ascutting off water supplies in besieged areas is used as a weapon of war.84 Problems werecompounded by the worst drought to date in 2014. By the end of 2014, nearly 10 millionpeople were food insecure.85 Health conditions deteriorated to the point that at the endof 2014 12.2 million people had no access to health care.86 Only 43 percent of 109 publichospitals and 51 percent of public health clinics were fully functioning by the end ofSeptember 2014.87 Shelter and Non-Food Items (NFI) became urgent needs due tointernal displacement starting from March 2013. In 2014 over 1.6 million people werein need of shelter assistance. For Education the MSNA survey found that in ten out of 14governorates nearly three million children (50 percent of Syria’s school children) nolonger go to school, making Syria the country with the second worst enrolment rate.Thousands of schools are destroyed, occupied by belligerents, or used as IDPs shelters.
Protection concerns increased across all sectors at an alarming rate, especially affectingchildren,88 women,89 and minority groups (Alawis, Christians, Armenians, Kurds andPalestinians).90
3.3. Key Humanitarian ActorsInternational humanitarian actors responded relatively late. The Syrian governmentrefused access, delayed agreement, and imposed inappropriate conditions on UNagencies and some INGOs. Against this background, agreement was obtained one yearinto the conflict on 29 May 2012, allowing eight UN agencies and nine INGOs to operate.
79 OCHA, REACH and SNAP (28 October 2014); UN Human Rights Council (13 August 2014); Women’s MediaCentre (n.d.).80 UNICEF (March 2014). VDC recorded up to 13,000 child casualties until 25 December 2014. http://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/81 OCHA, REACH and SNAP (28 October 2014).82 By the end of 2013, it requested US$ 1.41 billion. In December 2013, the UN announced SHARP for 2014 andappealed for US$ 2.3 billion. Financial Tracking Service (25 December 2014).83 OCHA, REACH and SNAP (28 October 2014).84 UN Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner (February 2014).85 UN-OCHA (December 2014).86 IFRC (December 2014).87 UNSC (21 November 2014).88 Price, Gohdes and Ball (August 2014).89 Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (2013).90 See: Open Doors (June 2013); UN (14 November 2014).
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By the end of 2013, 16 INGOs (the largest being Danish Refugee Council, PremièreUrgence – Aide Médicale Internationale, OXFAM UK, and International Medical Corps),9115 UN agencies92 (WFP, UNRWA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO) and the InternationalOrganisation for Migration (IOM) were operational in Syria. They partner with 107Syrian national NGOs.93 These include faith-based charities, small-scale social workgroups, and aid organisations with close ties to the Syrian government. All Syrian NGOsand charities are subject to strict controls by the Ministry of Social Affairs, which isauthorised to dismiss management.94IFRC and ICRC in partnership with SARC have separate arrangements with the Syriangovernment. SARC is the mandatory operational partner and focal point for INGOs andthe main implementing partner for UN agencies, channelling approximately 60 percentof their relief.95 SARC branches in 12 out of Syria’s 14 governorates and 75 sub-branches, including in difficult to reach areas such as Deir az-Zur and Raqqa, and inrebel-held territories on the Turkish border.UN agencies and their partners provide humanitarian assistance in ten sectors. The leadagencies for these sector groups are the WFP (food and agriculture, logistics, andemergency telecommunication), UNICEF (education, and nutrition, and WASH), theWHO (health), UNHCR (Shelter and NFI, and protection and community services), andUNDP (early recovery and livelihoods).From 2013 to date, SHARP issued annual requests for funding, and reported on itsavailable budgets. These data give a broad overview of the sectors in which UNorganisations and their partners have been active (see Table 3.1).In areas controlled by non-state belligerents, UN agencies and INGOs, grassrootsinitiatives and community-level networks deliver humanitarian assistance.96 Severalassociations of medical professionals and nascent, quasi-state structures established tosubstitute collapsed state institutions (such as the Local Administrative Councils andLocal Relief Committees) provide food assistance, health support, and shelter andNFIs.97 UN-OCHA estimates that from southern Turkey 140 expatriate Syrian NGOs, 35INGOs, and 25 Turkish NGOs relief organisations operate in opposition-held areas,mostly in partnership with local Syrian organisations.98
Table 3.1: SHARP Budgets and Requests (in millions US$) / Sector
SHARP 2013
Budget99 2013Request100 2014Budget101 2014Request 2015Request
91 SNAP (December 2013). At the end of April 2014, Mercy Corps stopped its operations from Damascus. Actioncontre la Faim (ACF)-Spain received no funding for 2014. UN-OCHA (27 December 2014).92 Based on the size of received SHARP funding by the end of 2014, in order of appearance. Ibid.93 UNSC (23 July 2014).94 The Syrian Observer (20 May 2014).95 IFRC (December 2014).96 Abdulwahid (November 2013), The Syrian Observer (4 July 2013), Khalaf, Ramadan and Stolleis (2014), SNAP(December 2013).97 ACU (February 2013).98 UN-OCHA (June 2014).99 Budget figures for 2013 refer to budgets presented in 2014 SHARP.100 As per revised appeal on 7 June 2013.
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Food and agriculture 512.2 617.9 522.7 1,119 1,218NFI/Shelter 47.8 343.1 29.9 421.0 639,5Health 109.5 177.3 103.8 233.4 317.9WASH 52.6 68.4 45.7 154.8 168.9Education 37.4 45.7 39.3 103.2 224.0Early recovery / livelihoods 6.7 43.1 13.9 71.05 102.3Protection and community 20.1 34.6 22.0 73.5 104.8Nutrition 3.7 10.6 18.5 30.0 50.7Coordination 22.08102 27.4 22.3 50.8 44.0Staff safety 6.9 - 2.5 6.2 -Logistics 10.4 14.4 4.8 12.06 9.8ETC 0 2.0 0.9 1.6 1.3Camp coord. & -management - - - - 12.2Cluster not yet specified - - 828.6 - -
Total 828.4103 1,409 1,290 2,276 2,900Source: SHARP Response Plans 2013, 2014 & 2015
3.4. Formal Coordination MechanismsFirst launched in 2012, SHARP provides a formal planning, coordination and financingplatform. OCHA’s Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) is represented in Damascus by anHumanitarian Coordinator (HC)/Regional Coordinator (RC).104 The Syria HumanitarianCountry team (HCT) includes all UN agencies and a number of INGOs representatives.OCHA has positioned UN Regional and Deputy Regional Humanitarian Coordinators inJordan and Gaziantep respectively. The Amman based Regional HumanitarianCoordinator (RHC) plays an active role in all strategic coordination bodies establishedwithin Syria and in the facilitation of cross-border assistance. The RHC is alsoresponsible for ensuring coherence between the SHARP and RRP. The coordinationmechanisms involve Syrian state agencies at all levels, and the HCT meets regularly withthe Syrian Higher Relief Committee (SHRC), a state body responsible for coordinatinghumanitarian assistance.105 The HCT is co-chaired by the Syrian Minister of SocialAffairs (MoSA) and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates (MoFAE). TheRHC also sits on a Steering Committee chaired by the Syrian Deputy MoFAE, whichprovides a platform for regular meetings involving all humanitarian agencies working inSyria. In addition, the RC/HC meets on weekly basis with representatives of the MoFAE“to discuss achievements, challenges and bottlenecks in the humanitarian response.”106Technical and operational coordination and information exchange takes place in the tensector groups, in which all UN agencies, the IOM, registered INGOs, Syrian ministries, theSARC and authorized local NGOs participate, depending on their field of expertise.Several inter-sectoral, technical working groups were established, for example theShelter Sector Working Group led by the UNHCR. The sector groups and technicalcommittees are complemented at a local level by UN humanitarian distribution hubs. All
101 Budget figures for 2014 SHARP refer to total resources available, which include carry-over funds from 2013.UN-OCHA (30 December 2014).102 For the cluster “coordination” the carry-over to 2014 of US$ 7.6 million has been deducted form the 2013budget given in SHARP 2014.103 For the 2013 a total of US$ 0.9 million is deducted as this amount was carried over to 2014 to finance theEmergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC).104 Since August 2013 this has been Yacoub El Hillo.105 Slim and Trombetta (2014).106 Ibid.
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INGOs report regularly and extensively about their activities to the Syrian MoFAE, asrequired by the Syrian government.Following UNSCR 2139 (22 February 2014), which demanded safe and unhinderedaccess for UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners, a ‘JointCommittee’ was established to discuss and coordinate ways to implement theresolution. The committee includes representatives of Syria’s MoFAE, MoSA, securitypersonnel, SARC and the UN represented by the RC/HC and/or the RegionalHumanitarian Coordinator.However, most humanitarian efforts in opposition-held territories were cut off from theUN coordination mechanisms in Damascus. The Syrian government refused to allow forassistance across borders that were no longer under its control and mostly stopped aidacross frontlines; UN agencies, at least until July 2014, would not move withoutgovernment consent; Syrian relief groups declined to work with the government; andINGOs found themselves caught in between or had established relations with variousopposition groups including the SNC. The latter established the ACU in December 2012with a view to coordinate assistance identify needs, and strengthen linkages betweendonors and relief actors in opposition-held areas.107 Meanwhile INGOs operating fromsouthern Turkey established the NGO Forum in early 2013, to enhance coordination andimprove (security) information exchange and needs assessments.108 After the ACU failedto become the focal point for coordinating the aid effort (see 3.7), the NGO Forumremained as the only active platform for coordination. Yet not all INGOs and TurkishNGOs operating in Syria from southern Turkey took part. The Forum also lacked accessto the UN-led coordination mechanisms in Damascus.Concerns about the lack of coordination in southern Turkey prompted UN-OCHA to mapand establish relations with (I)NGOs. By the end of 2013 consultations resulted in theestablishment of the Humanitarian Liaison Group (HLG) chaired by the RegionalHumanitarian Coordinator.109 Technical and operational coordination structures builton those of the NGO Forum.In April 2014 a stakeholder meeting of 150 representatives of 95 organisations agreedto “strengthen coordination and communication amongst and between all relevantactors, including communities, national and international NGOs, [and] UN agencies topromote cohesion and accountability of humanitarian actors responding to the Syriacrisis” and in July 2014, the HLG published the “Response Plan for the SyrianHumanitarian Operations from Southern Turkey”.110 A meeting in Beirut in September2014 consolidated this structure and integrated it into the existing UN-led Syria in-country coordination structure, including the HC/RC in Damascus.111 The latter wasdesigned to arrive at a fully integrated and coordinated “Whole of Syria Approach”.112
Figure 3.2: Emerging Coordination Structure ‘Whole of Syria’ Approach
107 ACU (n.d.).108 Interaction and ICVA (May 2013).109 UN-OCHA (June 2014).110 Ibid.111 Syria Humanitarian Country Team (18 December 2014).112 UNSC (25 November 2014).
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Source: UN-OCHA
3.5 Results
3.5.1 SHARP: Timeliness and ResponsivenessThe UN agencies and partners were relatively slow in responding to humanitarian needsas they failed to negotiate immediate access with a reluctant Syrian regime. From mid-2012 onwards modest levels of UN humanitarian assistance within Syria was enabled bya US$ 36.5 million CERF allocation for Syria.113 Yet the first Syria appeal was only issuedin December 2012; six months after OCHA estimated that 1.6 million people in Syriawere in need, and five months after IFRC had launched its own first appeal.114 It wastherefore only from early 2013 onwards that UN agencies responded with significanthumanitarian assistance.
113 UN-OCHA (31 December 2012).114 The IFRC launched its Syria Emergency Appeal in July 2012.
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From the moment that SHARP was initiated, UN agencies and partners have struggled torespond proportionately to the rapidly worsening scope, indicated by the fact thatSHARP funding requests since December 2012 more than doubled while the growth intotal needs (measured in number of persons in need) in that same period more thantripled (See Figure 3.1). The 2013 appeal was only funded for 59 percent and 57 percentin 2014 (see Table 3.1). The growth in budgets was less than 16 percent whilst thehumanitarian needs tripled during that same period.
3.5.2 People reachedNeeds assessments are fragmented and uncoordinated and mostly focus on the needs ofthose who can be reached by organizations who look for sector specific needs. Forinstance, WHO reported that since the beginning of the crisis until September 2014 itdelivered medical assistance to over 8 million Syrians with its partners.115 IOM reportedthat it assisted 2.75 million persons in Syria while providing a breakdown along sectors(see Table 3.2).116 In October 2014, the IFRC presented the most comprehensiveretrospective on people it reached through SARC and other Red Cross/ Red Crescentsocieties, amounting to 5.5 million persons since 2012.117
Table 3.2: Total Number of People in Need Reached since the Start of the Syria Crisis
People
reached
SpecificationsWHO 8 millionIOM 2.75 million Health (658,523 persons), transportation assistance (602,113), shelter(107,529), psychosocial support (241,537), livelihood assistance (4,347)IFRC / SARC 5.5 million 2012 (553,006 persons), 2013 (3,140,135), 2014 until Aug. (1,852,591).Total beneficiaries: food 2.15 million (2012: 194,000, 2013: 794,294, 2014until Aug. 1.16 million), hygiene kits 1.26 million (2012: 109,410, 2013:814,740), 2014 until Aug. 338,086), winterization items 55,000 (2012:15,000, 2013: 40,000, 2014 until Aug. ongoing).Total of 570,847 patients received treatment in IFRC-supported clinics,more than 87,000 in mobile health units, 127,973 in health points.Source: reporting agencies as listedOne year into the first SHARP appeal in December 2012, UN-OCHA presented a chart(Table 3.3) to inform its donors from the second international pledging conference heldin Kuwait in January 2013 about its achievements that year.118 It indicated that theresponse was most successful in food, health and WASH. In contrast, assistanceprovided in especially IEHK (Interagency Emergency Health Kits), cash (in shelter andNFIs), shelter, protection and community services, agriculture, and early recovery andlivelihoods fell significantly short of existing needs. On average, all sectors and sub-sectors reached 36 percent of people in need, largely due to the relatively strongperformance of the food sub-sector and health treatment, vaccinations andconsultations sub-sectors.
115 WHO (September 2014).116 IOM (18 November – 1 December 2014).117 IFRC (11 October 2014).118 UN-OCHA (December 2013).
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Table 3.3: SHARP in 2013, Achievements
Source: UN-OCHA (December 2013)The report specified the numbers of people reached across sectors (Table 3.4). Itconcluded that “[w]ithin the Syrian Arab Republic, humanitarian actors scaled up toreach a target (revised at mid-year) of at least 6.8 million people in need. They largelysucceeded, and in some cases surpassed the mid-year targets as needs continued tomount.”
Table 3.4: SHARP, people reached / achievements across sectors in 2013People reached / achievementsHealthcare 1 million children measles-mumps-rubella vaccinations841,000 children with polio vaccinationsFood andAgriculture 89,000 people with agricultural and livestock support536,000 Palestinian refugees with food and cash assistanceShelter andNFI 151 collective shelters rehabilitatedcash assistance to more than 564,000 peopleEducation school supplies were delivered to 1.5 million children‘catch-up classes’ for 310,000 childrenEarlyrecovery andlivelihoods 45,000 IDP families reached in 14 governorates5,000 local workers employed in cash-for-work scheme for solid waste removal and disposalimproving living conditions for 700,00 IDPsSource: UN-OCHA (December 2013)IFRC, operating outside SHARP, reported that eighty percent of the Syrian populationhad safe drinking water as a result of supplying Syrian water agencies with purificationchemicals and its support for rehabilitation of damaged facilities, by the end of 2013.119SARC provided food to 3,5 million people throughout Syria except in besieged areas and
119 IFRC (December 2014).
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distributed relief in 80 percent of “high priority areas”, reaching more than 3.5 millionpeople per month, three times as many as the year before.120In March 2015 UN-OCHA reported on its activities and coverage in Syria during 2014(Table 3.5). For this year needs were best addressed in food, health, WASH andeducation. Aid delivery in proportion to needs performed worst in protection and earlyrecovery. For all sectors and sub-sectors UN-led assistance addressed on average 60percent of needs; a marked improvement in its average coverage compared to 2013 yetlikely exaggerated due to minor assistance in terms of shelter for which data are lackingbut needs are probably high.
Table 3.5: SHARP in 2014, Achievements
Source: UN-OCHA (31 March 2015)
3.5.3 GapsSINA and MSNA surveys confirm that, overall, the humanitarian effort falls significantlyshort of meeting existing (and rising) needs.121 SINA found that in all visited sub-districts throughout the country over 90 percent of respondents consideredhumanitarian assistance generally in the preceding 30 days as “insufficient” or “largelyinsufficient”. The MSNA survey reports no improvements of the overall humanitarianresponse, but it does suggest that, at least in some sectors, assistance is having a modest,positive impact: “In some sectors, compared to SINA, the sectoral severity has increased,but a smaller number of persons are in need of humanitarian assistance [..]. In [other]sectors, more people need humanitarian assistance, but the severity of their needs islesser than during the SINA [..].”122 A closer look at sectoral level confirms this morenuanced reading but it does not remove concerns about the overall inadequateness ofhumanitarian assistance provided.SINA findings suggest that opposition controlled territories are relatively under-serviced compared to regime held areas at the time of the report’s release (Figure 3.4.)and that a much lower percentage of people-in-need were reached in five opposition-held governorates than the country-wide average, identified in SHARP 2014.123 UN-led
120 Ibid.121 Assessment Working Group for Northern Syria (December 2013), OCHA, REACH and SNAP (28 October 2014).122 OCHA, REACH and SNAP (28 October 2014).123 These three sectors are: health, education, and food. The five governorates that were either fully orpredominantly controlled by various opposition forces are: Deir az-Zur, Raqqa, Idlib, Aleppo and Hasakeh.
IOB Country Study Syria Crisis 26
cross-line operations largely failed to overcome security conditions and regimerestrictions, badly affecting access to opposition-held areas. SINA found that in “conflictareas where assistance is deemed sufficient, the only providers are NGOs thatreportedly provide 66 percent of the response; followed by the Local Relief Committeesat 17 percent, and the UN at 17 percent.”124 Given the deteriorating humanitariansituation in most opposition-held areas, UN agencies and partners faced growingcriticisms.125 On 31 January 2014, UN-OCHA acknowledged that it was unable “to reachthe vast majority who are in need in the opposition-held areas,” and it called for aresolution to urgently allow for cross-border assistance.126
Figure 3.3: Syria's frontlines October 2013
Source: Fabrice Balanche, Le Matin, 30 September 2013127
3.6 Cross-line and Cross-border Assistance
3.6.1 UN Security Council Resolutions 2139 and 2165Limited humanitarian access, especially to opposition-held areas became intolerable forthe international community. On 2 October 2013 a non-binding UNSC PresidentialStatement called on the Syrian government to facilitate “safe and unhinderedhumanitarian access to people in need, through the most effective ways, includingacross conflict lines and, where appropriate, across borders from neighbouringcountries.”128 However, the Syrian government would only authorize aid to pass throughthe few official Turkey and Jordan border crossings under its control, refusing toauthorize passage through at least eight other border crossings, most importantly Bab
124 Ibid.125 See e.g.: MSF (16 December 2013), Human Rights Watch (12 June 2013).126 Cited in Human Rights Watch (12 June 2013).127 Reproduced in: Balanche (24 October 2013).128 UNSC (2 October 2013).
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al-Salama and Bab al-Hawa that could potentially serve millions of people in need inIdlib and Aleppo.129 UN-OCHA, in turn, insisted that, by international law, using theborder crossings required Syrian government agreement “irrespective of whose controlthey are under.”130 The Syrian regime also restricted or delayed cross-line assistancewhile it denied access to areas under siege of its forces, causing about 175,000 people tobe cut off from aid.131UN agencies airlifted assistance to Qamishli to reach 50,000 IDPs in early February2014.132 The same month the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2139, expressing“grave alarm” over “the dire situation of over 3 million people in hard-to-reach areas”. Itdemanded that all parties, “in particular the Syrian authorities”, fully implement theprovisions of the UNSC Presidential Statement of October 2013. In March 2014, a multi-agency convoy entered Syria through the Nusaybin / Qamishli border crossing to reach268,000 people in northeastern Syria. Yet overall humanitarian access remainedblocked or heavily restricted, across borders and across front lines. During May and June2014 humanitarian access worsened again whilst the number of people residing inhard-to-reach-areas rose to 4.7 million.133 The number of people under siege, mostly byregime forces, increased to 241,000, and no additional humanitarian border crossingswere authorized.134On 14 July 2014 the UN Security Council to adopted Resolution 2165, authorizing UNagencies to “use routes across conflict lines” and the border crossings of Bab al-Salamand Bab al-Hawa (bordering Turkey), Al Yarubiyah (Iraq) and Al-Ramtha (Jordan), inaddition to those already in use, “with notification to the Syrian authorities [..]” butbypassing the requirement of formal approval by the Syrian government. The resolutionalso established an independent UN monitoring mechanism to confirm the humanitariannature of the relief consignments. Even if the Syrian government protested against whatit saw as an infringement of its sovereignty, 135 ten days after the resolution was adoptedthe first multi-agency convoys, authorized by UNSCR 2165, passed through the bordercrossings of Bab al-Salam and Al-Ramtha with food, NFI, WASH, and medical supplies.136
3.6.2 UN-led Aid reaching opposition-held areas since UNSCR 2165A total of 348 trucks carrying humanitarian supplies from UNHCR, UNICEF, UNFPA,WFP, WHO and the IOM passed the Bab al-Salam border crossing and Bab al-Hawa,during 30 days of cross-border operations under Resolution 2165.137 According to UN-OCHA, these shipments reached 972,554 beneficiaries, mainly in Aleppo governorate(487,784 beneficiaries) and in Idlib governorate (309,890 beneficiaries).138 In the sameperiod, more than 380 trucks passed the border crossing of Nusaybin-Qamishli, to theeast at the Turkish border, with permission of the Syrian authorities.139 According toUN-OCHA these supplies reached 503,820 beneficiaries in Hasakeh, Qamishli district,Malakiyah, and Ras al-’Ain in separate shipments in the months March, May, October
129 SNAP (April 2014).130 OCHA Operations Director John Ging cited in UN-OCHA (29 January 2013).131 By March 2014, opposition forces besieged another 45,000 people. UNSC (24 March 2014).132 SNAP (April 2014).133 UNSC (20 June 2014).134 Ibid.135 Earlier, the Syrian government sent a letter to the UN Security Council, ostensibly drafted by a group of Syrianand Arab lawyers, which described any cross-border assistance not authorized by the Syrian government as “anattack on the Syrian State” and as a form of “aggression.” Ja’afari (18 June 2014).136 UNSC (21 August 2014).137 UN-OCHA (12 December 2014).138 Ibid.139 Ibid.
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and November 2014.140 Dar’a was reached from the Ramtha border crossing withJordan. Between August 2014 and January 2015, 187 trucks carrying assistance reached376,490 beneficiaries in this area.141Meanwhile, the Syrian government became less pre-occupied about cross-lineassistance, possibly to counter arguments in favour of cross-border operations underUNSCR 2165. WHO reported that 70 percent of its medical assistance in July and August2014 went to opposition-controlled areas, including Dar’a and some besieged areas likeEastern Ghouta.142 In mid-November 2014, the IOM stated that 30 percent of itsassistance went cross-line.143 The Syrian government allowed ICRC greater cross-lineaccess, including to the besieged Yarmuk Palestinian refugee camp since UNSCR 2165.144However, Syria Government cross-line humanitarian assistance authorisation waspiecemeal, which negatively impacted living conditions in areas not under its control. Inmid-November 2014, OCHA estimated that in the four governorates most often reachedby cross-border operations (Aleppo, Idlib, Quneitra and Dar’a) two million people werestill in need. 145 Only 38 percent of these received monthly food support, and only 16percent received health support.146 It also estimated that on average only 20 percent ofpeople in need in hard to reach areas received monthly food assistance from while only11 percent received health supplies.147 As a majority of Syria’s people in need (4.7million) reside in opposition-held areas, needs are not met regularly and insufficiently, ifindeed at all.148
3.6.3 NGO Cross-Border AssistanceCross-border assistance from Turkey reached northern Syria from an early stage of theconflict. The Turkish Red Crescent, with Turkish government support, and a handful ofTurkish relief organizations quickly established contacts with Syrian activists andmedical workers inside Syria to distribute humanitarian aid.149 Food deliveries beganalready in June 2011, quickly followed by modest but growing volumes of otherassistance including medical supplies.150 One of the most active Turkish NGOs was theHuman Rights and Freedoms Humanitarian Aid Foundation (IHH), supported bydonations from Muslim communities worldwide and some European NGOs includingNorwegian Church Aid.151 In February 2013, the Turkish Red Crescent, and otherhumanitarian supplies organized by the Turkish government, reportedly reached45,000 beneficiaries in northern Syria.152Meanwhile, Syrian relief groups, supported by Diaspora groups including the Syrian-American Medical Society (SAMS),153 established a presence in southern Turkey. One oftheir most significant initiatives was the Polio Control Task Force (PCTF) a coalition ofnine Syrian groups, led by SAMS It distributed, with the ACU, vaccines via a network of
140 Ibid.141 UN-OCHA (20 January 2015).142 WHO (September 2014).143 IOM (December 2014a).144 Telephone interview, 11 December 2014.145 UNSC (21 November 2014).146 Ibid.147 Ibid.148 UN-OCHA (November 2014).149 International Crisis Group (30 April 2014).150 Ibid.151 Between March 2011 and June 2013, IHH reportedly channelled relief goods valued at nearly US$275 millioninto Syria. IHH (n.d.).152 International Crisis Group (30 April 2013).153 For SAMS activities in Syria see Syrian American Medical Society Foundation (n.d.).
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8,000 Syrian medical workers, from January 2013154 and reached 1.4 million children innorthern and north-eastern Syria155 by 2014.International NGOs soon joined the cross-border efforts. Médecins sans Frontières(MSF) channelled medical supplies from Turkey to field hospitals inside Syria. It enteredSyria unofficially in mid-2012 to provide emergency and surgical care.156 When by theend of 2013 opposition groups controlled large parts of northern Syria, MSF openednew hospitals there, and distributed relief items including baby milk and flour. Save theChildren in December 2012 sent NFI supplies from Southern Turkey and expanded tofood aid, healthcare supplies and other assistance, reportedly reaching 715,000 peopleby the end of 2013.157 Foreign NGOs had to formally register with the Turkish Interiorministry, causing some delays even if local authorities tolerated NGOs to operateinformally pending Government approval and at the time of writing this report,registration is no longer an issue. By mid-2013 INGOs partnered with activists and reliefgroups and networks in Syria, implementing programs and managing distribution.INGOs also established the “zero-point” system in August 2012, in which Turkish NGOsadministered by the Turkish Red Crescent, sent trucks to the border transferring cargoto Syrian trucks for transport and distribution in Syria.158 By the end of 2014, Syrian,Turkish and international NGOs were sending cross-border shelter, food, health,hygiene, clothing, education, energy, transportation, and WASH assistance.159 Thevolume of their aid has grown but is poorly coordinated and of limited scope. TheTurkish Red Crescent reported that relief with a monthly average value of US$23 millionpassed through the “zero-point” system.160 Mercy Corps reportedly sent 688 relieftrucks from southern Turkey into Syria since July 2014.161
3.6.4 Netherlands NGOs and Cross-Border AssistanceOn 5 December 2013 the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Trade and DevelopmentCooperation invited Netherlands NGOs to respond to a tender for cross-borderhumanitarian assistance to hard-to-reach areas in Syria and for unregistered Syrianrefugees in Lebanon and Jordan. 162 The policy was intended to complement Netherlandshumanitarian funding through UN channels, as long as these failed to access these areasand people.163 The tender followed an earlier €1 million Netherlands donation to Savethe Children cross-border NFI assistance program in 2013. Tender criteria included fourkey requirements:1. at least one year experience in cross-border assistance into Syria;2. conducting an appropriate needs assessment;3. ensuring quality, and reliability of monitoring mechanisms, and;4. taking sufficient measures to safeguard the security of aid workers.164The initial tender for €4 million was increased to €6 million in order to awardcompetitive tenders. Save the Children was awarded €1.5 million for food security,
154 ACU (n.d.); Sparrow (12 August 2014).155 Syrian American Medical Society Foundation (n.d.).156 MSF (7 March 2013).157 Save the Children (n.d.).158 International Crisis Group (30 April 2013).159 OCHA, REACH and SNAP (28 October 2014).160 UNSC (23 July 2014). However, by the end of 2014 cross-border supplies from Turkey seem to have decreasedas the Turkish Red Crescent reported US$ 9 million for October. UNSC (21 November 2014). In comparison, NGOcross-border assistance from Jordan reportedly did not exceed US$ 2 million per month. UNSC (22 May 2014).161 Mercy Corps information cited in Lynch (30 December 2014).162 Ministerie voor Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (5 December 2013).163 Ibid.164 Ibid.
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shelter and NFIs, providing basic supplies, bread and food vouchers for vulnerablechildren and their families for a period of three to four months.165 Both StichtingVluchteling, (€2 million, implemented by the International Rescue Committee), andWorld Vision (€2.5 million) proposed an assistance program targeting IDPs in northernSyria. World Vision focused on health, WASH and NFI to IDPs in Aleppo governorate.166At the time of writing results were not yet reported, but a limited assessment ofperformance against the four key requirements of the tender was possible.
Relevant experience in cross-border assistance: Save the Children entered northernSyria to distribute relief for the first time in December 2012 (see above), partlysupported with Netherlands funding for cross-border NFI assistance. The InternationalRescue Committee (IRC) began cross-border assistance in 2012 and reportedly reachedover one million people with healthcare, women and child protection, shelter, WASHand food security, by the end of 2013.167 IRC also previously partnered with StichtingVluchteling in providing cross-border assistance to over 830,000 Syrian IDPs fromJordan. World Vision only explored possibilities with a fact-finding mission which wasstill to report its findings at the time of tender.168All three NGOs carried out, or had already conducted, appropriate needs
assessments.169 Save the Children participated in and contributed to the SINA, releasedin December 2013, and conducted rapid needs assessments in local communities incollaboration with Local Relief Councils. IRC conducted rapid needs assessments amongIDPs in Idlib, Aleppo, Raqqa and Deir-az-Zur Governorates. World Vision identifiedgeographical humanitarian gaps in collaboration with the NGO Forum, and focused onRaqqa and rural Aleppo. It then conducted rapid needs assessments in these areas,followed by a more comprehensive household survey.Establishing solid monitoring and evaluation mechanisms proved to be a challenge,as security prevented expatriate staff from entering the country.170 All three tenderedNGOs adopted an approach based on remote-management, flexibility and constantfollow up, building relationships of trust with local partners. NGOs provided trainingand coaching to Syrian staff by Skype or facilitated travel into Turkey in small groups.The approach also included peer monitoring by other groups, or INGOs and theirpartners active in similar fields and areas. Save the Children’s approach of third partymonitoring by a Turkish consultancy company with networks in Syria is a relativelyexpensive option but increasingly used by agencies and donors. Save’s outputmonitoring uses an on-line (web-based) monitoring tool using of QR codes.171 IRCcarries out Knowledge, Attitude and Practices (KAP) surveys among aid recipients everysix months. The NGOs analysed data from a variety of sources, informing importantchanges to the NGOs’ assistance programmes. For instance, IRC changed the content of“dignity kits” based on beneficiary feedback, and changed its suppliers of non-food itemsbased on perceptions of poor quality amongst beneficiaries. World Vision changed thetype of rice, after monitoring information showed that it absorbed excessive amounts ofwater in very short supply in the distribution area.
165 DSH (a) (n.d.).166 World Vision the Netherlands (n.d).167 IRC (n.d.).168 World Vision the Netherlands (n.d). However, DSH assessed World Vision’s desk study and preparations sinceJanuary 2013 as being sufficient for the one-year experience requirement. DSH (b) (n.d.).169 Information provided by the three NGOs in Antakya and Gaziantep, 13-23 October 2014.170 Ibid.171 Each of the staff carries a smart-phone, and data is uploaded using a specially designed application. Using thissystem, deliveries can be time-stamped and geo-tagged.
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Security management was based on an explicit “‘acceptance strategy,”172 andcontinuous communication with locally formed civil protection groups that share aninterest in ensuring that humanitarian aid reaches intended beneficiaries. Securityassessments are carried out on an ongoing basis in close collaboration with localpartners. Low visibility (for instance by not placing labels) allows for discreteoperations and avoids causing undue attention to aid deliveries and local staff. Thetransfer of paperwork across multiple checkpoints and the Syrian border which wouldput staff at risk, prompted World Vision and Save the Children to provide local staff withscanners to allow for secured transmission via email. IRC complies with US legalrequirements and USAID policies. Accordingly, each piece of sensitive equipment for usein the region (e.g. smart phones and computers) were purchased, registered andlicensed for export in the U.S. To avoid undue influence on staff recruitment by armedgroups173 IRC announced publicly that recruitment decisions are taken in Turkey, andnot by local staff. Initially, IRC paid all its staff on a single day from one Syrian fieldoffice. To reduce attention to this when the program expanded and staff increased to400 staff, it spread paydays using various locations. Even if security management waslargely effective and operations were able to continue under very difficult conditions,World Vision recently was forced to suspend all programs in IS-controlled areas,following the abduction of some of its core staff.Although it still is too early to arrive at a conclusive assessment --pending the threeNGOs’ reporting on programme implementation-- it appears that Netherlands fundingfor cross-border assistance into Syria is making an important contribution in the contextof growing concerns that UN-led assistance is not sufficiently reaching people in need inopposition-held or difficult-to-reach areas. The contribution is made despite these NGOsand their Syrian partners facing significant security and administrative challenges.Earlier Netherlands funding to Save the Children has helped this NGO to further gain onthe ground experience, build an extensive network of contacts and trust, designinnovative ways to work in an extremely challenging environment, and in these wayspersuade more risk-evasive donors to come forward with additional funding for theorganization’s expanding operations inside Syria.However, it is not clear why the original tender was restricted to Netherlands NGOs. Theone-year experience criteria resulted in a very small pool of eligible NGOs. This mayhave caused one NGO to be awarded without meeting the requirement of one year ofrelevant experience, and another one to channel the funding to its U.S. partner.Furthermore, and proportionate to steep overall needs in areas insufficiently reached byUN agencies, the Dutch contribution to essential cross-border assistance remainsmodest.
3.7 Key ChallengesThe delivery of sufficient humanitarian assistance encountered organizational, funding,security and administrative obstacles for organizations operating from Damascus andthose involved in cross-border aid alike. These have had a detrimental effect on thetimeliness and effectiveness of the delivery, but also on the ability to deliver accordingto humanitarian principles.
172 ‘Acceptance’ is a key principle of security strategies in broad use by humanitarian NGOs. It is defined as acontinuous effort to “reduce or remove [..] threat by gaining widespread acceptance for one's presence andwork”. As such, it relies on an operational agency’s ability to effectively disseminate the message that it is actingin a neutral and impartial fashion. Van Brabant (n.d.).173 Svoboda (April 2014).
IOB Country Study Syria Crisis 32
3.7.1 Insufficient FundingSHARP appeals were only funded at 59 percent in 2013 and at 57 percent in 2014. UN-OCHA and UN agencies reduced targets across sectors (except nutrition) by about half ofestimated needs in 2013 and we observed that SHARP funds addressed 31 percent ofreal needs in 2013 and 60 percent in 2014.Under-funding caused early recovery and livelihoods, shelter and agriculture to be badlyaffected as humanitarian (live saving) food, health and WASH sectors needs were rightlygiven priority. This raises serious questions about the feasibility of current intentions tofocus future efforts towards “strengthening the resilience of affected communities andinstitutions.”174 After all, the early recovery and livelihoods, shelter and agriculturesectors are essential to any such resilience strategy as under-funded emergency needsconsume much of already insufficient funding. UN-led food, health and WASHprogramming sectors have been chronically under-funded, causing severely diminishedservice delivery. For example, in March 2014, funding constraints forced the WFP toreduce its food baskets, causing beneficiaries to receive 20 percent less nutrients underthe Sphere standard.175 WFP warned that it would be forced to reduce food baskets by afurther 80 percent in May that year if no additional contributions were forthcoming.WFP faced another financial crisis in September when under-funding threatened areduction in its food deliveries for the rest of the year.176 That same month, the IOM andUNHCR warned that they had to significantly reduce their existing assistance withinSyria if no more funding was forthcoming. Even when these acute financial crises (asopposed to overall funding shortages) were eventually addressed, they causedconsiderable interruptions of aid delivery as, for example, ordering and shipping foodsupplies into Syria can take up months. Facilities for pooled funding, such as the CERF,have not been able to adequately address such funding problems as Syrian allocationscompete with other major humanitarian emergencies worldwide.177SHARP’s financial gaps were worse than RRP under-funding. This may be explained bythe fact that most donors have no appetite to indirectly come to the rescue of the Syriangovernment. Be this as it may, inadequate and erratic funding undermined SHARPagencies’ demands to the Syrian government for better access as the latter argued thatUN budgets failed to cover needs in regime-held areas or were entirely insufficient.178
3.7.2 Humanitarian Principles and AccessSHARP funded agencies’ efforts to secure unrestricted and safe access to those most inneed have been challenged in terms of their ability to uphold humanitarian principles, inparticular neutrality and impartiality. From the start of the conflict the Syriangovernment imposed a range of administrative and political obstacles severelyhampering humanitarian efforts, or it denied humanitarian access altogether. As BenParker, UN-OCHA’s Syria country chief until February 2013, explained: “In government-controlled parts of Syria, what, where and to whom to distribute aid, and even staffrecruitment, have to be negotiated and are sometimes dictated.”179 Negotiating themodalities of these administrative constraints caused delays in establishing the UN’shumanitarian relief operations in Syria. Initially only eight INGOs were authorized to
174 Syria Humanitarian Country Team (18 December 2014).175 WFP (4 March 2014).176 UN-OCHA (17 September 2014).177 For 2015 the Syria crisis was allocated another US$ 30 million, or 16 percent of total CERF allocations. UN-OCHA (10 June 2015).178 Interview with UN official in Amman, 6 November 2014; Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic inGeneva (19 February 2014).179 Parker (November 2013).
IOB Country Study Syria Crisis 33
work in Syria. Requests to allow for more INGOs to partner with UN agencies resulted inan increase of their number to 16; still inadequate to provide the necessaryimplementation capacity for what has become a massive aid effort. In April 2014 theSyrian government summoned Mercy Corps, to cease operations from Damascus if itcontinued to provide cross-border aid without its permission.180 Other INGOs wereregistered but failed to obtain the required agreement with SARC, and could thereforenot operate. Authorised UN agencies and INGOs struggled to bring in sufficient staff astheir visa applications remained pending.Some have suggested that the Syrian government’s requirement for all agencies to workvia and with SARC compromised their humanitarian impartiality and independence dueto this organization’s close ties to the government.181 The government controls centraloperations by SARC as its president, Abdul Rahman Attar, maintains close relations tothe regime. However, SARC negotiated considerable humanitarian space, and conductedits operations with increased professionalism.182 Branches in most opposition-heldareas are active, and often form the only permanent humanitarian presence beyondlocal initiatives. Many SARC volunteers died in the course of their work including at thehands of government forces (see below), giving SARC a degree of respect including inrebel-held areas.183 More generally, it was not always easy for UN agencies and INGOs toselect truly independent local partners, as for example UNHCR and IOM partnered withthe Syria Trust for Development, an ‘NGO’ created by the regime and sponsored by theFirst Lady Asma al-Assad.184Cross-line humanitarian assistance, when government authorization was granted, wassubject to many administrative and politically motivated hurdles.185 UN agencies had tosubmit weekly loading plans, which caused significant bureaucratic delays. This waschanged in August 2014 to bi-weekly and monthly loading plans. Despite Syriangovernment promises that local governors in Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Idlib couldauthorize cross-line convoys, central approval by several ministers and officialscontinues to be required, causing significant delays. Supplies to hard-to-reach areasneed to be negotiated in intermittent meetings of the joint committee establishedfollowing the adoption of UNSCR 2139. Syrian authorities failed to respond to orrejected requests for the delivery of medical assistance, such as surgical supplies. Evenin cases where approval was granted, regime security forces repeatedly removedmedical supplies from convoys or refused to let them through. They also confiscatedinternational aid items from convoys destined for rebel-held territory.186 The regime attimes allowed aid agencies access to besieged areas in exchange for relief to regimesupporters in areas that the government is unable to access.187
180 Mercy Corps (23 May 2014).181 Concerns about SARC’s leanings toward the regime were also expressed in Dutch Parliament. Ministerie vanBuitenlandse Zaken, Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (20 September 2013).182 Slim and Trombetta (2014); interviews with humanitarian officials, November-December 2014.183 Interview with UN humanitarian negotiator in Beirut, 3 November 2014. SARC’s own sporadic operationalupdates appear to suggest that its core service delivery remains tilted in favour of regime-held areas. SARC(March 2014 and May 2014). Yet it is highly probable that SARC deliberately underreports its activities in theseareas in order to avoid undue regime interference. Activities of some SARC branches in rebel-held areas even gofully unreported as they fail to be formally recognised by headquarters in Damascus. Interview with UNhumanitarian officials in Amman, 19-20 May 2015.184 UNHCR (n.d.) (d); IOM (31 March 2014). On the Syria Trust’s intimate relations with the regime and how itserves regime interests, see: Ruiz De Elvira Carrascal (2012); Donati (2013); Kawakibi (2013).185 UNSC (21 November 2014).186 UNSC (24 March 2014).187 Parker (November 2013).
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Belligerents’ instrumentalization of humanitarian aid for military or political objectivesis one of the key obstacles that remains insufficiently addressed. A systematiccombination of regime-inflicted deprivation with violence, including by the use of barrelbombs, culminated in what Syrian security officials and regime supporters coined the“starvation until submission campaign”;188 laying siege to, sealing off and starvingdensely populated areas held by rebels including districts and suburbs in Damascus, theold city of Homs, in Aleppo, and al-Hasakeh, trapping hundreds of thousands. SinceUNSCR 2165 a few aid convoys have reached some of these besieged areas, includingYarmuk and Eastern Ghouta, but overall the sieges continued and humanitarianagencies have only sporadically been allowed to provide assistance here. Especiallysince its military advances from early 2014 onwards, ISIS also has been blocking accessfor relief agencies, personnel and goods into areas controlled by Kurdish forces inAleppo and northern al-Hasakeh, and into areas controlled by rival opposition groups inAleppo and into regime-held pockets in Deir az-Zur and northern al-Hasakeh.189Active fighting also prevented or severely hampered humanitarian access. Humanitarianand medical workers persistently found themselves in the crossfire, or weredeliberately targetted by both regime forces and insurgents. Since the start of theconflict to date, 69 humanitarian workers have been killed, including 17 UN staffmembers, 40 SARC workers, 7 Palestinian Red Crescent volunteers, and 5 INGO staffmembers.190 An unknown but certainly large number of Syrian humanitarian workerslost their lives. Twenty-seven UN staff members, 24 of whom working for UNRWA,continue to be taken hostage, are detained or remain missing.191 In 2013 and 2014 alarge number of humanitarian NGO workers were also kidnapped, including by ISIS thatin August 2014 seized 200 relief workers in eastern rural Aleppo.192 ISIS executed threepersons working for international humanitarian NGOs.193 According to Physicians forHuman Rights, since the start of the conflict 216 attacks were carried out againstmedical facilities, the bulk of which by government forces, causing the deaths of 590medical personnel.194 In December 2013, a British surgeon died in governmentdetention following his arrest more than a year earlier.195 Generally, regime forces’intense and indiscriminate use of heavy weaponry, including artillery and barrel bombs,caused severe security constraints, forcing humanitarian NGOs to scale downoperations.196 Government forces bombed relief facilities and convoys, andindiscriminately targetted traffic into opposition-held areas.197Against this background, humanitarian assistance delivery required delicatemanoeuvring, continuous negotiation, and engagement with all sides of the conflict.UNSCR 2165 enabled some improved access whilst the regime appears to prefer somecontrol over cross-line assistance over unauthorized cross-border assistance.Representatives of aid organizations said that in the course of the conflict a degree oftrust developed that, in their view, made both regime officials and rebel groups,including radical Islamist groups, more willing to allow humanitarian access acrossfrontlines and into besieged areas.198 Yet anti-terrorism legislation imposed by donors
188 Reuters (30 October 2013).189 OCHA, REACH and SNAP (28 October 2014).190 UNSC (21 November 2014).191 Ibid.192 OCHA, REACH and SNAP (28 October 2014).193 These were Peter Kassig (Abdul Rahman Kassig), Allan Henning and David Haines.194 Physicians for Human Rights (December 2014).195 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (27 October 2014).196 OCHA, REACH and SNAP (28 October 2014).197 Ibid.198 Interviews with humanitarian workers in Beirut and Amman, November 2014; telephone interview, 11December 2014; Farooq (28 January 2015); IRIN/HPG (December 2014).
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hampered engagement with Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS as both organisations, classified‘terrorist’, increasingly imposed conditions on the distribution of humanitarian aid toinclude their active involvement or directions toward preferred beneficiaries.199Attempts to encourage rebel groups to respect international humanitarian law have hadvery limited success and lack tangible results. ISIS’ attitudes toward humanitarianassistance have been a source of growing concern. For instance, in September 2014 itraided WFP warehouses and subsequently appears to have used their contents bydistributing food parcels carrying the ISIS logo.200 Even if conditions for cross-lineassistance marginally improved, they still did not produce sufficient access forhumanitarian assistance to those most in need.UN agencies operating from Damascus and NGOs engaged in cross-border work debatedthe extent to which belligerents’ actions and demands should be left unchallenged. ManyNGO workers argued that UN agencies gave in to Syrian government’s conditions to theextent that they scaled down ambitions to reach opposition-held areas. Syria based UNofficials argued that humanitarian agencies have insufficient political leverage on theSyrian government to lift restrictions, and they said to expect the UN Security Council toprovide the political and (in the case of unauthorized cross-broder assistance) legalparameters for more favourable conditions. They also pointed out that a more assertiveapproach is likely to provoke the Syrian authorities, and ultimately to backfire bytriggering even more draconian constraints on their operations. Finally, they assertedthat cross-border assistance should not be viewed as an end in itself, and thatimprovements in cross-line relief efforts can be a feasible alternative. There is somemerit in this as the Syrian government has repeatedly hinted at further restrictions andobstruction while it appears fully aware of its leverage in this respect.UNSCR 2165 gave UN agencies an important tool to increased access, therebyaddressing UN agencies’ argument that they could only use border crossings withoutSyrian government authorization if receiving sufficient politial and legal backing. Yet UNagencies have not taken full advantage of the resolution, judging by the modest increaseof cross-border relief supplies and cross-line operations despite growing humanitarianneeds in opposition-held areas. To date, the regime summoned only one INGO to ceaseoperations from Damascus due to its engagement in unauthorized cross-border aid,prior to the resolution. Concerns about possible government retaliation for increasedinvolement in assistance efforts in rebel-held areas therefore appear overstated. Thisleads us to conclude that UN operations from Damascus and NGOs providing cross-border assistance need to improve coordination and follow a common strategy in orderto improve access. This will also require donors, including the Netherlands, to furtherincrease financial contributions, in particular to NGOs working from southern Turkey inpartnership with local relief groups inside Syria.
3.7.3 Coordination ChallengesThe increased regionalisation of the Syria crisis provides a highly fragmented contextfor humanitarian coordination. Syria and refugee hosting countries have separatecoordination platforms under a rather loosely managed regional structure. Each UNagency, and many INGOs have regional offices and representation in Amman or Beirut,and each group meets in regional coordination meetings. OCHA has positioned UNRegional and Deputy RHCs in Jordan and Gaziantep respectively. The Amman-basedRHC has Syria responsibilities with the Syria HC/RC, but lacks a clearly defined role incoordinating cross-border assistance or ensuring coherence between the SHARP and
199 Interviews with UN humanitarian officials in Amman, 19 and 20 May 2015200 As reported by social media, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gurFG_HOPtQ See also: BBC (3 February2015).
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RRP. These functions are also seriously challenged by regional politics and,unfortunately, the UN system’s internal politics. Regional coordination for Syria and forcross border operations is further detailed below. Yet bringing coherence between theRRP and SHARP also has proved to be a challenge. Reaching agreement on theComprehensive Regional Strategic Framework (CRSF), an attempt to bring coherence toapproaches across the region, was a drawn out process. The CRSF, led by the RHC’soffice, was signed off by regional governments (but not Syria) and UN agencies, and wasreleased in June 2014. The CRSF aims to promote national strategies, with prioritiseddelivery through national channels where possible, and principally in the area of basicservice delivery (education, water supply and solid waste management).Attempts to bring together the RRP and the SRP were frustrated with the inclusion ofvulnerable host populations and when in 2014 the need arose to move towardsnationally led responses with a longer-term vision. One donor representativequestioned the efficiency of UNHCR led programming and its ability to manage theconflict of interest inherent to its triple functions of coordinator, implementer anddonor.201 The independent evaluation of UNHCR’s response notes the tensionexacerbated by the CRSF process and documented that “nearly every relevantrespondent, when asked about UNHCR’s coordination role, commented negatively onhow UNHCR, OCHA, HCT, and HC/RC coordinated at whatever level”, and a deep seatedsense of frustration with the on-going ‘turf battle’.202 The evaluation notes that thesetensions may be largely resolved in Jordan, but they continue to play out at the regionallevel and in Lebanon.Turkey-based INGOs attributed the UN team in Damascus’ reluctance to sharestrategically important information on time with them to a reluctance to jeopardise itsrelationship with the Syrian government. This hampered information sharing and trust,and it caused reluctance among INGOs to inform UN agencies about operations insideSyria for fear of this being shared with the Syrian authorities. Unwillingness to exchangeinformation particularly hampered coordination in cross-sectoral activities in responseto protection needs, as data here are especially sensitive.203At the end of 2012 some donors, including the Netherlands, looked at the ACU as apotential cross-border NGOs’ coordination platform. However, the ACU soon becameparalyzed by political infighting, with claims of inflated salaries, mismanagement, andalleged corruption.204 Western donors and INGOs alike felt that large funding from ArabGulf countries had made the ACU unresponsive to their accountability standards. SomeINGOs raised the more principled objection that the ACU, as an extension of the Syrianopposition in exile, could not serve as an impartial, humanitarian agency in the firstplace.205 When concerns about the ACU’s accountability standards appeared to bevalidated, the Netherlands was quick to end its financial support.Meanwhile, the southern Turkey NGO Forum established its own cross-bordercoordination mechanism, but was unable to include all active organisations. Perhapsdonor conditionality, including the Gulf Arab countries and also the Netherlands, torequire the NGOs to actively take part in and contribute to the Forum’s activities mayhave gone a long way to improve participation.
201 interview with donor representative in Beirut.202 Hildalgo et. al. (2014)203 Svoboda (April 2014).204 Whewell (9 January 2014).205 Interaction and ICVA (May 2013).
IOB Country Study Syria Crisis 37
OCHA arrived in southern Turkey in early 2013, but initially failed to establish strongrelationships with INGOs at a time when tensions over a perceived standard approach tocoordination without much consultation or adding value to existing mechanisms. INGOsresisted OCHA coordination as they felt that UN agencies failed to meaningfully engagein cross-border assistance in the first place, and therefore did not have the credibility orthe relevant expertise to coordinate this assistance.Some UN agencies active in southern Turkey stood accused of taking decisions thatfailed to maximize aid effectiveness. For instance, WHO distributed polio vaccines tofour INGOs involved in cross-border assistance without making these vaccines availableto the Syrian-led Polio Task Force; the most active player in this field. In January 2014the task force requested these INGOs, including Save the Children UK, to make availablethe polio vaccines, but Save the Children reportedly refused to release the vaccines, andalthough not being able to use them itself, 250,000 vaccines stored in a warehouse inIdlib were allegedly destroyed.206 Save the Children denied the allegations.207Relations between OCHA and cross-border INGOs improved slightly with the adoptionof UNSCR 2139 and 2165. Some INGOs accused UN agencies of disregarding their needsassessments and local knowledge and of “dumping” assistance across the border. Lackof coordination may have caused some duplication of assistance as various sourcesclaimed duplication of aid to some communities in Syria receiving assistance, from theINGOs and from UN-led convoys.208 Some INGOs also feared that UN-led cross-borderassistance relied on their own Syrian implementation networks, causing INGOs to beoutbid and lose their valuable relationships within Syria.In July 2014, the HLG published its detailed “Response Plan for the Syrian HumanitarianOperations from Southern Turkey.”209 At the time of our visit in October 2014, INGOsreported that relations with OCHA and UN agencies were improving. INGOrepresentatives acknowledged OCHAs added value in some areas, specifically politicalanalysis and information management. However, INGOs’ perception remains thatalthough coordination is more inclusive, there is significant scope for improvementespecially given the additional staffing costs incurred. Tensions about real or perceivedUN agencies’ reluctance to send significant humanitarian assistance across the borderalso remains, and causes resistance among INGOs to fully participate in OCHA’scoordination framework.
206 Sparrow (12 August 2014).207 Save the Children (27 August 2014).208 However, no clear evidence emerged to further substantiate these claims. Interviews with INGO workers inBeirut and Amman, November 2014.209 UN-OCHA (July 2014).
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4. Syrian Refugees and Humanitarian Assistance in LebanonThis chapter provides an overview of humanitarian assistance and protection providedto Syrian refugees in Lebanon. It focuses on UNHCR and its partners, because theNetherlands humanitarian policy favours coordinated mechanisms. Along with chapters3 and 5 the analysis presented here seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the
effectiveness and sustainability of Netherlands government supported humanitarian aidto refugees from the war in Syria. This is intended to inform contextual, political andinstitutional considerations for effective Netherlands humanitarian funding channelling.The chapter starts with an introduction of the Lebanon context, followed by adescription of the humanitarian response and the main results and ongoing needs,before concluding the analysis.
4.1 ContextThe Syrian refugee influx into Lebanon took place when the government and politicalsystem were torn by political conflict between the ‘14 March alliance’, (anti-Syrian SunniMuslim groups and likeminded Christian-Maronite political leaders), and the ‘8 Marchcoalition’, (pro-Syrian groups led by the Shi’ite armed group Hizbullah). Lebanon’sinternal instability worsened as the Syrian crisis becamse a major political issue. The 14March alliance viewed it as an opportunity to weaken the regime in Damascus. The 8March movement supports the Syrian regime in countering the uprising. In the summerof 2012, tensions over Syria prompted clashes in Tripoli between armed groups fromthe Sunni Muslim neighbourhood of Bab al-Tabbaneh and the predominantly Alawiteneighbourhood of Jabal Mushin. Instability and political stalemate at a national level wasfurther fuelled by Hizbullah’s decision in early 2013 to support the Syrian regime bysending its forces to help fight the insurgents in Syria. The move flouted the Lebanesegovernment’s official policy of “dissociation” from the Syrian conflict and was stronglyopposed by the 14 March alliance.210 Resulting disagreements caused Lebanon’s politicalprocess to grind to a halt while sectarian tensions peaked. In May 2013 Lebanon’sParliament postponed elections citing security concerns over the conflict in Syria.Security conditions in Lebanon also deteriorated due to repeated clashes betweenSyrian rebels and Syrian government forces resulting in cross-border shelling, andexchanges of fire involving Hizbullah fighters and Syrian gunmen inside Lebanon.During the summer of 2013, major confrontations pitched the Lebanese armed forcesagainst pro-Syrian opposition Islamist groups in the Abra neighbourhood of thesouthern city of Sidon, bomb attacks on two Sunni mosques in Tripoli, and severalattacks and bombings by radical Islamist groups against Hizbullah and Iranian targets insouthern Beirut. While sharp differences emerged over how to address or manage thesesecurity challenges, Sunni leader Tammam Salam assembled a new coalitiongovernment in February 2014, in May the term of President Michel Sleiman expired,leaving a power vacuum without agreement over his successor.The Salam government faced a serious security challenge in the battle of Arsal in August2014 when fighters belonging to ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra clashed with the Lebanesearmed forces, killing 20 soldiers and taking at least 29 hostage. In November theLebanese Parliament extended its own term to 2017, again citing security concernsemanating from the Syrian civil war and its impact on Lebanon. The political gridlockresulting from these developments paralyzed most of Lebanon’s policymaking and
210 Saad al-Hariri of the 14 March alliance was also accused of providing financial assistance to Syrian armedgroups. Abouzeid (18 September 2012). Mortada (30 November 2012).
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public institutions and undermined the government’s ability to implement an adequateresponse to the humanitarian consequences of the Syria refugee crisis.The burden of the Syria crisis and the influx of refugees on its neighbour’s healthcare,economic, education and social systems is well documented in the World Bank’s 2013Economic and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA).211 It estimates an additional 170,000Lebanese in poverty due to the Syria crisis. In its report the Bank predicts that 3.15million of Lebanon’s 4.1 million citizens would be in need of some form of financial,shelter or food support by the end of 2014. On the other hand, a UNDP reportemphasized that the country in 2014 received US$ 800 million worth of internationalassistance, generating 1.28 percent economic growth.212 However, wealth remainspoorly distributed, causing the poorest communities hosting the bulk of Syrian refugees,especially in Akkar and the Biqa’,213 to experience considerable tensions and clashesbetween refugees and local residents.214
Figure 4.1.: UNHCR registered refugees in Lebanon
source: UNHCR (15 December 2014).
4.2 Humanitarian ResponseThe first Syrian refugees arrived in Lebanon in the beginning of April 2011 when 5,000refugees sought refuge from the violence in Homs. Almost all of them stayed with hostfamilies, in Wadi Khaled, Northern Lebanon, a mere 40 kilometres from their hometown. Many of them returned shortly afterwards, but as the violence in Syria increased,by the end of 2011 4,840 people had registered as refugees with UNHCR, and thisnumber almost doubled three months later.215 As the war continued in major populationcentres, refugee numbers increased steeply during 2012. By October that year, thenumber of refugees in Lebanon exceeded the 100,000 mark.In 2013 and 2014, much of the fighting in Syria focussed on Aleppo’s countryside,displacing a further 860,000 people into Lebanon.216 As new front lines opened up in2014, 440,000 additional refugees registered in Lebanon, causing their total number to
211 World Bank (20 September 2013).212 Interagency Coordination Lebanon (2014)213 UNHCR (September 2014).214 For a mapping of such clashes see: http://cskc.daleel-madani.org/cma215 UNHCR (16 March 2012).216From mid-September 2014, 80 percent of total UNHCR projections for 2014.
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reach one million in April that year. To date, with a total of 1.2 million registered Syrianrefugees in Lebanon, at least one in every four people in the country is a refugee(including 42,000 Palestinian Refugees from Syria and 270,000 Palestinian Refugees);217the highest refugee per capita ratio in the world and the equivalent of 4 million refugeesin the Netherlands. Nearly all refugee households who crossed into Lebanon in 2014 (90percent) needed help with registration, shelter, food and basic material needs.218UNHCR registration data demonstrate a gradual increase, accelerating in mid-2013 andgrowing at sustained high levels from mid-2014 until August that same year, andslightly decreasing since.219 However, these data do not necessarily reflect actualarrivals, but also an increase in UNHCR’s registration capacity. Data do not includerefugees who chose not to be registered, likely to have increased in numbers since theautumn of 2014 when the Lebanese government began to impose restrictions on newentrees. The number of registered refugees in Lebanon declined from September 2014while the violence in Syria continued and intensified.Analysis indicates that people were displaced in waves, and arrived in numbers wellabove UNHCR registrations in 2011 and 2012, which show a more gradual curve. 220 Thissuggests that many only registered with UNHCR after they had exhausted their ownresources to meet their needs. Comparing registration with actual arrival data indicatesthat people survived initial displacement without the help of the international systemwhich was slowly starting up (in 2011 and early 2012). This is supported by the factthat international efforts only reached less than half of those arriving.221
Figure 4.2 Registered Syrian Refugees in Lebanon
Surveys suggest that refugees are largely from (lower) middle class urban backgroundswith an average household income of US$250 per month and relying on familysavings.222 Wealthier strata often have sufficient means to survive without UNHCRregistration.223 Many refugees met their initial needs using their savings and therevenues of sold assets such as jewellery, and thanks to support from the hostcommunities and local charities, such as mosques and churches. At this time authoritieswere largely allowing them to work and settle. After these resources depleted and the
217 LCRP (a) (n.d.).218 Interagency Technical Working Group (May 2014).219 UNHCR (16 February 2015).220 See e.g. DRC (11 February 2013).221 Ibid.222 Beirut Research and Innovation Centre (November 2013).223 many of our interlocutors indicated that some only reluctantly register with UNHCR for fear of data sharingwith Syrian authorities, especially in the south (controlled by Hizbullah).
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de-facto permission to work was gradually withdrawn, refugees became increasinglydependent on international assistance to meet their livelihood needs.UNHCR led the response from June 2011 and started registration through Lebanesecentres in Tripoli and Beirut and through mobile registrations in Arsal and al-Qaa, andwith the opening of a centre in Ghaziyeh in south Lebanon. A handful of agencies startedto distribute mainly NFIs and extended health services mainly in Akkar, the Biqa’ Valleyand North Lebanon later in 2011.
4.2.1 Appeals and FundingThe UN agencies launched their first appeal (RRP) late in 2012 for the period January toJune 2013. In light of the rapidly evolving situation and acute funding shortages, theinitial appeal for over US$ 250 million was revised and a list of priority projects wasdrafted. By April 2013 the Lebanon RRP component was funded at 48 percent225 but at90 percent of the priority list.226 The plan was updated in June 2013 to cover ongoingneeds until December 2013, when agencies expected the number of refugees to reach
the 1 million mark, requiring assistance worth US$ 1.216 billion (see table 4.1).227 Thisappeal was funded for 73 percent. A second appeal was launched for 2014, which wasless 46 percent funded.In 2014 RRP agencies predicted increased needs to require over US$ 1.5 billion (1.7billion if Government costs are included). Donors from the Arab Gulf countries distrustHizbullah’s involvement in public institutions and hesitate to contribute to the RRP.228However, the RRP attracted less funding than the year before.
Sources: RRP 5 mid-year report. RRP 5 final report. RRP 6 Feb 2015 snapshot.
224 Final expenditures not yet reported at the time of writing.225 Revised Syria Regional Response Plan Funding status as of 18 April 2013.http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=1859226 UNHCR (16 May 2013).227 http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php228 Shibli (February 2014).229 The appeal was revised down from the 1.7 billion 2014 budget, during the course of the year.
Table 4.1: Overview of overall coordinated humanitarian response 2013 (expenditure) and 2014 (projected) in Lebanon
Sector Lead Expenditure
2013 US$
million
Budget
2014224
UNHCR
component
Main RRP partners
Protection MoSA 144.2 184.5 105.8 UNHCR, UNRWA, NRC, SCIFood security WFP 278.7 550.3 0 WFP, UNRWA, FAO, IRCShelter UNHCR, MoSA 201.6 168.0 75.4 UNHCR, IOM, NRC, SCIBasic needs (NFIs) UNHCR, MoSA 189.4 149.1 61.2 UNHCR, DRC, IOM, SCIWASH UNICEF, WHO, UNDP 143.4 202.4 58.8 UNICEF, Medair, WVIHealth UNHCR, WHO, MoPH 93.9 188.1 93.1 UNHCR, WHO, UNICEF, IMCLivelihoods and cohesion UNICEF, WHO, UNDP 30.6 98.0 19.6 UNDP, UNHCR, FAO, IOM, OXFAMEducation UNHCR, UNICEF 134.3 182.7 53.7 UNHCR, UNICEF, UNESCO,UNRWA
Total 1253 1723.1 500Sources: Syria Regional Response Plan 5 – 2013 Final Report and 2014 RRP: Indicative requirement.
Table 4.2: RRP appeal coverage Lebanon
Period Appeal Priority Funding CoveredJan-2013-June 2013 267,087,536 136,506,945 128,326,338 48%June 2013-Dec 2013 1,216,189,393 881,769,237 73%
Jan 2014-Dec 2014 2291,515,491,900 694,311,565 46%
IOB Country Study Syria Crisis 42
Overall needs increased and the response was adjusted accordingly. Funding shortagesrequired targeting only the most vulnerable people. WFP is the largest recipient of RRPfunding as it received US$ 501.8 million (2014), compared to UNHCR’s US$ 467.8million, representing an overall RRP component of 27 percent.The RRP is implemented in Lebanon by 77 RRP agencies,230 mostly NGOs and UNagencies coordinated under the formal responsibility of the Ministry of Social Affairs(MoSA) and managed by the Inter-Ministerial Committee established in 2012. It tookconsiderable time for this structure to emerge. The delays left space for UNHCR to takeresponsibility for leading partners in ensuring protection and delivering assistance.Arrangements are in accordance with the usual division of roles and mandates in anyrefugee crisis in which agencies such as OCHA and its funding modalities (e.g. CERF)usually play a minor role consistent with their respective mandates: UNHCR leads in arefugee crisis and OCHA in a conflict situation (e.g. inside Syria).
4.2.2 Lebanon Government PoliciesDespite not being a State party to the 1951 Refugee Convention nor its 1967 Protocol,231Lebanon is until recently regarded as having played a largely positive role with regardsto protecting de facto refugees from Syria even if it does not always succeed in activelyensuring their protection. The Lebanese government stated its intention to uphold theprinciple of non-refoulement, and points at the large number of Syrian refugees itcurrently hosts. Yet Lebanon’s General Security did issue several deportation orders andforced Syrians to return when they faced criminal charges.232 The full extent to whichdeportations were actually carried out was not clear at the time of writing this report.Until 5 January 2015, when visa requirements were introduced, Syrian nationalsreceived a residency permit valid for six months, renewable free of charge for anadditional six months after which renewal costs are US$200 for persons 15 years of ageand older. The Government of Lebanon also waived all outstanding fees (and fines) inAugust 2014 for Syrians and Palestine refugees resident in Lebanon until December2014, in order to address lapsed residency cards, including due to lack of payments. Thisenabled many tens of thousands to renew their residency permits.233Recent measures caused a decrease of 3.6 percent of registered refugees during October2014 and a 56 percent drop in new registrations.234 On 31 December 2014 Lebanon’sGeneral Security Directorate announced that all Syrian arrivals now need to carry validpassports, possess minimum amounts of cash, and show proof of a hotel booking.Exceptions are made for “humanitarian cases” to be determined in coordination withUNHCR.235 Yet the criteria for such exceptional cases remain to be defined. Nor is it clearwhat these requirements will mean for refugees who already are in Lebanon.236 Thegovernment’s tougher refugee policies result largely from rising popular resentment ofthe impact of the crisis. A May 2013 poll found that 52 percent of respondents country-wide believed that Syrian refugees were posing a threat to national security while 82percent said that Syrian refugees were taking jobs from the Lebanese.237
230 UNHCR (7 September 2012).231 Because of this, Syrian refugees in official Lebanese parlance are referred to not as laji’in (refugees) but as
nazihin (displaced persons).232 Franjieh (29 December 2014).233 Debriefing with Protection Unit UNHCR Beirut.234 IRC and NRC (November 2014).235 Kullab (3 January 2015).236 A Lebanese government spokeswoman was cited as saying that a next step would entail re-evaluating thestatus of refugees registered with the UNHCR.237 Christophersen, Liu et. al. (2013).
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The fact that the government does not formally allow refugee camps means that almostall refugees settle in urban areas and host communities. As a result, increasing numbersof Lebanese citizens experience rising housing, food and education costs. Thetraditionally close between the Syrian and Lebanese people are becoming increasinglystrained and communities’ hospitality is showing signs of collapsing, leading to seriousprotection concerns as indicated by a steep increase in negative coping mechanisms.As we have seen, the Lebanese government faced difficulties in arriving at a coherentand proactive set of refugee policies. Most policy efforts focussed on curbing the refugeeinflux and, by October 2014, at least 45 some municipalities were reported to haveimposed regulations on Syrian refugees including curfews.238 However, othermunicipalities allowed them to work, coordinated with INGOs and NGOs, and ensuredthat both refugees and local residents benefited from the assistance provided.Increasing discontent about the refugee situation among the Lebanese populationserved to lay bare the government’s lack of action. Allegations of corruption in the officeof the head of the Higher Relief Council (HRC), a government agency previouslyinvolved239 in providing assistance to refugees and represented in the inter-ministerialcommittee on Syrian refugees, has further fuelled negative perceptions of thegovernment’s policies.240 In November 2014, a poll showed that an overwhelmingmajority of Lebanese thought that the government and politicians generally weremishandling the refugee crisis.241The Lebanese government tried several times to formulate a policy to improve theresponse to the refugee influx. In December 2012 the government led by Najib Miqatilaunched its “Response Plan to the Crisis of Displaced Syrian and Lebanese Families”,seeking funds for several ministries and the Higher Relief Council.242 Yet with the Miqatigovernment collapsing in March 2013, the plan was not followed up. On 23 October2014, the government adopted a ‘refugee policy paper’243 in which it described thenegative impact on socio-economic conditions and security. It proved to be theforbearer of new and tough restrictions on Syrians entering Lebanon in early January2015. In February 2015, thousands of Syrian refugees were removed by the Lebanesearmy clearing the area along the Syrian-Lebanese border near Zabadani, ostensibly toallow for military operations against Syrian rebels crossing the border.244 Only veryrecently, the Lebanese government started to more pro-actively formulate andcoordinate the humanitarian response as it became involved in World Bank and UNDP –led efforts to support host communities’ capacities to cope with the refugee influx. Theseinvolve technical cooperation with government representatives, several ministries, andthe government’s Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR).Some government policies did not support effective UNHCR programming. A long-termapproach to livelihoods or shelter is not consistent with Government policy ofdiscouraging the integration of refugees.245 MoSA hesitated to support programmingaimed at ‘social cohesion’, for fear that this may support a longer-term presence ofrefugees. UNHCR in partnership with UNDP supported municipalities with a US$ 1.5million capacity building fund.
238 Human Rights Watch (3 October 2014). On such local curfews against Syrian refugees see also: al-Saadi (25November 2014).239 In 2012, the Government announced that the Ministry of Social Affairs would lead the refugee response,leaving the HRC to manage the response to Lebanese returnees from Syria.240 Diab (12 November 2013). Bashir was released on bail in December 2014.241 Sidahmed (15 November 2014).242 Naharnet Newsdesk (3 December 2012).243 Lebanese Council of Ministers (23 October 2014).244 Samaha (6 February 2015).245 As perceived by UCAP partners.
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MoSA assigned one of their staff to work closely with UNHCR and UNDP in Tripoli. Thethree agencies now coordinate the municipalities working group to encourage hostcommunity participation, especially in WASH and shelter programs. In Tyre, UNHCRcoordinates with municipalities bilaterally, as some partners and refugees do not trustlocal officials, especially those with links to political and belligerent actors in Syria forfear of passing on confidential information.246 One authority reported to have been kept“well informed, but largely uninvolved”.247 Some reports indicate that municipalities donot receive enough support from central authorities, which shows some of the systemicand long-standing problems in the political and administrative system.248 Givenmunicipalities’ crucial role in service provision to host communities in order to copewith the refugee influx, this may account for continuing tensions and a lack of access ofUNHCR to certain municipalities. At the same time, local authorities were worried thatrefugees are so well served that this is leading to frustration among the hostcommunities, especially those seeking employment or access to (secondary) health care.UNHCR responded with US$ 25.5 million for 278 Community Support and over US$ 30million of Institutional Support to Government Programmes. Most of these funds go tocentral authorities as UNHCR assessed very few local authorities to have the requiredcapacity and systems in place (planning, financial management etc.) to effectivelyimplement projects.249
4.2.3 UNHCRUNHCR’s core business can be summarised as providing refugees with coordinatedassistance and protection. It has been present in Lebanon for 47 years with both countryand regional support activities (registration, refugee and asylum seekers statusdetermination of refugees and resettlement) to other country offices in the Middle Eastand North Africa. It has six offices in Lebanon and employs 580 staff, 133 of whom areinternational.250Registration aside, the UNHCR implements almost its entire budget through partners,who also receive direct funding from back donors, through RRP or otherwise. Even ifUNHCR is not the most prolific RRP recipient, its overall coordination and protectionmandate makes it strategically, and in policy terms, the dominant agency. It plays a keyrole in quality control in all programming aspects: from needs assessments, toimplementation arrangements, monitoring, information management and it is overallresponsible for the success of the international response.251UNHCR decentralized its operational coordination to the point of delivery culminating inexpanded capacities and responsibilities in four sub offices (Tyre, Tripoli, MountLebanon and Zahle), in 2013. In doing so, it established coordination functions withoutinterfering with operational resources. However, it also created new positions thatadded to the coordination complexity and costs.
4.2.4 CoordinationWith large numbers of refugees came a considerable influx of aid agencies. UNHCRclarified its role within broader humanitarian coordination systems. In accordance with
246 Various partner interviews.247 Interview with the vice mayor of Tyre.248 Central government transfers to municipalities in Lebanon comprise only 0.6 percent in Lebanon compared to3 percent in developing countries generally. Atallah, Bashiri, and Harb (April 2014).249 UNHCR (2014).As one study observed, almost 400 municipalities do not have one single employee and another 400 suffer fromvery weak administration. Atallah (March 2012). http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/featuredArticle.php?id=6250 http://www.unhcr.org/ga14/index.xml251 Section 4.3.2 provides a more detailed description.
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the Transformative Agenda252 item of providing “empowered leadership”, a CountryHumanitarian Coordinator was deployed in Lebanon and a Regional Coordinator was tooversee the overall regional programme. Reports indicate that at the regional level, themain actors reached consensus easily that UNHCR should lead the coordination of theoverall response.253 At the same time UNHCR actively participated in the HCT and theUN Country Team, chaired by the HC/RC. UNHCR reportedly kept the HCT informedabout the refugee operation on a regular basis and coordinated with OCHA and the HC.Some participants in the Lebanon coordination architecture attribute great importanceto HCT’s role, pointing out that it adds a layer of accountability to the response.254Coordination is UNHCR core business, but operationally, registration is among itsstrategic responsibilities. Registration is the basis for eligibility for UNHCR coordinatedassistance and is essential for the legal and material aspects of protection.255 UNHCRmanages the sector working group system in which it defines its role as “facilitatingcollective decision-making.”256 It enhances its role by closely monitoring partnerimplementation, organisational risk management, and quality assurance strategies.Programmes are implemented largely by partners, mostly (I)NGOs and other UNagencies. The Independent UNHCR evaluation found that “there was a generalconsensus on the fact that UNHCR had the lead role in the coordination of the overallresponse in Lebanon”257 and had the mandate, capacity, and resources to lead.Coordination platforms include interagency coordination in Beirut and the sub-offices,and comprise 12 sector working groups and a number of specific task forces, andinteragency structures. The independent UNHCR evaluation found that in Lebanon “thecurrent coordination model is largely effective” and “in support [of] knowledge sharingand decision-making.”258 Our partner interviews contradict this and most partners wespoke to found that coordination platforms were seen as “useful” but “output driven,”259offering only limited opportunities for learning and suggesting that the agenda needs tobe complemented with impact analysis focussing on what works well and what does not.The lack of quality data and a lack of partner’s analysis capacities compromised thereliability of needs assessments and beneficiary targeting. Our findings suggest thatpartners highly value UNHCR’s approach to coordination (3.5 out of 5). The results ofour interviews compare favourably with those of the Coordination Feedback Survey of104 respondents of 22 agencies, conducted by the Lebanon Humanitarian Inter-AgencyForum (LHIF) in May 2014,260 which rated UNHCRs coordination performance at 2.3 outof 5. External observers also speak of the heaviness of the structure and lack of technicalcoordination (e.g. on child protection) between UNICEF and UNHCR, leaving partnerscaught in the middle of disputes over indicators and reporting frameworks. However, atinteragency level the view is that the system is overdeveloped with too many layers,participants, duplicate leads etc. taking too many resources, especially sincedecentralization duplicated the management of these mechanisms in six regions in arelatively small country.261
252 InterAction and ICVA (May 2013).253 OCHA had only eight staff in Lebanon at the time.254 Inter agency stakeholder interviews in Beirut.255 The Independent UNHCR evaluation (section 7.7.2) cites “building trust in UNHCR’s impartiality, informationmanagement opportunities and the protection value” as three main aspects of importance.256 Interview with Country Representative UNHCR Beirut.257 Ibid.258 Ibid259 UNHCR partner interviews in Beirut, Tyre and Tripoli.260 “LHIF Program/Field Staff Feedback on inter-agency Coordination in Lebanon,” (May 2014).261 UNHCR-PDES (July 2013).
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UNHCR’s decision to decentralize operational coordination to sub-offices resulted froman identified need to be closer to implementation to support operations of a relativelylarge number of partners262. In the eyes of many observers centralization encouraged analready existing relatively cumbersome and expensive set of coordination structuresthat functioned primarily for information sharing. However, partners feel that thedecision was made without much consultation with partners, who consequently havenot aligned their decision-making model with that of the UNHCR. For instance, UNICEFremains centralized, which created asymmetrical dynamics for NGOs who implementfor both UN agencies. Decentralization also reportedly caused delays and underminedthe timeliness of assistance.263 The independent evaluation speaks of decentralisation asboth a “constraint and an enabler” and notes an “absence of a harmonised approachbetween different decentralised units and vis-à-vis implementing partners.”264Local NGOs and CBOs, especially faith-based NGOs, often funded by Gulf states, do notfully participate in the system as they lack the networks and bilateral contacts, facelanguage barriers and apply different humanitarian standards, despite UNHCR efforts toreach out to them.Interviews with partners and both independent and internal evaluations confirm thatskilled sector coordinators, the separation of coordination from UNHCR operationalmanagement and improved data collection and analysis, information management, anda more participatory RRP strengthened coordination in 2013 have all improved theperformance of the overall coordination framework.265
4.2.5 UNHCR PartnershipsUNHCR’s global policy is to provide assistance and protection in partnership withgovernments, NGOs and the private sector. UNHCR partnership and other forms ofhumanitarian coordination are essentially voluntary commitments and can only beenforced by local authorities and encouraged by donor conditionality.UNHCR describes its overall mission as providing “operational support and coordinationto a wide range of private and public actors who work in the interest of refugees” even ifits first concern is with the international protection of refugees.266 For this reason wefocus this part of the study on the quality of the partnerships.267Partners can be government agencies, INGOs, local NGOs, CBOs, the private sector andalso other UN agencies. UNHCR distinguished between two types of partners:1) Implementing partners are those who operate with UNHCR funding, although notnecessarily exclusively;2) Operational partners who work within and report to UNHCR’s coordinationmechanisms but are not funded by UNHCR.
262 UNHCR briefings in Tyre.263 Hidalgo et. al. (3 November 2014), Beyond Humanitarian Assistance ? UNHCR and the Response to Syrian
Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon, January 2013 – April 2014.264 Ibid.265 Ibid. and UNHCR-PDES (July 2013).266 http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c296.html267 Partners are both Implementing Partners (funded by UNHCR) and Operating Partners (not funded byUNHCR).
IOB Country Study Syria Crisis 47
UNHCR describes the added value of its partnership as “presence on the ground”offering “local expertise and the capability to become operational on short notice inemergency situations.”268
4.2.6 Partner selection and project approvalPartner selection starts each year with a call for proposals, providing UNHCR with anoverview of all plans by agencies interested in UNHCR funding. Those not interested toapply or non-eligible can still be regarded as partners if included in UNHCR coordinatedframeworks through the RRP or bilateral arrangements.The majority of partners are (local affiliates of) international NGOs. For 2015, UNHCRhas selected 11 national partners and 19 international. A smaller number are LebaneseNGOs, such as the Amel Association. Some of these are independent technical agenciesand educational institutions that deliver training programmes or technical services.Others are development partners of the international NGOs who have acquiredindependent funding from UNHCR. UNHCR also partners with eight other UN agencies.Only one Lebanese government institution (MoSA) is listed among the implementingpartners.We spoke to 14 UNHCR partners269 (nine in Tyre and five in Tripoli) about theiractivities and partnership with UNHCR. We selected partners from three sectors whichthe Netherlands’ MoFA deemed of particular interest: protection, shelter andunconditional cash programming. An overview of all scores is provided in Appendix 2.
Netherlands NGOsOne of only two Netherlands NGOs operational270 in Lebanon is Dorcas, whichimplements one of the four tenders for the implementation of the ‘AmendmentVoordewind’ working with non-registered refugees in al-Metn, Mount Lebanon (seeAppendix 4). The rationale of the fund was that bypassing the policy to channel fundingthrough coordination platforms (in this case UNHCR) was justifiable if UNHCR did notreach certain people of concern. In other words, it was assumed that UNHCR was notincluding unregistered refugees in its programmes. However, UNHCR coordinatesseveral partners (including Dorcas) who work with non-registered refugees inLebanon,271 making the decision to fund Dorcas to appear less pertinent.The other operational Netherlands NGO is War Child Holland (WCH). The latter assistsSyrian children through the provision of remedial classes, psychosocial support andrecreational activities in the North, in Beirut and in Mount Lebanon.272 The NetherlandsMoFA supports WCH in two ways: by way of a grant from the Netherlands Syria ReliefFund (direct NGO funding) while another part of War Child’s programme is funded byUNHCR, making it the only Netherlands based UNHCR implementing partner.OXFAM-Novib is integrated in a joint OXFAM International operation,273 led by OXFAMGB, whose focus is on cash for rent and protection (gender). Others, such as Cordaid(Caritas, mainly in health and child protection), Netherlands Red Cross (IFRC/LebanonRed Cross, shelter and health), programme through their international affiliatenetworks. Only few other Netherlands NGOs, such as MSF Operational CentreAmsterdam (MSF-OCA) have a programming track record in the Middle East (Jordan).
268 http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2f6.html269 see Appendix 3.270 The term operational here is used to indicate that staff, resources and inputs are directly managed from theNetherlands.271 UNHCR (25 April 2014).272 RRP partner profiles on http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/partnerlist.php273 Interview with Oxfam country managers in Beirut.
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Other actorsHumanitarian actors outside the UNHCR-led framework include local Community BasedOrganizations (CBOs), ICRC, MSF and private actors. Major CBOs in Lebanon are al-Sahaal-Islamiya (Islamic Health, related to Hizbullah), Makassed Philanthropic IslamicAssociation and Dar al-Fatwa (Sunni Endowment). CBOs are strongly embedded inLebanese communities where civil society tends to be organised along sectarian lines.The international organizations engage with them on a local level. During securitydeteriorations (in Arsal, Tripoli, Sidon, and the Palestinian camps) some CBOsmaintained access when many international actors evacuated or continued operationswith local staff.274 Commonly, local CBOs make up 75 percent of the UNHCR’s NGOpartnerships, but this percentage is much lower in Lebanon, presumably because of thepartisan nature of the CBOs or maintain vulnerability criteria, standards and principlesdifferent from UNHCR’s.275ICRC and MSF are important humanitarian organizations with sizeable programmes, butthey choose to remain outside UNHCRs coordination framework. MSF-OperationalCentre Geneva (OCG) indicated that they are willing to formally participate atinteragency level, but at the time of information gathering they were still waiting for aninvitation. Both agencies agree that UNHCR engages regularly and bilaterally with themto ensure operational continuity (referrals and follow up) and to avoid duplication.276
4.2.7 Needs AssessmentsThe RRP is a needs-based appeal, but unlike for Syria there is no consolidated overallneed assessment, as these are the responsibility of each individual partner separatelyfor their project proposals. UNHCR cross-checks with their own contextual analysis andother reports. All needs assessments are stored on the UNHCR web portal.277UNCHR and partners conduct an annual overall vulnerability assessment, feeding datainto the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASyr), providing quantifiedsector and region information on demographic profiles, assets, income, expenditure offamilies, barriers in accessing services such as health and education, coping strategies,and debts. In addition to VASyr regular (cross) sector needs assessments are carried out.VASyr data collection started in 2013, followed up in 2014, and planned for in 2015.Only when under-funding created the need for further targeting, which becameapparent in early 2013, REACH278 was deployed to undertake a multi-sector needsvulnerability assessment in Lebanon. In order to come to a more integrated approach,the Multi Sector Needs Assessment platform was established in February 2014 by aninter-agency technical working group, consisting of NGOs, MoSA, IOM, and UN agencies.The purpose is to identify priority needs, within and across sectors, and identify gaps.The Multi Sector Needs Assessment initiative assessed 86 needs assessments in May2014 and found the following gaps:279
 limited contextualization and triangulation of primary data through secondary dataanalysis;
274 E.g Amel Association in Arsal.275 UNHCR briefing in Tyre and debriefing in Beirut.276 UNHCR briefings, interviews with ICRC, MSF OCG Head of Mission.277 The earliest assessment in this repository is the DRC shelter needs assessment from July 2011. The mostrecent one is the OCHA / REACH needs assessment of Lebanese host communities in October 2014.278 REACH is a joint initiative of two international NGOs, ACTED and IMPACT Initiatives, and the United NationsOperational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT). REACH was created in 2010 to facilitate thedevelopment of information tools and products in support of and within the framework of inter-agency aidcoordination mechanisms.279 Interagency Technical Working Group (May 2014).
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 measurement units not sufficiently harmonized to allow for comparability;
 limited data disaggregated by gender and age;
 the situation is not tracked over time;
 lack of harmonized language and sector-specific terminology - resulting in inabilityto make comparisons.Partners face a number of challenges when assessing the needs of refugees includinggeographic dispersion and difficulties with locating them in remote mountainous areasor privately rented accommodation in urban areas. People are also quite mobile280 andtheir vulnerability can change over time.
4.2.8 MonitoringActivity monitoring is a continuous process conducted by UNHCR field staff, sectorspecialists and project control staff, often jointly with partners and with otherstakeholders, including government and donors. During the emergency stage of massarrivals and the need for life saving activities monitoring rightly focused on outputs(implementation and distribution). It entailed reviewing implementing partnerperformance reports; reviewing and analysing secondary data (Activity Info inputs); on-site field visits and regular meetings at project sites. Performance is reviewed againsttargets for sectors, geographic areas and partners on a monthly basis. Other monitoringactivities valued by partners were UNHCR field visits and real time feedback. UNHCRpro-actively monitors implementation on the ground, often by accompanying partnerstaff during their activities.UNHCR and partner field staff meet with refugees to complement assessments in annualstructured dialogues. In 2013, more than 170 focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews were held with around 2,000 vulnerable refugee men and womenof all ages and backgrounds. Groups were identified based on a mapping or profiling ofthe registered population, as well as gaps in information relating to a certain group.UNHCR has a network of over 300 Refugee Outreach Volunteers (ROVs), some of whomspecialise in areas such as health, legal issues, etc, and regularly report back to UNHCRand partners on needs they see and suggested responses. UNHCR project control andprogramme officers verify compliance with the project agreement. A review of partners’internal systems and controls, as well as financial recording, documentation, andreporting is integrated in an overview of partner capacity as the basis for negotiatingpartnerships and agreements. UNHCR also keeps track of expenditures on a monthlybasis.UNHCR reports across all sectors on a monthly basis, outlining, needs, achievements,gaps and constraints. The reports are aligned with the Operations Plan. In addition,UNHCR provides a comprehensive mid-year review which is reviewed by HQ. Mid-yearimplementation and expenditure rates reviews allow for adjusting targets, budgets, andimplementation plans, feeding into the mid-year RRP Lebanon review. During thereview the unspent balance with each partner is analysed and agreements may beadjusted to extend the agreement to ensure that unspent balances are used, oragreements with additional allocations of resources are made with partners who haveimplemented according to plan. At the end of the year UNHCR prepares a final report onits activities, achievements, gaps, constraints, and lessons learned, which feed into thedetailed planning exercise for the following year.
280 UNHCR briefing in Tyre.
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Although some partners reported UNHCR’s approach as “unnecessarily close,” overallthey strongly appreciate the implementation of monitoring systems. Critical feedbackfocussed predominantly on the functionalities of online information managementtools.281 The two systems most frequently quoted as potentially useful for referral andcrosschecking information were Activity Info and RAIS (Refugee Assistance InformationSystem). Activity Info is the basis for the WWW.282 However, information is at agencylevel and is not useable for individual or household level analysis. This is the function ofthe RAIS refugee database which reportedly contributed to limiting Unconditional CashProgramme (UCAP) duplication and to verifying the status of new arrivals. However,some partners are reluctant to share data on RAIS because of fear of breach ofconfidentiality. Some partners found that uncorrected entry errors reduced confidencein the accuracy of the information. Others report a lack of understanding of how systemsrelate to each other. UNHRC claims that RAIS is continually being upgraded to improvethe functionality and that most partners do use it to record assistance delivered.Partners consistently report to lack knowledge of outcomes or impact and the capacityor resources for robust analysis. This may explain why monitoring systems are seen asuseful for external reporting but not functioning well as project management tools.
4.2.9 Predictability and TimelinessUNHCR Lebanon partners perceive predictability and timely disbursement of funding tobe the most problematic of all partnership aspects. UNHCR reviews project activityfunding every three months against its actual credit status and every six monthly forproject related staff positions. When credit is low due to late back donor payments, cashflows can become problematic. Rather than managing these risks internally, (e.g. withnon-earmarked funding) UNHCR chooses to transfer them to the earmarked countryprogrammes in Lebanon, who in turn have no other choice than to pass on the problemto the field offices and partners. UNHCR auditors confirm that this “had severeimplications” on partners planning capabilities including on staffing andprocurement.283 Having said this, this strategy also ensured a level of services thatwould not be achieved with a more conservative approach.Partners indicate that untimely and unpredictable funding seriously challenged theirability to plan and retain and motivate key staff, and that this has in some cases hadnegative consequences for activity implementation. Partners could only contract stafffor 6 months and plan operations for three months. UNHCR assumed that this wouldallow partners to retain staff. However, partners report that if staff cannot implementactivities, they tend to leave as they perceive inaction as a threat to their job security.This causes relatively high staff turn over, loss of training inputs and delays inimplementation and wanting quality. The fact that partners could only enter into threemonthly procurement agreements means that bulk discounts were not available, leadingto significant cost increases and inefficiencies.One partner reported that delays in funds disbursement had a detrimental effect on theprotection of medium to low at-risk refugees.284 Having been forced to suspendactivities due to a sudden cash flow crisis induced by the late remittance of protectioncash activities, this partner was forced to prioritise the most at risk group at the expense
281 Interestingly, we found relatively high correlations between needs assessment and monitoring, even if thesystems are not connected, perhaps indicating that issues are linked to a broader information managementagenda.282 Who is doing What Where.283 Email exchange with member of the UNHCR Audit Section, Internal Audit Division, OIOSU-227, UNON, missionin Lebanon.284 By prioritising the most vulnerable, these were relatively less affected.
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of other beneficiaries already included in its project. This left a number of vulnerablepeople without protection for up to two months.These observations are supported by a relatively strong connection between the extentto which partners valued the predictability and timeliness of UNHCR fund disbursementand the extent to which they valued results: in other words the higher they valuedpredictability, they higher they value programme results and vice versa. Poorpredictability affected both efficiency and effectiveness of some partner operations. Theindependent UNHCR evaluation finds that “this leads UNHCR to prioritise the type ofactivities it can finance in time, as opposed to following a needs-based approach andspending funds on what the agency wants to do.”285UNHCR is aware of these problems and risks. In order to improve the situation it nowguarantees an operating level for the 12 months of 2015 based on what is actuallyavailable in its Geneva bank accounts at the beginning of the year. Although this willprovide more predictability and hence improve planning, it will also mean that partnerswill face significant reductions in their budgets. UNHCR auditors have not seen this wayof managing financial risks in other operations and we also did not come across theseproblems in Jordan. Henceforth, this particular risk management strategy seems and itsconsequences seem a particular feature of UNHCR in Lebanon, which it says resultedfrom far more frequent budget increases than in other operations.
4.3 ResultsThis section analyses the effectiveness of the UNHCR’s coordinated response toprotection, shelter and livelihoods needs of the refugees. At the time of writing thisreport, final data for 2014 are not yet available as the RRP6 final Lebanon review isexpected to be available only in May 2015.
4.3.1 ProtectionThe collective response from the RRP Lebanon partners resulted in an impressive set ofoutputs in 2013 and 2014. UNHCR and partners achieved key output targets in Sexualand Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) and Child Protection. Between January andDecember 2014, more than 4,407 children received individual assistance, includingpsycho-social support, emergency care arrangements, and reunification. Additionally,more than 1,300 social workers and case workers, including government staff, benefitedfrom training and coaching to improve the quality of services.286 UNHRC identified ansupported 5,678 persons at risk from SGBV and sensitized almost 12,000 people on thesubject.287However, despite these results, needs remain high, particularly as a result of severeincreases in negative coping due to increasing numbers of refugees now living inextreme poverty as well as increased host community hostility. Although there are noreliable data on SGBV and disrespecting the rights of children288 focus group discussionsit is believed that the problems are extremely widespread due to inadequategovernment policies and funding and economic, social and political conditions inLebanon289.
285 Hidalgo et. al. (3 November 2014).286 In the same period, over 335,651 children, including adolescents and youth, and over 126,406 caregiversbenefited from other psychosocial support activities. During the 2013/14 school year, 229,000 children out ofthe 619,100 in need received support in accessing education. UNHCR (n.d. (a).287 UNHCR Lebanon (August 2014).288 Gilbert (18 July 2014).289 Anani (September 2013).
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4.3.2 ShelterRefugees are found in many different types of accommodation of varying quality. Theseinclude rented rooms, abandoned and refurbished buildings, collective centres andinformal settlements, scattered across the country often on private land leased torefugees, often against exorbitant costs and at significant risks of eviction.290RRP data show that outputs fell significantly behind targets in 2014 which may accountfor the fact why housing remains one of the most urgent issues for refugees. It isestimated that about 40 percent of refugees now live in substandard shelters,291including in 350 informal tented settlements. By August 2014, 41 percent of Syrianrefugees were in substandard shelter, mainly in informal settlements and garages,worksites or unfinished buildings.292 The government’s proactive security measuresintroduced in the second half of 2014 have focused on sensitive areas including informalsettlements and collective shelters. Approximately 10,000 de facto refugees have beenevicted as a result.293 Poor living conditions increase women’s and girls’ risks to sexualand gender based violence due to lack of privacy, and overcrowding. Female headedhouseholds may be at greater risk of sexual exploitation when they are unable to meetrental payments. Survival sex in households that cannot pay for their rents is anincreasingly reported problem.Rental market dynamics increased evictions, indebtedness and resulting economic andpsychosocial distress. The integrated nature of these issues provides opportunities tomainstream protection in shelter programming.294 This would mean putting the conceptof protection vulnerability at the heart of the shelter strategy, which would benefit theelderly, people with special needs, female-headed households, and single mothers.
4.3.3 CashVulnerable refugees require income in addition to assistance and protection to meettheir basic needs for survival and they mostly seek this by way of informal employmentopportunities which is scarce and illegal. General employment reached approximately20 per cent by the end of 2014,295, but for refugees employment is increasingly difficultto find and women and young people are disproportionally affected with nearly 4 out of5 Syrian displaced women not having access to work related income.296An estimated 70 percent of the total registered Syrian refugee population requiresassistance to meet basic needs, and of this population, an estimated 29 per cent isdeemed severely vulnerable.297 NFI sector partners have successfully met most of thebasic needs of vulnerable refugee populations. However, the sector faces fundingshortages, exacerbated by a reduction of ECHOs budget by 50 percent,298 and needs areongoing as a result. The introduction of e-vouchers299 was encouraged by the fact thatSyrian refugees are scattered over 1,700 locations in Lebanon making in-kind or papervoucher distribution verification and post-distribution monitoring inefficient. Accordingto the Independent UNHCR Evaluation refugees largely welcomed the switch from in-
290 Hidalgo et. al. (3 November 2014).291 UNHCR Lebanon (December 2014).292 UN-HABITAT and UNHCR (August 2014).293 LCRP (b) (n.d.).294 Hidalgo et. al. (3 November 2014).295 LCRP (b) (n.d.).296 Ibid.297 LCRP (c) (n.d.).298 UNHCR, MSNA Team (n.d.).299 ‘e-vouchers’ usually refers to the WFP assistance, where the voucher can be used at one of a network ofparticipating shops for the refugees to purchase food.
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kind assistance to cash assistance providing them with the dignity associated with thefreedom of choice to make their own budgetary decisions and priorities.300The UNHCR cash programme is unconditional cash, where refugees have an ATM cardand pin number to withdraw cash. The ‘One Card’ pilot, where the same card is used toload WFP voucher value and withdraw cash from the ATM will start in June 2015. Thecash programme was an important and appropriate programme, allowing for people toset their own priorities and make their own choices about items and quality. Yet even ifcash for the purchase of NFIs was conceived to extend more flexibility, Dorcas(supported with direct Netherlands funding) continued to provide in-kind items inMount Lebanon.301
4.3.4 Other SectorsFood and Health are two of the most critical needs in any humanitarian situation andRRP partners successfully averted the outbreak of communicable diseases ormalnutrition. In 2013 the agencies collectively distributed mostly according to targetswhen adjusted for under-funding.302 Partners confirm that this represents a very goodoverall result against planned targets, signifying an endorsement of UNHCR’s facilitationin terms of coordination, funding and advocacy allowing its partners to reach refugeeswith assistance and protection required for their immediate needs. In 2014, the RRPcontinued with the same operational framework, generating similar levels of outputs.
4.3.5 CoverageThe Independent UNHCR evaluation found that “current interventions are insufficient torespond to increased refugee numbers,”303 and it identified lacking partner capacitiesparticularly in the shelter and WASH sectors and in certain geographic areas (e.g. Arsal).At the beginning of the crisis 100 percent of the registered refugees received hygienekits and food vouchers. Targeting was managed by a task force and introduced in thesecond half of 2013 when numbers increased rapidly and RRP funding did not match.Targeting was informed by preliminary VaSyr-results which showed that 70 percent ofthe refugees were in need of ongoing basic needs assistance, now inclusive ofwinterization assistance.304The targeting task force identified individual households,reducing the number of beneficiaries.
Table 4.3: Targeting the most vulnerable: classification (percentages of overall in Lebanon registered refugee
households and individuals in 2014):
However, at the same time the RRPs are based on agency level needs assessments in
300 Hidalgo et. al. (3 November 2014).301 Dorcas won a €1 million tender for distributing NFIs to new comers (and cross border support).302 UNHCR (n.d.).303 Hidalgo (3 November 2014).304 This demonstrates that 65 percent of the population is considered moderately or severely vulnerable.305 Percentage of individuals included in categories “Moderate” or “Severe Vulnerability”: Moderate + severe pluschildren under 2, Pregnant and Lactating Woman, elderly (>60 years) and non-autonomous individuals (those inneed of support for daily basic activities) included in “Mild” and “Low vulnerability” categories. Inclusion ofspecific categories brings the total to 71 percent.
VULNERABILITY CLASSIFICATION (corrected percentages)Low Mild Moderate Severe Mod-severe Total Indiv. Mod-Severe+ Vuln. Cases Low-mild
Households 19 28 45 8 53
Individuals305 12 24 52 13 65 71Source: UNHCR Targeting briefing paper
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Lebanon, the quality of which is at times questionable. The thoroughness of UNHCR’stargeting process did not prevent assistance- and protection gaps, caused by under-funding and Government policies. UNHCR is addressing these through advocating theauthorities, but would need more political back up from its donors for this to becomemore effective.
4.3.6 StandardsOutput standards and standard operational procedures are developed in national levelsector working groups and task forces, in consultation with field-based partners.Generally, partners highly value UNHCR as a facilitator for the achievement ofappropriate, timely and quality outputs. In Tyre, partners scored adherence tostandards at 4 and in Tripoli 3.6 out of 5.The most pressing problems with standards are in the shelter sector. The IndependentUNHCR evaluation finds that “humanitarian standards have been met except in theshelter sector where SPHERE standards were not maintained and in the educationsector.”306 The evaluation team observed that “not all temporary shelter and settlementsolutions were considered safe and adequate.”307 The harsh winter of 2014-15 hasshown this assessment to be correct. Although the UNHCR and its partners prepared forand responded to winterization needs, by mid-January it was still looking for US$ 70million to finance an adequate response.308 It reported in this context that “the situationacross the region remains precarious for many, particularly given the extremely poorconditions in which refugees are living.”309 At the end of January 2015, IFRC reportedthat at least four Syrian refugees in Lebanon, including two children, had succumbed tothe harsh weather conditions.310UNHCR’s own analysis links some substandard results to inappropriate donorconditions311, which it cannot ignore for political reasons (e.g. promoting trade, usinghumanitarian assistance to subsidize donor country private enterprise from). Somegovernment policies312 also inhibited UNHCR’s ability to achieve standards. Partners arecritical about outcome standards; in the sense that they perceive a lack of commonunderstanding of what these should be, and how these should be measured.313Despite these issues and recurring needs all sources (UNHCR, refugees, partners and theliterature) find that UNHCR has performed beyond what could be expected in Lebanon,especially when considering the unfavourable policy context.314 UNHCR has successfullymanaged the sometimes competing interests of assistance and protection. In achallenging relationship with the host government, it has effectively prioritizedprotection in Lebanon, and established robust and well functioning registrationmechanisms during a high, rapidly evolving influx of often traumatised refugees who areoften reluctant to share their protection needs for political or cultural reasons.
306 Hidalgo (3 November 2014).307 Ibid.308 UN News Centre (16 January 2015).309 UNHCR (26 January 2015).310 IFRC (27 January 2015).311 UNHCR briefing in Tyre.312 E.g. in informal settlements, shelters are not permitted to be permanent structures, and some localmunicipalities or landlords do not permit work such as drainage to be carried out313 Partners in Tyre and Tripoli.314 Hidalgo (3 November 2014).
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4.4 Conclusions and Key challenges
4.4.1 EffectivenessOur findings confirm those of the independent UNHCR evaluation that “[o]verallUNHCR’s response to the influx of refugees in Lebanon has been effective and isconsidered successful.”315 Despite some shortcomings, RRP results when measured interms of outputs, coverage and quality were largely achieved, particularly whenanalysing the protection, shelter and basic sectors. The limited number of refugees wewere able to talk to confirmed to have had timely and acceptable levels of shelter, food,water and protection assistance. The overall strong endorsements by its operating andimplementing partners indicate that UNHCR successfully created conditions in terms offunding, coordination and advocating authorities, and enabled its partners to deliverhumanitarian services and ensure the protection of the refugees. Partners and externalstakeholders confirm that UNHCR has successfully scaled up from its relatively modestbeginnings at the start of the crisis to a capable if somewhat inefficient platform forcoordination, quality assurance and risk management. UNHCR also supported hostcommunities in order to ease the inevitable tensions as a result of the massive influx ofrefugees. Various observers confirm the importance and quality of UNHCR’s work,including municipality authorities, and humanitarian actors independent from UNHCRfunding. However, the literature and anecdotal evidence suggests a worrying trend ofshrinking protection space due to host government policies, combined with persistentcases of substandard shelter, and with cash programming targeting increasingly smallernumbers due to funding shortages, particularly in winterization and protection.Knowing what works and what does not, especially whether and how coordinationfacilitates results effectively and efficiently, requires further research by way of robustsector impact evaluations. The Independent UNHCR evaluation, notes that “[i]n theabsence of a significant baseline, confusion in terminology between outputs andoutcomes, the treatment of outcomes as sub-objectives (in RRP6), and the struggle toidentify relevant indicators, often conflating beneficiaries and benefits, it is difficult tomeasure progress except as reported.” 316 There is a serious lack of impact analysisinforming the evolution of programmes.317 We found only two impact evaluations318commissioned by UNHCR (both in conjunction with WFP), only one of which focuses onLebanon and Jordan.319 Perception studies are the norm and even in the absence ofrobust evidence, there is sufficient anecdotal information indicating a widening gapbetween outputs and outcomes, suggesting that factors outside the control of UNHCR(host government policies and funding levels) are starting to take their toll among theSyrian refugees in Lebanon.
4.4.2 PartnershipsPartnerships provided UNHCR with the implementing capacity it needs to fulfil itsmandate. Partners indicated very high levels of satisfaction with the quality of needsassessments and monitoring and reported that UNHCR successfully created theconditions required for achieving outputs of protection and assistance appropriate tothe needs of the population.
315 Ibid.316 Ibid.317 Impact (def.): the statistically proven socio-economic changes at the level of beneficiaries, which can beverifiably attributed to a project’s inputs.318 Canteli, Morris and Steen (2012).319 http://www.3ieimpact.org/en/funding/thematic-window/jordan-and-lebanon-humanitarian-assistance-thematic-window/
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Some partners complain about the lack of equality or even trust in the partnership.Some observers reported that not all local NGOs uphold agreed standards, supportingthe view that UNHCR is right in monitoring some of its implementing partners closely.The issue of humanitarian partnership has been the subject of numerous debates andmany angles are possible depending on one’s agenda. However, most of these debatescome to the conclusion that uneven or asymmetrical relationships and fundingdependency are ultimately the defining characteristics. Given this the lack ofpredictability and timely disbursement of funding is a very worrying problem in thesystem.UNHCR partnerships have been successfully implemented, but were difficult to manage.Partners vary in size, capacity and ability to engage at operational, tactical and strategiclevels. Some observers speak of a “closed system” with “little regard for horizontalconnectivity.”320 There seems to be some truth in this given that UNHCR has notsucceeded to partner substantially with government institutions, particularly atmunicipality level and with CBOs challenging the imperative of local ownership and thesustainability of its programmes.
4.4.3 CoordinationThe evidence from the literature and field work suggests that coordination waseffective321 and that sector coordination and task forces contribute to commonly sharedand well-targeted services, avoid duplication, and set realistic targets. However, wehave found indications that it may be less than efficient and that the added value ofdecentralisation is called into question by other UN agencies and most UNHCR partners.UNHCR acknowledges that the current system involving a large number of partners isnot efficient, and it intends to limit the number of implementing partners. These willthen subcontract the smaller NGOs and ensure the quality and manage risks. At thispoint in time it is not clear to what extent these intermediaries have themselves thewillingness or capacities to play this role. On the other hand, some of the local NGOs arelooking forward to work in partnership with INGOs (especially those with adevelopment mandate). Other partners question the efficiency of UNHCR’s sub-contracting model: as the system is becoming increasingly sophisticated aboutcoordination, the demand for specialization and the costs will continue to increase.Nevertheless, the intended model of working with strong (international) NGOs thatsubcontract smaller (often local) NGOs seems to be justifiable in terms of efficiency,which may free up space for engaging more directly on strategic and advocacy issueswith larger partners. It is too early to say whether this strategy will work. Outsourcingrisk management and quality assurance this way may well cause further inefficienciesunless UNHCR rationalises its structure. This analysis would lead us to agree with theconclusion of others that “UN coordination architecture in-country should berationalised so as to facilitate consensus and unified leadership with respect to thestrategic priorities of the response.”322
4.4.4 SustainabilityThe fact that assistance and protection needs have not changed or even deteriorated,shows that the RRP has failed to sustainably improve the situation of refugees inLebanon. The delivery of relatively high standards of services is no longer feasible givendwindling donor resources. The dire situation in which most refugees find themselves isexacerbated by continuously contracting protection space due to Lebanese Government
320 Interviews in Beirut.321 Hidalgo (3 November 2014).322 Ibid.
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policies driven by security concerns and the socio-economic impact on hostcommunities.The refugee influx surpassed the Lebanese government’s capacity for delivering publicservices, and had an adverse economic impact especially on poor communities hostingthe refugees. In response, the system is now adopting a “resilience and stabilization”323approach in the overall planning framework, Lebanon’s Crisis Response Plan (LCRP).Under the lead of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators, the alignment of therefugee response with a broader crisis response potentially adds an element ofsustainability to the response through a transfer of responsibility to Government. LCRPaims to centralise Lebanese leadership and institutions, recognising the challenges ofdevelopment and political stability.At the same time, ongoing needs among the refugees are likely to become more acutedue to newly introduced Lebanese policies and dwindling donor funding. UNHCR’s legalprotection mandate requires it to remain slightly more critical and distanced from thehost government. Its refugee protection mandate is sometimes at odds with thegovernment’s agenda, and tensions may well become more profound now thegovernment has made it clear that it wants to put limits on the influx of refugees. Forthese reasons UNHCR is likely to continue to rely on NGOs particularly in the area ofprotection even when it needs to improve its dialogue with local authorities especiallyin areas where hostility against refugees has taken alarming proportions. The politicalcrisis and development needs in Lebanon predate the influx of Syrian refugees, and itseems inappropriate to use humanitarian resources to address what is essentially aninternal governance issue. Furthermore, as one World Bank official put it, “resilienceshould be understood as on top of humanitarian assistance not instead of it.”324However, if past experience is anything to go by,325 the feasibility of the resiliencestrategy is questionable.
323 UNHCR (15 December 2014).324 Interview in Beirut, 3 November 2014.325 UNHCR notes that many municipalities lacking project and financial management capacity has alreadyrendered them inelligible for CSP funding.
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5. Syrian Refugees and Humanitarian Assistance in JordanThis chapter provides an overview of humanitarian assistance and protection providedto Syrian refugees in Jordan and uses the same analytical framework as chapter 4. Westart with a short introduction of the Jordanian context (5.1) and than outline in section5.2 the humanitarian response based mainly on analysis of information from the UNHCRweb-portal326 and focusing on the role of UNHCR and its partners. Section 5.3summarises the main results. Section 5.4 concludes the analysis and summarisespossible implications for Netherlands humanitarian policy.
5.1 ContextJordan was slow in reducing state subsidies on basic commodities and services. Slowingeconomic growth coupled with mounting government debts forced Jordan to agree to anInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) Standby Agreement in August 2012, committing thegovernment to a range of austerity measures. In November that year, an end to petroland fuel subsidies prompted earlier smaller scale protests following the ‘Arab Spring’ toescalate into widespread demonstrations. A significant number of indigenous Bedouintribesmen and East Bankers, viewed by many as King Abdullah’s core constituency, tookpart in the protests as they expressed their grievances over the government’sprivatization policies. Anger mounted over rampant corruption thought to have reachedthe highest echelons of power including the royal palace.327
Table 5.1: Estimated costs of refugee influx for Jordan328
Source 2012 2013 2014 Total 2012-
2015(forecast)Nasser/USAID (2015) €0.54 billion €0.8 billionHashemite Kingdom Jordan /Ministry of Planning (2014) €1.82 billionAl Wazani/AdenauerFoundation (2014) €1.5billion €1.9 billion(cumulative) €3.7 billion(cumulative)MoPIC (2014) € 824 millionThe political- and security implications of the arrival of Syrian refugees and the Syriancrisis generally added considerable strains on the country’s already precarious fiscaland socio-economic and fiscal conditions.329 Where additional spending failed tocompensate for refugees’ access to services, this fuelled growing discontent among theJordanian population. As refugees settled in mostly urban areas, anecdotal evidencesuggest a steep increase in rents330 while the growing availability of cheap labourrepressed wages and, arguably, put further pressures on considerable unemploymentamong Jordanians. Many Jordanians, after showing a remarkable degree of hospitality toSyrian refugees, grew weary about their rising numbers and became increasingly criticalof the government’s policy to allow them to seek protection in Jordan.331 In September2012 a poll among Jordanians showed that nearly two-thirds of respondents favoured
326 http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php327 International Crisis Group (12 March 2012).328 Estimates of the cost of the refugee influx or crisis vary considerably, and against unclear baselines. Forexample, the UNHCR figure for end 2012 is 119,399 registered Syrians, while we had another 46,620 awaitingregistration on 31 December 2012, meaning a cost of around 9,000 Euro for each known refugee.329 On the economic benefits attributed to the arrival of refugees in Jordan, see the comments by Jordanianeconomist Yusuf Mansour cited in: Hall (24 June 2013).330 UNHCR reports that this trend has recently reversed331 Several MPs called for the establishment of a “buffer zone” inside Syria to avoid a further influx. Neimat (28March 2013).
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closing the borders to Syrian refugees.332 Two years later, the same pollster found thatthe proportion of respondents favouring this had risen to nearly 80 percent.333The Syrian conflict and refugee crisis raised a number of political challenges andsecurity concerns. As Islamist groups began to dominate the Syrian uprising and inneighbouring Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood rose to power, the Jordanian governmentbecame increasingly concerned that the influential Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood(Islamic Action Front --IAF), would capitalize on growing popular support. Thegovernment already was at loggerheads with the IAF’s demands for far-reachingconstitutional reforms. These differences prompted the IAF to boycott parliamentaryelections held in January 2013. Salafist-Jihadist groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra, beganto recruit among radicalized Jordanian Sunni Muslims inside Jordan.334 Fears grew thatthe country might turn into an Islamist Jihadist hub, posing a significant domesticsecurity challenge to the government and possibly provoke the Syrian regime, which letfew opportunities pass to accuse Jordan of harbouring insurgents and terrorists.335Jordanian authorities developed increased scrutiny (narrower criteria for access toterritory; verification of documentation at security checks around the country; morestringent response to illegal work etc.) measures directed at Syrian refugees andclamped down on local Salafist preachers and activists accused of advocating radicalagendas. When IS’ territorial gains in Iraq and Syria accelerated in 2014, theGovernment joined the US-led coalition force against it in September that same year.The crisis allowed the Government to strengthen its position. The World Bank in July2013 reversed demands to scrap bread subsidies, in order to avoid widespread unrest.The Syrian crisis also gave a major impetus to Jordan’s ties with Arab Gulf states,especially after Jordan joined the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in May 2011, giving itaccess to financial and military assistance, discounted oil prices, trade and investmentopportunities, and humanitarian aid. Recognising Jordan’s growing strategic importancein a region in turmoil, US total bilateral aid to Jordan between 2011 and 2014 amountednearly US$2.4 billion.336 Syria’s civil war also dampened domestic calls for politicalchange and reform, and prompted passive support to the regime. Following the captureof a Jordanian pilot in December 2014 by IS and his violent death, many Jordaniansceased criticism of the government’s decision to join the US-led anti-IS coalition, andother anti-government grievances.
5.1.1 Arrivals and RegistrationThe first Syrian refugees arrived in Jordan in March 2011, shortly after the SyrianGovernment clamped down on protests in Dar’a.337 Most refugees originated from Dar’a,20 kilometres from Irbid, Jordan’s second largest city.338Refugees’ places of origin changed over time and reflect the evolution of the Syriaconflict. In March 2013, more than two thirds (67 %) originated from Dar’a. By the endof 2013, they accounted for slightly over half (52.7 %) of all Syrian refugees, and as
332 The poll was by the Jordanian Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS). Neimat (10 September 2012).333 Shteiwi, Walsh and Klassen (2014). Another recent poll among Syrian refugees and Jordanian hostcommunities suggests that while tensions have risen, mutual perceptions have not yet reached the level ofoutright hostility or overly negative attitudes. Care International (April 2014).334 Pelham (10 January 2013). At the end of 2014, it was estimated that around 1,500 Jordanian fighters hadjoined radical islamist armed groups in Syria and Iraq. http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/335 Al-Hayat (9 April 2014).336 Sharp (17 March 2015).337 http://syrianrefugees.eu/?page_id=163338 Olwan and Shiyab (2012).
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fighting increased in the central and northern areas of Syria, increasing numbers ofrefugees were driven from Homs (14.9 %), rural Damascus (7.5 %) and Hama (4.5 %).By September 2014, more than one third came from Homs (15.1 %), rural Damascus(9.6 %) and Aleppo (4.5 %), with Dar’a now accounting for 45.9 % of the total.339
Figure 5.1. Origins of southern Syrian refugees in Jordan
Source: UNHCRUNHCR’s registration capacity expanded in 2013, with new registration centres in Irbid,Raba Sarhan and Amman, allowing Syrian refugees to register on the day of their arrival(in the case of Raba Sarhan) or when they present at UNHCR’s urban locations, andcontributing to the elimination of remaining backlogs. Figure 5.2 shows that by October2014, the total number of Syrian refugees reached 620,000 – equivalent to almost 9.6%of the Jordanian population. At the time of our visit, a total of 618,500 Syrians wereregistered as refugees340. The de facto closure of the border by Jordanian authorities in2014 (see section 5.2.1) left approximately 3,000 Syrian refugees stranded.341
339 UNHCR registration340 “Inter Agency Regional Update” (20 November 2014).341 Sweis (12 December 2014).
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Figure 5.2 Syrian Refugee UNHCR registrations in Jordan (January 2012 – November 2014)
source: UNHCR registrationUNHCR data (fig.5.3) confirm that actual arrival rate of refugees has fallen from as earlyas February 2013.
Figure 5.3 Monthly arrival rate of refugees in Jordan August 2014 to October 2014
Figure 5.4: Refugees Monthly New Arrivals in Jordan July 2012 to August 2013
Figure 5.4 shows that during the time of our visit in October 2014, only 344 people wereofficially recorded as new arrivals.342 UNHCR reports a net decrease in overall refugee
342 UNHCR (14 March 2015).
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registration.343 At the time of writing, the Jordanian Government was still receiving newSyrian refugees, albeit under very strict conditions and security scrutiny.Approximately 85 % of the refugees who settled in Jordan, representing 520,000 people,live in non-camp settings in urban and rural areas. The highest concentrations are innorthern and central Jordan, including Amman (27.7 %), Irbid (23.3 %), Mafraq (12.4%) and Zarqa (8.5 %). 344
5.2 Humanitarian ResponseBetween March and July 2011 UNHCR registered 5,391 Syrian refugees in Jordan and by31 July 2012, 91,374 Syrians had arrived in Jordan, but only about 50% of theseregistered immediately with UNHCR.On 2 August 2012, 5,896 Syrians lived in the Ramtha (King Abdullah Park and CyberCity) and Za’atari transit facilities. Za’atari camp was opened on 29 July 2012 with thetransfer of 477 Syrians from facilities in Ramtha and by 31 August 2012 the populationin Za’atari was 23,378 registered Syrians. The vast majority were scattered among localhost communities.345 In August 2012, 39,600 displaced Syrians were registered, with anadditional 2,283 persons waiting to be registered.346 Even if WFP started to distributefood vouchers, and UNHCR cash, almost from the beginning, large numbers did notregister for fear of their personal security.347 Lack of information may also have playedits part.
5.2.1 Appeals and FundingThe first RRP was launched in March 2012. INGOs such as CARITAS started to respondin late 2012348. The results of the Jordan section of this appeal were patchy. Although allinitial protection and cash needs were fully funded, most other sectors were onlycovered by 75% at the most, with 50% of the shelter needs not responded to,349 despitein kind contributions from Gulf states, resulting in competition among the mostvulnerable for scarce resources. This may have contributed to unrest and violence inZa’atari, the largest concentration of refugees in Jordan.350 As in Lebanon, anecdotalevidence suggests that refugees compensated with their own resources and by thoseprovided by host communities and local charitable organisations in Jordan, asinternational agencies were relatively slow in their response. Food vouchers do not onlymeet survival needs, but are also tradable (in practice, not purposefully) and representimportant opportunities to obtain cash for other purposes (such as health or dentalcare). The fact that food sector needs were less than 75 percent covered means thatthese added benefits were limited and required WFP and UNHCR to target assistanceonly to the most vulnerable causing coverage issues. By the end of 2014 theinternational community’s humanitarian system was still only funding 58 percent ofidentified needs. Recalculations later showed this to be 75% as the projected beneficiarynumber was lower than projected. In total for 2013 and 2014, the RRP system brought1.4 billion USD to Jordan in humanitarian and resilience aid, funded at 70% and 75%respectively.
343 UNHCR (13 November 2014).344 Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, MoPIC (1 December 2014).345 Mercy Corps (October 2012).346 IMC and UNICEF (12 August 2012).347 IFRC and JRC (September 2012).348 CARITAS Jordan (16 October 2012).349 UNHCR (n.d.).350 Luck (23 August 2012).
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The main recipient from the RRP is WFP, mostly to cover the huge food sector needs (ata cost of nearly US$18 million per month). UNHCR’s RRP component was approximately25 percent of this amount, and as the second largest recipient, was particularly affectedby under-funding. The 2014 mid year review warned that under-funding would expose1.1 million people to avoidable diseases and poor coverage of a polio vaccination
campaign, and that 10,000 people could lose access to treatment for non-communicablediseases. It also warned that 83,000 vulnerable refugees in urban areas would notreceive monthly cash assistance during the last quarter of the year.353 The 40 percentfunding shortfall required UNHCR to target RRP assistance to only the most vulnerablecases leaving a large number of people without humanitarian assistance. UNHCR’sappeals are based on verified needs assessments and it takes the principle of impartialassistance very seriously. Warnings about the implications of under-funding forrefugees have consistently become evident (see section 5.3), but never led to fullcoverage of any of the appeals.The impact of underfunding was somewhat mitigated by the fact that populationnumbers were lower than expected. The Government repeatedly cautioned that it couldnot host more refugees due to its limited resources and inadequate internationalassistance. It claimed that its education and healthcare systems were on the verge ofcollapse as it had to accommodate 140,000 Syrian pupils while the number of Syriansseeking healthcare at public hospitals rose by 600 percent.354 The Governmentpresented its own Response Plan(s) showing the costs of the refugee influx andrequested international relief efforts to include host communities’ needs and associatedJordanian government costs. In September 2014, the Jordanian government said it wasin need of foreign assistance amounting to US$4.5 (€4 billion) to deal with the refugeecrisis.355
351 UNHCR (n.d.). https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=5658352 2014 RRP6: Indicative requirement. Final expenditures not yet reported at the time of writing.353 UNHCR (n.d.) (b).354 Ibid.355 Minister of Planning Ibrahim Saif cited by Petra News (1 September 2014).
Table 5.2: Overview of Jordan overall coordinated humanitarian response 2013 (expenditure) and 2014 (projected requirements):
Sector Lead Expenditure 2013 US$
(million)351 Budget2014352 UNHCR RRPcomponent
(2014)
Main RRP partners (2014)
Protection UNHCR 95.4 169.1 56.7 UNHCR, IRCFood WFP 256.5 322.1 1.4 WFP, FAO, JHCO, CARITASShelter UNHCR, NRC 196.5 136.5 99.5 UNHCR, IOM, NRC, JHAS, UN-Habitat, ACTEDNFIs UNHCR, NRC 75.9 104.2 54.0 UNHCR, NRC, WVI, JHAS, CARE, Mercy Corps, UNFPAWASH UNHCR, UNICEF 136.9 153.8 19.5 UNICEF, UNICEF, UNDP, ACTED, RI, Mercy CorpsHealth UNHCR, WHO 87.4 120.0 24.6 UNHCR, WHO, UNICEF, IMC, JHAS, CARITASCash UNICEF, CARE 57.1 107.6 56.8 UNHCR, CARE, SCI, IRC, DRC, HI, ACTED, ACFEducation UNICEF, SCI 70.7 86.3 3.8 UNICEF, NRC, UNHCR, CARITAS, SCI
Total 1016 1223 355Sources: Syria Regional Response Plan 6 – 2013 Final Report and 2014 RRP: Indicative requirement.
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Figure 5.5 RRP5 Funding shortfalls per sector (end of year 2013):
source: UNHCR RRP5 Final Report
5.2.2 Jordanian Government PoliciesLike Lebanon, Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 refugee convention or its 1967Protocol but it did sign a memorandum of understanding with UNHCR under which itreceives technical and policy support. The Memorandum of Understanding also statesthe cooperation between UNHCR and Jordan on issues of international protection,including by defining the concept of who is a refugee and the principle of non-refoulement.The Government proactively ensures that the international humanitarian system’sprogrammes are closely harmonized with its own policies. An example of strategicimportance is the introduction of iris-scan technology in registration and cashprogramming. The immigration department and security services, use the same systemand many refugees perceive a link between refugee data to other informationmanagement systems and policies, even if encryption prevents misuse. This does notalways encourage registration of vulnerable refugees356 and discouraged some NGOsfrom reporting to the international coordination system.357 Need assessmentquestionnaires require approval and, as programming is needs-based, this can lead tobiases. Some partners report delays in project approval and implementation as aresult.358Employment is subject to a costly work permit for Syrian refugees and health care isbecoming very difficult to access for the most vulnerable. The resulting precarioussituation is compounded by cuts to cash distributions and the erratic and under-fundedfood voucher programmes, leaving Syrian refugees with only illegal livelihoodopportunities to meet the ever-increasing living costs in Jordan. Negative copingmechanisms are on the rise, exposing the most vulnerable to increased protection risks.Initially failing camp security in Za’atari raised concerns about inadequate protection. InOctober 2013 Amnesty International reported high crime levels in the camp and other
356 UNHCR partner in Amman: “Beneficiaries are sometimes afraid to talk to UNHCR, and don’t call the hotlinebecause they are afraid they will be referred to the police.” Interview in Amman.357 External stakeholder and partner interviews in Amman.358 Mafraq partner interviews.
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security-related fears.359 In March and early April 2014 riots broke out in the camp inresponse to the killing of a refugee. The Jordanian government blamed pro-Syrianregime “sleeper cells”360 but given a noticeable drop in security incidents in Za’atari bothbefore and after, the incident appears to have been anomalous. Regardless, refugeesreportedly resented camp authorities’ reliance on the mediation of local strongmenamong the refugees in the camp who act as “street presidents”. This is alleged to haveencouraged corruption involving such ‘street presidents’ as they reportedly use theirinfluence to build clientelistic ties to the refugee community.361 Compounding theseproblems, UNHCR and the Jordanian Gendarmerie reportedly established links withdifferent refugee interlocutors, raising questions about security enforcementresponsibilities in the camp.362 However, no major security incidents are reported since,and UNHCR appears to have discouraged the emergence of local bosses in Azraq campby establishing direct relations with refugee communities from the start.At the same time the Government closed dozens of informal crossing points into Jordanwhile border authorities reportedly announced in June 2013 and again in October 2013that they would limit access for Syrians without valid identification papers, Syrians ofPalestinian origin, Iraqi refugees, and unaccompanied males.363 Syrian males with nofamily are no longer allowed entry following reports of former FSA fighters joining ISranks.364 UNHCR supports re-registration but advocates for flexibility through pre-arrangements with border security authorities. During our visit in October andNovember 2014, reports emerged about thousands of Syrian refugees stuck at theSyrian side of the border without access to appropriate shelter or basic facilities as theywere denied entry. UNHCR registered virtually no refugees since 25 September. TheSyrian Refugees Affairs Directorate (SRAD) confirmed a sharp reduction in new arrivalsbut refuted that Jordan denied refugees access, explaining the smaller numbers by a lullin fighting in Dar’a governate.365 Yet satellite imagery dated 2 November and posted byUNOSAT, appeared to contradict such claims. The photographs showed a large numberof makeshift shelters in the open desert at the Rubkan border crossing.366 On 4December new satellite imagery again showed “probable shelters,” this time in the opendesert near Hadalat border crossing.367Meanwhile the Government’s policy aims to encourage the population to move fromurban areas to the camps by stricter labour and settlement law enforcement andproviding services exclusively in Za’atari and Azraq camps. As of 14 July 2014, theGovernment began to apply an encampment policy more strictly, including by issuinginstructions to UNHCR to cease registration in urban areas of persons having left thecamps without a ‘bail-out’. The Government also increased forced relocations to thecamps of individuals without “bail-out” documents, coupled with denial of access toservices in urban areas for those who had not regularized their situation in non-campsettings.
359 Amnesty International (31 October 2013).360 al-Samadi (9 April 2014).361 Sullivan (14 October 2014).362 Ibid.363 al-Samadi (13 June 2013); Amnesty International (31 October 2013).364 UNHCR Protection Unit briefing Amman.365 Interview in Amman, 5 November 2014.366 UNOSAT (2 November 2014).367 UNOSAT (4 December 2014).
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Figure 5.6: Return to Za’atari from urban area in 2014
This graph suggest that the encampment strategy is working. In November 2014 UNHCRreported that Za’atari reached full capacity. This prompted UNHCR to transfer refugeesto Azraq camp, which opened in May 2014. However, the camp’s remote location andharsh living conditions, act as deterrents.368 UNHCR currently only accepts new arrivalsin Za’atari under specific circumstances such as family reunification.
5.2.3 UNHCRUNHCR plays the same assistance and protection coordination role as it does inLebanon, under the same mandate (see Chapter 4.2). UNHCR initially responded with itspre-crisis capacity when the first refugees came across the border near Ramtha. Itscaled up significantly and now maintains five offices in Jordan, including Amman HeadQuarters, which includes Amman Field Office, Mafraq sub-office (with responsibilitiesfor Za’atari camp, border monitoring and Mafraq Governate), Irbid Field Office andAzraq Field office. Amman, Mafraq and Irbid offices also contain registration sites, inaddition to mobile registration facilities. UNHCR’s operational requirements in Jordanincreased from US$ 62.8 million in 2010 to a revised 2013 budget of US$ 367.6 million.The budget for the 2014 emergency response for Syrian refugees is US$ 430.4 million.369It employs 779 staff (114 of whom are international).370
5.2.4 CoordinationConsistent with the Independent UNHCR evaluation,371 and as in Lebanon, differentpartners value the sector system differently. At the top-level, coordination betweenUNHCR and the HCT, Resident Representative (Res Rep) and the HC was marred byambiguity over responsibilities in refugee operations. Although respectiveresponsibilities in such situations were set out in April 2014 in a letter co-signed by theERC and High Commissioner. Those provisions have not been applied in Jordan as it isnot considered an L3 emergency even if Amman coordination includes regionalresponsebilities related to the Syria crisis as whole.The Independent UNHCR evaluation finds that most negative impressions concerncoordination between OCHA and UNHCR’s, and UNHCR’s perceived “double/triplehatting” as implementer, coordinator, and funder.”372 As in Lebanon, partners andothers are concerned that the system is overly elaborate with too many layers, taskforces and other specialised functions.
368 During summer temperatures in Azraq can reach up to 45 degrees celcius. “The site is definitely not ideal,we’ve tried to make the best of it.” Steffen Horstmeier of World Vision cited in Ammun News (28 April 2014).369 UNHCR (n.d.) (c).370 Ibid.371 “While UN, NGO, and UNHCR respondents have mixed perspectives regarding UNHCR’s coordination role,donors and INGOs tend towards more negative comments.” Hidalgo (3 November 2014).372 Ibid.
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Especially in urban settings partners value coordination meetings as useful for sharingbest practices, standardization and cross-checking to avoid duplication. Partners concurthat the right actors participate in the meetings but that local NGOs and CBOs areunderrepresented which does not allow them to cross check or refer beneficiaries withthese agencies.373 Unlike in Lebanon, essential government bodies actively participate,especially in the shelter and protection sectors. Those who see themselves mostly asimplementers of UNHCR’s programmes are content with the WWW agendas of themeetings, whereas the more prolific INGOs see opportunities to take coordination to ahigher, more strategic level374 even if we found some evidence that contingencyplanning and vulnerability assessments were on the agenda of coordination meetings375.
5.2.5 UNHCR PartnersThe analysis in this section is based on UNHCR partner perspectives on selection, needsassessments, monitoring, coordination and results. These were gathered in interviewswith UNHCR partners in Amman, Irbid and Mafraq.The RRP overall operational framework in Jordan consists of the Government of Jordan,12 UN agencies, 51 national and international NGOs. Sector coordination is based inAmman, as most staff commutes daily between the capital and refugee locations,predominantly in the north (Irbid and Mafraq), to participate in sub-working groupsand coordination fora in the relevant Governorates and camps. UNHCR collaborateswith other UN agencies in the Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF), chaired by the UNHCRCountry Representative and composed of heads of main UN agencies, the INGO Forum,ICRC and key donors. IATF is the main coordination body, overseeing overall refugeeresponse. It also works on cross sector issues such as gender mainstreaming. Inaddition, the International NGO (INGO) Forum, with 53 participants, collaborates onsetting strategic policies and advocates for improved service delivery and protectionpolicies. UN agencies and NGOs chair the sectors and sub-sectors.UNHCR coordinates the Syrian refugee response in collaboration with the Governmentof Jordan and acts as “facilitator of collective decision-making.”376 The Government hasthe overall (policy) lead, and UNHCR leads the coordination of the eight sector workinggroups through the Inter Sector Working Group (ISWG). In 2013, the Governmentestablished the SRCD (Syrian Refugee Camps Directorate), under the Ministry ofInterior, to coordinate activities in refugee camps. In 2014, this became the SyrianRefugee Affairs Directorate (SRAD) with responsibility also for refugees outside thecamps as the primary government institution for the refugee response. Otherinstitutions involved are the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,and most significantly the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. TheMinistry of Public Works which develops and manages the Azraq and Za’atariinfrastructure, is an implementing partner. Collaboration is particularly strong in theprotection sector particularly in child protection, gender based violence andpsycho-social interventions. The Government of Jordan (including the Ministry ofSocial Development, the Family Protection Department, the Juvenile Police Departmentand the National Council for Family Affairs) and international actors collaborate to alignnational protection and coordination mechanisms and to ensure that Syrians haveaccess to national protection mechanisms and programmes where appropriate.
373 Partner interviews in Amman, Mafraq and Irbid.374 UNHCR partners: “Coordination platforms should be used more to discuss analysis and advocacy.” and ‘Thereis no coordinated discussion at working group level on what to do when funding stops and “We need to urgentlydiscuss the consequences of WFP funding situation.” Interviews in Amman October 2014.375 http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107376 As described by UNHCR Leadership during Amman briefing.
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5.2.6 Partner SelectionAs part of the new PartnershipManagement process, UNHCRlaunched a Call for Expressions ofInterest in August 2014 forinterventions with a running time ofbetween 3 to 12 months. The purposewas to solicit interest from partnerswishing to obtain UNHCR funding, or as UNHCR put it, those “willing to participate in aUNHCR operation and contribute complementary resources (human resources,knowledge, funds, in-kind contributions, supplies and/or equipment) to achievingcommon objectives as agreed in a Project Partnership Agreement.”377The selectionprocess includes a risk and track record assessment, and a quality check of the of needsassessments used to justify the intervention and resulted in implementing partnershipswith four UN agencies (IOM, UNOPS, UNRWA, and UNV), five government departments,and 15 NGOs (five of which Jordanian). 378In Amman, Mafraq and Irbid we spoke to six of UNHCR’s implementing partners and toeight operational partners379 addressing protection, shelter and cash needs. In Mafraqwe also included agencies that implement in Za’atari, including representatives of twoGovernment departments, UN and Red Cross organisations and local and internationalNGOs. Most partner worked with UNHCR for several years, some already during theIraqi refugee response in Jordan, and as such are familiar with UNHCR systems andprocedures. We also spoke to refugees when visiting a child protection centre, acollective shelter unit in Mafraq and during home visits in Amman and Irbid. Thesepartners represent a varied and diverse range of actors in terms of responsibility,mandate, vision, mission and technical expertise. Collectively they are part of UNHCR’simplementation capacity. On average they have worked in the RRP framework for justover two years at the time of the interviews and received more than three RRP grants.UNHCR funding component is less than a quarter on average (a third for those operatingin Za’atari). The camps-level partners we interviewed are twice as dependent on UNHCRfunding than their ‘urban’ counterparts, which may account for some of the differencesin perceptions on needs assessments, monitoring, coordination and results.
5.2.7 Needs assessmentsUNHCR and partners continued to invest in information management tools, includingimprovements to the refugee response portal (data.unhcr.org), protection incidentmonitoring (Inter-Agency Gender-Based Violence Information Management System(GBVIMS)) and case management tools (Inter-Agency Child Protection InformationManagement System (CPIMS),380 and a RRP6 specific tool381 for online activities,planning, tracking and reporting specifically.NGOs are responsible for undertaking the needs assessment required to design theirinterventions, which may account for why the quality (in terms of accuracy and a solidbasis for programme design) is rated at a very high level (4.5 out of 5). Unsurprisingly,this is even more true for partners operating in Za’atari camp. Assessments are morechallenging in open situations such as the urban areas, than in closed settings like
377 UNHCR (n.d.) (c).378 Ibid.379 Implementing partners receive (part of their) RRP funding as a UNHCR subcontractor; operating partners donot receive UNHCR funding, but coordinate in other ways (e.g. by participating in sector working groups).380 Online versions of both the CPIMS and GBVIMS are being piloted by UNHCR in Jordan.381 http://www.syrianrefugeeresponse.org
Table 5.3: UNHCR Partner Perceptions (scores out of 5)
Average Camp Urban OverallRRP months 27 25 25.6No. of RRP grants 2.2 3.8 3.4UNHCR % of budget 34.2 17.5 22.3Output 5.0 4.9 4.9Outcome 3.0 3.4 3.3Standards 3.7 4.4 4.2Coverage 3.5 2.8 3.0Needs assessment 4.5 3.4 3.8Monitoring 4.0 3.0 3.3Predictable and Timely 5.0 4.0 4.4Coordination 3.1 3.6 3.5
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Za’atari. The fact that non-camp needs assessments, including questionnaires and otherassessment tools require prior approval from MoPIC makes the process slow andbureaucratic in urban areas which may also account for a lower appreciation. UNHCRhas developed a needs assessment registry and guidelines to ensure some coordination.The main interagency needs assessment framework is the sector coordinatedVulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) the development of which started in 2014and was launched in January 2015. The VAF is based on predicted expenditureexpanding on pilot work carried out by UNHCR and the World Bank in 2014. However,partners judge it to be more participatory and adjusted to sector indicators developed inthe sector working groups. Partners highly value the comprehensiveness andparticipatory nature of the development of the needs assessments system aspositives.382
Figure 5.7: The conceptual framework for Vulnerability Assessment383
However, complexity and participation also meant that the system took time to developand made validation a cumbersome process. Despite efforts to improve needsassessment coordination, some partners expressed reservations about the accuracy ofneeds assessments. For instance, WFP needed to tighten its targeting in the second halfof 2014, due to funding shortfalls, which affects urban programmes disproportionally.VAF was not formalized in time but was still used to assist WFP in this process.384 WFPinformed partners that they expect a 7-10 percent error (7,000-12,000 people) in theirtargeting exercise, affecting mainly cash and protection partners who were, according toone partner, not informed on the criteria used by WFP to exclude beneficiaries from thelist. However, WFP did explain the process to partners and refugees. This may havecontributed to some in-efficiencies in data collection, reflected in the lower score byurban partners 3.5 out of five.The Home Visit project385 was launched in 2012 as part of UNHCR’s cash assessmentprogram. Between March 2012 and October 2013, 61,823 homes were visited by IRD(International Relief and Development) outreach workers and a smaller number byUNHCR staff with standard questionnaires collecting data on migration patterns,
382 Almost all partners mentioned this spontaneously during interviews.383 ACAPS and UNHCR (26 September 2013).384 Interview with UNHCR Senior Field Coordinator.385 IRD and UNHCR (2013 & 2014).
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population characteristics, living conditions, refugee household budget analysis, andhealth and education needs. This work continued in 2014 and although the quality andcomprehensiveness is impressive, but it is unclear how the analysis is used to informprogramming decisions. There are also concerns about duplication with postdistribution monitoring, as some areas correspond with the Home Visit questionnaires.Even if they serve different purposes, data collection can be rationalised.It seems perhaps surprising that UNHCR does not have needs assessments tools readyprior to a refugee crisis. RAIS, the off-the-shelf tool, was unable to capture refugeemobility and did not interface with the iris scan systems. Nevertheless, and even if toolslike this need to be contextualised, given the crucial role of needs assessments inprogramming decision-making, it is critical that UNHCR have needs assessment toolsready and design procedures and processes to roll them out much faster.
5.2.8 MonitoringUNHCR Jordan developed information management to facilitate coordinated planningand implementation by partners. It successfully incorporated iris scan technologyalready in use in several government systems in registration and cash programming,which greatly contributed to overall confidence in data and information management.The new technology also facilitated accurate referral and targeting.Partners operating in camps expressed higher levels of appreciation with the quality ofmonitoring information then those in urban areas. This is not unusual as similar toneeds assessments, closed settings represent a more controlled data environment thanopen settings, where populations are more geographically, socially and economicallymobile. This, and the fact that partners report an ability to achieve higher standards, arelikely to be among the reasons why refugees prefer living in urban areas.386UNHCR requires all partners to work with ActivityInfo for accountability and reportingoutputs and basic coordination characteristics, such as the WWW overviews. Refugeelevel (outcome) information reporting and exchange all benefited from thestandardization of PDM tools through the monitoring and evaluation taskforce. Data areentered into RAIS database and used for targeting, referral and follow up. However notall partners understand how to use these tools for project management purposes. Thediverse nature of partners and their own internal systems designed to meet other backdonor requirements, compounded utility challenges. As a consequence, differentmonitoring systems appear to exist in parallel, and some partners just use Excel toinclude lists of beneficiaries and some partners. The Independent UNHCR evaluationalso found that different NGOs report on different indicators and targets.387 UNHCR isaware that partners need additional support and training to be able to use the systems.
It cites high staﬀ turnover as a major factor challenging coordinated use.388 However,other analysis demonstrates more fundamental information management issues389.
5.3 ResultsThe analysis in this section is not intended as a comprehensive evaluation of RRP resultsor UNHCR performance, but explores results in terms of output, outcome, coverage, and
386 Ibid.387 Ibid.; Hidalgo (3 November 2014).388 UNHCR Amman briefings.389 Reference to both the strengths and weaknesses of the IM systems, training and support can be found athttp://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=2704 andhttp://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=6158
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quality (standards) in order to assess the effectiveness and sustainability of Netherlandssupported humanitarian assistance.
5.3.1 ProtectionAs in Lebanon the UNHCR partnership achieved a very impressive set of protectionoutputs in 2013 and 2014.390 Partners confirmed391 that these outputs were part of whatthey see as a perfect record (5 out of 5).However, increasingly RRP outputs lag behind schedule and protection concerns areamong the most important, especially for those living in non-camp settings. Protectionoutputs did not prevent negative outcomes such as continuing deportation, refoulementand family separation (also between camp and non-camp), and forced encampment. TheIndependent UNHCR evaluation notes “growing concern that UNHCR and its partnersare not fully meeting refugees’ protection needs in Jordan.”392 It identified opportunitiesfor UNHCR to improve the integration of protection in assistance programmes, notablein shelter. Increased debt and a lack of livelihoods opportunities create a deepeningdependence on humanitarian assistance or reliance on negative coping strategies suchas limiting food consumption and children’s access to education, marrying off childrenor sending them to work.393 Gender based violence is widespread and may be under-reported as victims are often afraid to speak openly.394 Early marriages are commonwith 51.3 percent of female and 13 percent of male respondents in a recent survey saidthey married when they were still children.395 While the majority of early marriagesamongst the Syrian population were conducted in Syria, UNHCR and protection partnersare working to prevent and respond to early marriage through awareness campaigns396conducted with the community, religious leaders and with the Shari’a Court and throughprovision of counselling and multi-sectoral services through a network of serviceproviders and safe spaces. 30 percent of Syrian refugee children born in Jordan do nothave birth certificates and similar gaps exist for marriages, deaths, and other family-related certificates.397 The establishment of a Shari’a Court in Zaatari, mobile presence ofthe Office of the Civil Registrar in the refugee camps, awareness-raising campaigns onthe importance of birth and marriage documentation, and exceptional Cabinetexemptions from fines for late registration, may have contributed to increased levels ofcivil registry documentation held by Syrians. While all demographic groups of refugeesreported high levels of distress resulting from exposure to violent conflict andrelocation, women and children in particular lack access to community support andsocial coping mechanisms due to the lack of safe spaces for them to meet and socializeoutside of the home.398 The number of safe spaces outside of camps increased in 2014.These function as a location for the delivery of psychosocial support, and foridentification and referral of child protection and SGBV cases.399Other protection targets seem relatively low and designed around feasibility rather thanneeds. For instance, 6,086 individuals were submitted for resettlement in 2014, (0.9% of
390 UNHCR (n.d.) (a).391 Partner interview in Amman, Mafraq and Irbid.392 Hidalgo (3 November 2014)393 Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, MoPIC (1 December 2014).394 Ibid.395 Save the Children (2014).396 Amani Campaign, Interagency child protection and gender based violence campaign, Jordan 2014 p 12,data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=5569397 Ibid.398 UN Women (2013).399 Jordan SGBV Sub-Working Group, Women and Girls Safe Spaces (2014),http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/working_group.php?Page=Country&LocationId=107&Id=35
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registered refugees in Jordan) when over 200,000 refugees, many of whom Syrian, triedto reach Europe in 2014 alone (see also the Lebanon section of this report).
5.3.2 ShelterSince 2012, refugees required a total of 120,000 housing units to accommodate Syrianrefugees in host communities in addition to the almost 90,000 people living in camps. In2012, conditions in Za’atari were harsh.400 However, UNHCR partners upgraded Za’atarifrom an emergency to a basic services camp with improved infrastructure and shelterfacilities. Nevertheless, standards in Za’atari vary significantly according refugees’ timeof arrival. Early settlers have better quality shelter than new arrivals who are morelikely to live in tents.401 At the beginning of 2014, the camp hosted approximately125,000 people, 64,000 people of whom in emergency tents,402 and the remainder in
15,000 pre‐fabricated containers. 91.6% of needs assessment survey respondents listed shelter assistance as a critical ongoing need. In camps, significant investments arerequired to meet basic necessities.403 REACH identified that 75.2% of shelters in AlZa'atari are caravans, implying that almost a quarter of the population live in tents.404 InJanuary 2015, when heavy snow hit Za’atari, a number of tents collapsed, and it becameevident that refugees continue to have needs that UNHCR and its partners are unable toservice, despite their best efforts.405Support to refugees in urban settings focused on winterization, provision of additionalshelter units, and upgrading housing to adequate standards. Azraq camp was prepared
to receive 52,000 people, but by the end of 2013, only 406 semi‐permanent T‐shelter units were installed. Many refugees continue to live in expensive and substandardaccommodation in urban areas. On average a refugee family can expect to payapproximately JOD150 (US$ 210) to rent a two bedroom flat for one month.406A source of concern is that increasing numbers of displaced Syrians built informaltented settlements (ITS) in rural and peri-urban settings as they can no longer afford tolive in host communities and are increasingly unwilling or unable to reside in officialcamps. Some groups, like nomads and agricultural workers may have chosen to live inITS. There are now 87 informal settlements hosting a total of 7,028 individualsidentified across five governorates. Analysis indicates a 113 percent increase in thenumber of ITS residents compared to December 2013.407 However, more recently thesituation seems to have stabilised. ITS are illegal under Jordanian law408 and itsoccupants are exposed to serious protection risks and among those with the mosturgent needs for assistance.409
5.3.3 LivelihoodsFrom the beginning of 2013 partners provided three types of cash assistance dependingon the particular profile of the refugee household:
400 In August 2012 Andrew Harper, UNHCR representative in Jordan, reportedly described the situation inZa’atari as being “very harsh”: “I do not wish to paint a rosy picture about the camp, but there is no other choice.They [the refugees] were brought here because there is no other choice. The UNHCR is trying to deal with theharsh conditions in the camp. Unfortunately, the expectations of the refugees are higher than the realities.” al-Du’mah (20 August 2012).401 UNHCR, Jordan Refugee Response (September 2014).402 Ibid.403 Jordan Response Plan 2015.404 UNHCR and REACH (June 2014).405 WFP (14 January 2015).406 In interviews, refugees in Amman and Mafraq quoted rents as high as 400 JOD per month.407 UNICEF and REACH (June 2014).408 With the exception of Bedouin and Nawar409 Hidalgo (3 November 2014).
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1. regular monthly cash assistance or time‐bound monthly assistance;  2. one‐off or ‘staggered’ urgent cash assistance to address a specific financial shock or need that is not covered by other forms of available assistance;3. seasonal or specific assistance including winterization support or support for newarrivals.410By September 2013, 8,246 families received urgent cash assistance, 24,930 families withregular cash assistance, and 9,268 families with seasonal assistance.411 WFP suppliescash for food (e-vouchers) to 98% of refugees. 21,000 households receive unconditionalcash, with 7,000 households approved but currently on stand by due to the lack (oruncertainty) of funding.412 Yet the most recent update on cash distribution resultsconfirming partner perspectives that outputs against targets are on track in 2014.413Respondents to a rapid assessment in July 2012 expected to remain displaced for theforeseeable future and were unclear about how they would continue to cover householdcosts as their displacement continued into the winter period. 414 The assessment showedthat an average sized family requires JOD 320 (USD 450) a month to cover householdexpenses, excluding rent. The majority of survey respondents reported increasinghardships despite having received assistance in various forms.415 According to morerecent Home Visit data,416 a majority of respondents said they relied on humanitarianassistance and charity but a growing number reported receiving income from work.417Given that legal employment is strongly discouraged, and as this policy is now muchmore strictly enforced, there are reasons to believe that cash handouts are now the mainsource of income for Syrian refugees, even if the Government estimates that over125,000 Syrians work without permits.It can be concluded that the cash programme has been very successful in meeting Syrianrefugees’ essential needs in an appropriate and dignified manner. Analysis shows thatcash meets urgent needs (particularly for renting shelter) of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Itrepresents a “flexible and responsive means to augment the work of other sectors.”418Yet there have been contradicting findings on the broader and longer term impact andeffectiveness of cash programming in Jordan, prompting the need for more andspecialised research.419 However, refugees have ongoing needs for food assistanceindicated by the fact that 85 percent of refugees would not have sufficient access to foodwithout WFP assistance.420 Jordan’s cost of living is among the highest in the MiddleEast, and low income and limited income-earning opportunities remain the mostrestraining factor to food access, compounded by rising prices.
410 Ibid.411 UNHCR (n.d.) (a).412 Ibid.413 UNHCR (August 2014).414 CHF (July 2012).415 50 percent of respondents stated that they were unable to find work, and that they rely on charity as theirprinciple source of income (31%). Focus group participants report that wages for Syrian refugees had fallenbelow standard market rates. 95 percent of survey respondents reported complete depletion of remaininghousehold savings. All survey respondents indicated that they have received food assistance from local charities,while 77 percent had received household/Non-food items. 68.7 percent reported having benefited from cashassistance, though the value and frequency of cash transfers varied considerably, ranging from one-timedistributions of JD20 [USD30] to larger sums sufficient to cover household expenses for two months or more.Ibid.416 Syrian Refugees Living Outside Camps – Home Visit Data Findings 2013.417 Between March 2012 and October 2013.418 Hidalgo (3 November 2014).419 See e.g.: Sloane (January 2014); Husain, Bauer and Sandström (April 2014); Hidalgo (3 November 2014).420 WFP and REACH (2014).
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5.3.4 CoveragePartners in Jordan report that generally speaking RRP coverage has been satisfactory,but it is increasingly becoming a source of concern. There are two main reasons for this.Firstly, under-funding (75 percent of RRP6 2014) compounded with poor predictabilityaffected all assistance sectors, but particularly the food sector, which has knock-oneffects undermining refugees’ broader coping strategies. WFPs monthly budget of 23.3million US$421 is financed on a monthly basis, but donor commitments are erratic,creating significant stress on the system and affected populations. WFP is barely able tomaintain coverage and only at a cost of reduced standards.422 According to UNHCRofficials confirm that reductions are ‘fund-driven and not needs-driven’423.Vouchers are not only important to ensure food security but refugees also exchangethem for cash they need for urgent shelter, health or education expenses. The lack ofpredictability results in the need for constant targeting and readjusting of plans, and itprevents WFP from planning ahead for more than a month, creating inefficiencies inprogramme management. WFP was forced twice in late 2014 to alert donors to theconsequences of eminent funding short falls and was bailed out only at the last minuteon both occasions. WFP targeted 7 percent of vulnerable households, but needs to cutanother 15 percent due to continuous funding shortfalls424.The second reason is related to Government policies, particularly affecting protectionand livelihood status and access to health care. Although refugees (apart from the verylimited number who were able to obtain a work permit) were never allowed to work,this policy is now much more strictly enforced, thereby exposing refugees to risks ofexpulsion, imprisonment, or eviction. Refugees are now required to pay fees, which themost vulnerable cannot afford. Although we have not received documented reports ofrefoulement, other analysis shows that such cases are increasing. In addition to thesecases UNHCR notes that “the overwhelming majority of returnees interviewed over thepast year cite either a lack of livelihoods or family reunification as the primary reasonfor returning to Syria”.425 People living in ITS are among those most at risk. Partnersconfirmed the need for increased cash assistance because of severely reduced services(especially in urban areas). Cash and protection partners report that recent WFP cutsput more pressure on cash requirements.Most partners confirmed a shrinking protection space in Jordan. People increasingly selltheir food vouchers and reports of begging, child labour and sex work are on theincrease. Smaller numbers moved south within Jordan perhaps hoping that they are lessvisible there and that restrictive policies are not implemented as strictly as in Irbid orAmman. In these places shelter is also more affordable. We received unverified reportsof voluntary returnees as conditions in Jordan have become unbearable.426 Others seekresidence in camps where there more secure access to services and protection. Somepeople try to reach other countries, such as Turkey or Libya, and from there, to Italy orGreece, facing massive protection problems on the way.
421 “Syrian Refugees: Inter-Agency Regional Update.”https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=8189.422 In February 2015, WFP loaded the reduced one-month entitlements of JOD13 (from JOD20) per personreaching 442,021 individuals in all governorates via e-cards. In camps, WFP loaded entitlements worth JOD20per person reaching 90,284 individuals.423 Feedback on draft report424 Interview with WFP official in Amman.425 UNHCR feedback on draft report426 WFP and UNHCR partner analysis shows that if services (mainly WFP food vouchers) are reduced, 30 to 40percent of Syrian refugees say they will return to Syria. Only 10 percent of the respondents said they wouldreturn to the camps. Interview with WFP official in Amman, October 2014.
IOB Country Study Syria Crisis 75
5.3.5 StandardsUNHCR partners report few issues in relation to standards, indicating few compromisesto the quality agreed in task forces and working groups, especially in urban areas (4.4out of 5), but less so in camps (3.8 out of 5). This may be related to the fact that despiteefforts to provide appropriate shelter to all refugees, insufficient funding cause anumber of refugees to still live in tents. After three years, UNHCR’s minimum shelterstandard in Za’atari are still tents. Even if Saudi donors donated a large number ofprefab units this was not sufficient for everyone427 and 15,000 refugees428 spent the2014-2015 winter at 700 meters’ altitude in Za’atari under canvas, where gas heatersand an over-used electricity grid pose major fire hazards.UNHCR reports that aside from the tents in Zaatari, all other forms of basic assistancein– core relief items, health, WASH – covered the entire population to Sphere standardsalmost immediately. It also admits that insecurity around distributions in early 2013and uncoordinated activities, caused unannounced and small-scale donations of non-standard items. The problem with Sphere standards is that they are not contextualizedto the needs of Syrian refugees and may not always provide dignified429 solutions.Non-camp conditions are far from optimal either. One-fifth of refugees who settled inurban areas live in substandard accommodation, such as emergency or temporaryshelters. Although recent reports indicate that rents are now stabilizing, possibly as aresult of the stagnating influx of Syrian refugees, most vulnerable refugees cannot affordthe high rents for adequate shelter in urban areas. This has caused room sharing andgeneral overcrowding in poorly maintained structures or temporary shelters,rapid depletion of family savings, increased risk of eviction, and rising tensions withhost communities, leaving refugees exposed to increased protection risks.430Until recently the refugee response system provided the minimum standards andrefugees were able to survive with the cash provided to them. However, the alreadymentioned cuts and strict targeting are challenging a dignified life for hundreds ofthousands of refugees in Jordan. Shelter sector partners are equally concerned about thefuture and report major technical gaps which need to be urgently addressed. UNHCRreports that with Za’atari now full to capacity and the encampment policies taking fulleffect in 2015, urgent additional camp extension works may be needed in Azraqincluding investments in land development, infrastructure works (electricity),construction of new basic service facilities, as well as investments for additional shelterunits.431 Za’atari too will need work on its electricity grid and improved winterization.Given the strong correlation between livelihoods and many protection issues, and thefact that shelter is the main expense for refugees, shelter has emerged as an importantentry point for addressing broader protection issues. Programmatically speaking thereare opportunities to strengthen links with other sectors. In the longer term UNHCR islooking for an increase in the number of affordable housing units in the market, andsecure tenure and rental contracts need to be ensured to protect the rights ofrefugees.432
427 Shelter Working Group Jordan (March 2015).428 Direct observations and UNHCR camp management briefing in Za’atari.
429 The Sphere Handbook Humanitarian Charter asserts the right of populations to life with dignity, protection and
assistance.430 Ibid.431 UNHCR, Jordan Refugee Response (September 2014).432 Ibid.
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5.4 Conclusions and Key ChallengesThe study in Jordan focused on the scope of UNHCR operationality and partnerships,responding to a context that is evolving towards:1) shrinking protection space for refugees in Jordan, and;2) systematically under-funded appeals, with a very uncertain future as pledges fallbehind requirements.
5.4.1 EffectivenessThe RRP has been a largely effective instrument when considering its outputs. Partnersconfirm the perspectives of other key stakeholders and the analysis by independentconsultants, an overall effective UNHCR operation. The Netherlands governmentcontributions to the RRP helped UNHCR and partners to meet life saving needs of themost vulnerable Syrian refugees in Jordan and to effectively coordinate the response.Partners report the implementation of all activities as agreed.433 Not one partnerreported issues about their ability to deliver outputs: distribute goods and servicesaccording to agreed targets and value this 5 out of 5. As in Lebanon, UNHCR hassuccessfully created the conditions in terms of registration, coordination, funding andadvocacy for its partners to distribute all outputs to the population as agreed incontracts. However, the difference between numbers of arrival and numbers registeredmean that, until September 2013, assistance was not distributed in a timely manner,especially in urban areas. Refugees and host communities used their own resources(savings, selling off assets, volunteering, donations, mosques) to meet needs in theinterim.Partners value UNHCR’s timeliness and predictability very highly, particularly in thecamp settings where no further issues where reported. Partners gave timely funddisbursements in accordance with agreements a perfect score. As in Lebanon, frequentbudget revisions were necessary in Jordan as the influx of refugee numbers increasedrapidly in 2013. For reasons outside the scope of this evaluation, this did not lead to thesort of problems involving poor timeliness and poor predictability in partner fundingand project implementation, as encountered in Lebanon.UNHCR recognises that outputs alone will not improve refugees protection status andstandards as Government policies and host community attitudes have far moreinfluence on outcomes than protection projects, information dissemination andcommunity support projects. UNHCR and partners are increasingly struggling to adapttheir programmes to the rapidly deteriorating policy and funding environments,reflected in increasingly poor outcomes for the refugees.These challenges are manifested by issues with standards (especially in shelter) andcoverage (especially in terms of protection of those living outside camps) due to fundingshortfalls and government- enforcement of restrictions to the extent that refugees areunable to legally meet their own livelihoods needs. At the same time, the costs of living(particularly due to increased rents) are soaring. Refugees are pushed into poverty andare increasingly having to cope in a way that challenges their protection and exposesthem to various forms of exploitation. This is particularly affecting women and children,
433 The analysis is somewhat speculative as our resources only allowed us to analyse outputs. We cannot say withany degree of confidence the extent to which outcomes or impact can be attributed to any particular category ofinputs (e.g. as provided under the RRP agreements).
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but also (young) single men.434 Partners are concerned that, because of fundingconstraints and encampment policies, programmes might continue in the camps, butservices in urban areas will deteriorate sharply in 2015. According to some of partners,UNHCR and WFP are not sufficiently challenging government encampment policies, butothers believe that UNHCR has been as vocal as possible, and it cannot be expected topush harder without more political leverage from donor governments.
5.4.2 SustainabilityPersistent gaps between outputs and outcomes indicate poor sustainability. TheJordanian government hosted large numbers of vulnerable Syrian refugees for morethan four years at considerable costs.435 To date, it allowed UNHCR to deliver programscovering all needs for services and protection generally at appropriate standards withsome exceptions. As in Lebanon, the sustainability of the humanitarian effort in Jordan isnow at immediate risk as funding is running thin and the crisis is protracting. RRPfunding has been at about 60 percent in 2014 and the dependency of the mostvulnerable Syrian refugees in Jordan is increasing. These shortages and resultinguncertainties act as warning signs for refugees to prepare for worse times to come.The Jordan Response Plan (JRP) seeks to provide a planning framework for a moresustainable approach to the twin problems of refugee emergency needs and hostcommunity and government capacities to meet them.436 Yet it is not clear exactly howthe two distinct pillars will work towards a common humanitarian goal, and theframework will pose a significant challenge to some donors, as not all of them areprepared to support development activities in Jordan.437 Although we have not seen in-depth analysis of this, there seems to be more scope for a UNHCR hand-over ofcoordination functions in Jordan than in Lebanon. Jordanian government institutionsgenerally are stronger, are proactively engaged with UNHCR both in policy andimplementation terms, and have a stronger track record in delivering social protectionservices to vulnerable groups. However, Jordanian engagement on refugee issues wouldmore likely be from a security perspective, or representing refugees as a burden, ratherthan emphasising the needs and strengths of refugees. Key donor representatives suchas DfID438, acknowledged that security and economic issues take priority over refugeeissues in their diplomatic efforts with host governments.Meanwhile, refugees are driven into camps in Jordan where they live in conditions, a farcry from what they are used to in Syria, with little hope for a better future. The oneschoosing to stay in the cities face increasing protection problems and poverty, which aredifficult to escape from without engaging in illicit activities. Only the very desperate orthe very brave try to escape from the region, which comes with its own protectionconcerns. Increased violence in Syria, the contracting global and regional protectionspace, and the drying up of resources made available for food and shelter, and theunwillingness of third countries to increase resettlement targets combined driveincreasing numbers of people in the hands of people smugglers and other illicitnetworks, and force them to adopt negative coping strategies.
434 UNHCR, Jordan Refugee Response (September 2014).435 In its National Resilience Plan (2014-16), the Government of Jordan estimated that it required US$ 1.2 billionin 2014 to maintain existing levels of basic services, including US$ 731 million for water and sanitation,education, health, housing and other services. Cited in: IRC and NRC (November 2014).436 UNDP and UNHCR (2014).437 Possible exceptions are USAID, DEVCO, and DFiD.438 Interview with British Embassy staff in Amman
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6. Conclusions and Policy ImplicationsThe Syrian civil war created an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in terms of scopeand intensity. By the end of 2014, more than 200,000 civilians were killed and half ofSyria’s pre-crisis population was displaced, either within their country or abroad.This chapter draws on the data and analysis provided in the previous chapters in orderto: 1. present our key findings on the humanitarian response led by, respectively, UN-OCHA (in Syria) and the UNHCR (in the neighbouring countries);2. explore likely scenarios for the Syrian conflict and its humanitarianconsequences within Syria and in two of its neighbouring countries, Lebanonand Syria, and;3. assess the role of and implications for Dutch humanitarian policy.
6.1 The Protracted Syrian CrisisThe Syrian conflict escalated into a protracted crisis inflicting an ever-growing toll onmillions of residents and larges number of refugees in the neighbouring countries. Theconflict mutated into a multi-layered war, involving an increasing number ofprotagonists and external actors. It also witnessed a merger of the Iraqi battlefieldswhere armed conflicts resumed in 2014.International diplomatic efforts to encourage a political settlement have virtuallyground to a halt as external actors, especially within the UN Security Council, are sharplydivided on how to end the conflict. Even if protagonists will realize the stalemate andresign to any gains from the conflict, civilians will likely continue to pay the price aschances are that their needs will go largely unaddressed.Internationally financed humanitarian assistance will remain pertinent, for those inneed within Syria and in the neighbouring countries. In the context of dwindlingresources and donor fatigue, learning from the experiences to date will be essential.
6.2 SyriaUN-OCHA led UN agencies and NGOs, the IOM, and SARC were relatively slow and unable
to address all humanitarian needs of the population of Syria for two main reasons:insufficient funding and an inability to negotiate unrestricted access with the Syrianregime.The effects were 1) the need to prioritise lifesaving activities over recovery andresilience work, undermining the sustainability of the aid effort and 2) under-serviceopposition held territories.Our analysis suggests that a complex UN-led, multi-agency response to a violent intra-state conflict and humanitarian emergency involving competing claims on sovereigntyand territorial control cannot be relied on during the acute stages of a violent conflictinvolving belligerent parties with the characteristics of regimes such as the one inDamascus in order to provide adequate humanitarian assistance in a timely manner.Humanitarian actors largely outside the UN framework, which also maintain areasonable level of trust of the regime (SARC) and a number of NGOs proved to be amuch more effective channel at the early stages of the emergency.Largely due to considerations to maintain workable relations with the Syriangovernment in Damascus, UN agencies have not sufficiently capitalized on the increased
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access by way of cross-border assistance granted to them by the UN Security Council. Todate, this has caused assistance to still be grossly insufficient in areas under rebelcontrol and especially witnessing high and growing humanitarian needs. This points upto the importance of cross-border assistance via other channels that has grown but, todate, is still to reach levels to start addressing the shortcomings of the UN-ledhumanitarian effort within Syria.Our analysis also demonstrates that under-funding affected humanitarian agencies’ability to address needs, undermined their operational capabilities, and reduced theirnegotiation position with the regime.
6.3 Lebanon and JordanThe large influx of Syrian refugees placed a significant burden on already troubledeconomies, social cohesion, state institutions, and the overall political stability ofLebanon and Jordan. Like in Syria, the international humanitarian system, led byUNHCR, scaled up relatively slowly, to the needs of the refugees, mainly because of thetime it took to establish an elaborate coordination architecture. Refugees were able tosurvive their initial displacement in 2011 to early 2012 using mainly their own savingsand to host government institutions, communities and charities in the two countries.Overall, the provision and standards of humanitarian assistance were appropriate to theneeds. Cash programmes were important and appropriate as it allowed refugees to settheir own priorities, but inadvertently may have added to growing tensions betweenhost and refugee communities. Protection and shelter activities also met the mosturgent needs of the most vulnerable populations. However, this is now increasinglychallenged by chronic under-funding and restrictive host government policies. Reportsof increasing problems with SGBV, child protection, refoulement etc. indicate risingprotection concerns in both Lebanon and Jordan. Shelter remains below a standardwhich takes into account the dignity of the population, in particular for those who didnot chose to live in informal tented settlements, but also in urban areas and, still to someextent, in the camps in Jordan.Most stakeholders interviewed and much of the literature are positive about the wayUNHCR facilitated an effectively (but perhaps not efficiently) coordinated response to therefugee crisis. UNHCR also added significant value to the work of it’s partners in terms ofrisk management and quality assurance.Even if needs assessments can be improved and better coordinated, they were a crucialcontribution to the relative success of the RRP. UNHCR needs-based approach providesat least in theory a buffer against the risks of instrumentalizing humanitarian aid forpolitical, security and trade objectives. However, this has not prevented somegovernment officials, political actors and belligerents from perceiving the humanitariansystem as a political instrument, creating space for their own (internationallyuncoordinated) system, which in turn has placed unremitting challenges to UNHCR’sefforts to uphold humanitarian standards.UNHCR’s mandate does not exist in a political vacuum, and it can only be implementedto the extent that donors are able or willing to fund it and prioritise its remit indiplomatic efforts in order to be sustainable. Many donors are unable to continue tomake ongoing financial commitments required to maintain the relatively high standardsrequired. Key donor representatives such as DfID, acknowledged that security andeconomic issues take priority over refugee issues in their diplomatic efforts with hostgovernments. With the exception of Germany and Sweden, donor countries have notbeen able to muster domestic political support for substantial resettlement quotas.
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Combined with host government restrictions on employment and movement this hasnow caused a very precarious protection and assistance environment.
The provision of comprehensive and verifiable data in order to confidently assess RRP’s
impact remains a weak aspect of the humanitarian effort in both countries. Even afterthree years of programming, most UNHCR partners found that they were only able toreport on outcomes and other than that speculate about what made a real difference tothe lives of the beneficiaries. Stakeholders expressed the strategic importance of impactevaluations in order to demonstrate and protect the credibility of humanitarianassistance and to inform effective programme designs.
6.4 Policy ImplicationsThese findings may be viewed as having a number of policy implications and –suggestions for humanitarian actors and donors:1. As the humanitarian response inside Syria demonstrated, donors need to considercomplementary ways to allow for access to those in need while the UN developscoordination platforms especially at the onset of major humanitarian emergencies;2. Donor countries should actively provide leverage to UNHCR and OCHA byprioritising humanitarian diplomacy;3. UNHCR and other UN agencies should be enabled and requested to providecomprehensive and reliable data on project outcomes and impact evaluations inaddition to perception studies and process evaluations already commissioned;4. The protracted nature of the Syria crisis and the ongoing need for internationalsupport will require continued and increased humanitarian relief and developmentassistance including to host government institutions and host communities inLebanon and Jordan. Humanitarian agencies will need to continue to focus onproviding humanitarian assistance to people in need in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.Resilience and other development agendas should be financed from non-humanitarian facilities such as the World Bank and UNDP programmes.Our findings lead us to recommend Netherlands Humanitarian Policy to:1. Consider further stepping up direct financial contributions to NGOs with a proventrack record of providing cross-border assistance and primarily working fromsouthern Turkey. Netherlands-based eligibility criteria should be removed to allowfor fully international bids.2. Support the improvement of coordination mechanisms for Damascus based UN-agencies, UN-OCHA in southern Turkey and cross-border NGOs by
 including in tender conditionalities that NGOs involved in cross-borderassistance need to actively take part in the NGO Forum in southern Turkey,
 closely monitoring the emerging coordination framework of the HLG inGaziantep, and use its leverage both among NGOs and UN agencies to ensure thatthese efforts are followed up and the coordination framework is consolidated;3. Continue, and where possible strengthen, diplomacy in collaboration with other(European) donors to provide political leverage to UNHCR when it criticallyengages with officials in Lebanon and Jordan in cases where host governmentpolicies undermine the protection and livelihood status of the refugees;
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4. Ensuring effective and evidence based programming and contribute to thecredibility and domestic political continuity of humanitarian funding consider tomake funding conditional to impact evaluations of any sizeable grant.Our recommendations may require additional DSH capacity for contracting,programming, monitoring and reporting. DSH currently has 11 staff who manage a verylarge portefolio, which apart from the Syria crisis also includes a large number ofprotracted crises, major emergencies, and natural disasters elsewhere in the world. Forthe Netherlands to have an effective humanitarian policy, additional staff will ensurethat the full range of existing funding channels are better used in order to maximise therelative strength of each.
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IntroductionThe 2014 evaluation programming of the Netherlands’ Ministry of ForeignAffairs includes the policy evaluation of the Netherlands’ HumanitarianAssistance. The evaluation department of the ministry, IOB, is responsible for theimplementation of the evaluation. The set-up of this evaluation envisages threecountry-case studies that will be conducted in the period and will concern theCommon Humanitarian Fund in Sudan, the Syria Regional Response and theHuman Response Fund Drought Crisis in Ethiopia. These studies allow for amore in-depth study about the expected improvements in HA delivery atcountry-level and its effectiveness.These Terms of Reference concern the assignment for the case study on theSyrian crisis.
Background information on the Netherlands HA policy and the
evaluation
Background information on the Netherlands HA policyThe overall objective of Dutch humanitarian assistance is to contribute to therelief of life-threatening human needs amongst the most vulnerable people,mostly women and children, caused by (chronic) crisis situations and/or naturaldisasters. In principle, the Netherlands provides humanitarian assistancethroughout the world with a focus on chronic crisis areas in the developingworld. The basic principles underlying Dutch humanitarian assistance are thehumanitarian imperative (assistance is provided wherever the needs are mosturgent), neutrality, impartiality and independence.
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In 2011 a policy document was drawn up to outline how the Netherlands actsupon lessons learned in recent years in order to respond to new developmentsand challenges.439 In this policy document the following goals were prioritized:
1. More self-reliance and resilienceIn the case of humanitarian aid, prioritising and strengthening the use oflocal capacity and structures. More attention will be devoted to disasterrisk reduction (DRR): preventing disasters, mitigating the impact ofdisasters, and disaster preparedness.
2. More effectiveness through less duplication and more coordinationEmergency appeals need to become more uniform, so that they aremutually comparable and better coordinated. At present, each aidorganisation operates its own system, which is inefficient. Morecooperation in needs assessments will ensure more cohesion, lessduplication, and fewer gaps in aid provision.
3. Humanitarian access and neutralityAid organisations must have free access to the people affected. Thehumanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independencemust be upheld. This protects humanitarian aid from being equated withpolitics and from the potential risks this brings for both victims and aidworkers. The Netherlands wants to be an active advocate in this area.
4. Greater accountabilityThe Netherlands will continue to focus on accountability for results inhumanitarian aid. Furthermore, the government has a role in ensuringadequate communication towards the Dutch public on the results of thehumanitarian assistance provided.The policy document includes four to six commitments for the realisation of eachof the four goals.The Netherlands does not implement humanitarian aid directly but, as a donor,enables humanitarian organisations to do so. Dutch policy emphasises theimportance of a strong central coordinating role of the UN in humanitarian crisissituations. For reasons of assumed efficiency, the Netherlands in principleprefers the UN channel for humanitarian assistance and only channels fundingthrough NGOs in cases where this is not possible.The Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), led by the UN Office for Coordination ofHumanitarian Assistance (OCHA), guides Dutch humanitarian action in countriesand regions characterised by chronic crises. In case of an acute crisis situation,this applies to the Emergency Appeals of the UN, the International Committee ofthe Red Cross (ICRC), and the International Federation of Red Cross and RedCrescent Societies (IFRC). The Netherlands sees itself as a partner in the globalhumanitarian system, with a global portfolio – and thus it focuses its attention onimproving that global system. The Netherlands provides flexible funding, withthe vast majority of its contributions to UN agencies and the ICRC being either
439 Staatssecretaris van Buitenlandse Zaken, Hulp aan Mensen in Nood, 23 december 2011, Kamerstuk 32605 nr.64.
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wholly, or partially, unearmarked and it is a timely donor, aiming to commit 75%of the annual humanitarian budget before the end of April each year. In returnfor these good humanitarian donorship practices, the Netherlands asks thehumanitarian system to implement the full range of its planned reforms, tofurther strengthen the capacity of UN leadership, and for all involved agencies tocoordinate under the cluster system. All these forms of aid are subject tointernational agreements and principles, especially the European Consensus onHumanitarian Aid and the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles, whichlargely determine Dutch policy choices.In the period 2009-2012 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spent a total of EUR 1.1billion on humanitarian assistance440. Since 2009 the annual expenditure hasslowly decreased from EUR 293 million to EUR 258 million in 2012.441Furthermore, the Netherlands funded EU humanitarian assistance through itsODA contribution to the EU institutions. The Global Humanitarian Assistancereport estimates the contribution to have been EUR 71 million in 2012, thusadding a substantial amount to the humanitarian assistance funded through theMinistry of Foreign Affairs.442
2.2 Background information on the evaluation of Dutch Humanitarian
Assistance
The objective of the evaluation is to render account for the policy by providinginsight into the Netherlands’ HA policy development, its implementation andwhether the envisaged results were achieved. It also aims to provide lessonslearned from experiences of the implementation of HA, particularly with regardto adaption of the Netherlands’ policy to the rapidly changing contexts in whichHA is provided.
The central evaluation question is: to what extent has the central objective ofthe Netherlands’ humanitarian assistance policy, i.e. to provide humanitarianassistance in an effective way, been realised?
The approach envisages three main activities:
a) Assessment of the policy relevance
b) A systematic review of available literature and evaluation reports to gain more
insight into the extent to which the expected improvements in HA delivery have
been realised and in particular what progress has been made on the
implementation of the HA reform agenda.
c) Three country studies (on the Common Humanitarian Fund in Sudan, the Syria
Regional Response and the Human Response Fund Drought Crisis in Ethiopia) for a
more in-depth study about the expected improvements in HA delivery at country-
level and its effectiveness.The evaluation research will focus on the last five years (2009-2013) and will beupdated for the first half of 2014 when relevant.
440 This is spending allocated through the six budget articles for humanitarian aid, namely: UNHCR, UNRWA,WFP, emergency aid to developing countries, emergency aid to non-OECD/DAC countries, disaster risk reduction.441 For 2013 the total indicative budget was set at 215 million.442 Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2013; correspondence with authors.
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The planning envisages the implementation of the desk studies and countrystudies: between September and December. The draft report will be submittedon 31 January 2015. The final report will be completed no later than 28 February2015.
Background information on the Syria crisis humanitarian response
Context/crisisAs the conflict in Syria enters its fourth year, insecurity, violence, and specificpersecution continue to force the people of Syria to seek safety and protectionelsewhere. The result of the ongoing crisis is further massive populationdisplacement and growing humanitarian needs. The UN estimates that 6.5million people are internally displaced and a total of 9.3 million people are inneed of humanitarian assistance, 46% of whom are children. These figuresinclude at least 270,000 of the 540,000 registered Palestine refugees who havealso been displaced within Syria. The Syrian refugee population has grown from200,000 in 2012 to over 2.5 million in February 2014. Most of them are hosted inLebanon (944,000), Turkey (619,000), Jordan (577,000) and Iraq (230,000). Asof the end of January 2014, over 3 million people were estimated to be living inhard to reach areas being besieged by either the Government of Syria oropposition forces (OCHA Humanitarian Bulletin, Syrian Arab Republic Issue,January 31, 2014).
Humanitarian AssistanceThe Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) now renamed the Strategic Response, isbeing administered through UN OCHA. The Strategic Response providesassistance within Syria as well as to neighboring countries that are dealing withthe refugee influx. For the response in Syria the Syria Humanitarian ResponsePlan (SHARP) received $US 1 billion, for the assistance to neighboring countriesthe Syria Regional Response Plan (SRP) received $US 2 billion. Major donors arethe USA ($US 1.16 billion), the EU ($US 732 million) the UK ($US 381 million),Kuwait ($US 344 million) and Germany ($US 312 million). Funding requirementsas pledged in the Kuwait Pledging Conference totaled $US 6.5 billion: $US 2,27billion for inside Syria through SHARP and $US 4,2 billion for the regionalresponse through SRP.
Humanitarian assistance within Syria through SHARPThe Government of Syria restricts humanitarian access and the humanitarianorganizations’ ability to operate. Cross-border access to deliver humanitarianassistance from neighboring countries to opposition areas requires theagreement and cooperation of the Syrian authorities. Several NGOs and otherindependent aid agencies provide cross-border aid from neighboring countrieswithout Syria’s consent. The international Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)works with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) to provide assistance to IDPsand other victims of the conflict in Syria.UN agencies and 12 international NGOs have been authorized by theGovernment of Syria to work with SARC. The humanitarian assistance is
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constrained by a number of factors, including insecurity and conflict andconstraint for humanitarian organizations to get access to the affectedpopulation in Syria. In October 2013, the UN Security Council issued aPresidential Statement urging Syrian authorities ‘to facilitate the expansion ofhumanitarian relief operations and lift bureaucratic impediments and otherobstacles in Syria’.The 2014 SHARP response plan identifies 5 overarching strategic objectives:1. Advocate for the protection of civilians, in particular those with specificvulnerabilities and prioritize their needs in accordance with principles ofinternational law, international humanitarian and human rights law.2. Increase the provision of appropriate life-saving emergency services andrelief supplies for affected people in Syria, especially in the sectors of foodand agriculture, water, sanitation, health, nutrition, shelter, education andessential non-food items.3. Expand early recovery and restoration/stabilization of livelihoods,supporting the rehabilitation of vital public services affected by the crisis andcreating an environment for humanitarian assistance to enhance theresilience of affected communities.4. Enhance the operational capacity of national and internationalhumanitarian responders and support existing local and community copingmechanisms.5. Ensure adequate levels of preparedness to respond to further emerginghumanitarian needs.
In consultation with concerned line ministries and SARC, UN agencies, IOM andINGOs have identified critical activities to be undertaken across the 14governorates in order to strengthen complementarities and further upscaleprogramming.UN agencies, IOM and INGOs working under the SHARP 2014 seek US$ $2.27billion through 122 projects to respond to an estimated 9.3 million people acrossthe country who are in need of critical life-saving humanitarian assistance andprotection. As of 15 December 2013, SHARP 2013 has received 74 percent ofrequirements or a net sum of $1.046 billion, out of the total funding requirementof $1.4 billion
Humanitarian assistance in the neighboring countries: The Syria Regional
Response Plan (RRP)UNHCR leads efforts to provide assistance to Syrian refugees in neighboringcountries, including non-food items such as shelter and cash assistance. UNOCHAestimated that the majority of Syrian refugees (more than 80%) are livingoutside camps, mostly in urban settings.The RRP addresses three specific target populations: refugees in fixedsettlements like camps; refugees living outside camp settlements; and hostcommunities. The Plan envisages a coordinated response to the needs of newarrivals, clearer assessments of vulnerability among the existing refugee
IOB Country Study Syria Crisis 104
populations, and attempts to address the most immediate local priorities such aswaste management, water supply, small scale reconstruction and health servicedelivery. An important component of the 2014 RRP is to strengthen local servicedelivery and resilience, thereby promoting social cohesion and enhancingrefugee and host community protection. Although limited in its intended scopeand duration, the RRP 2014 is designed to complement longer-termdevelopment interventions upon which stabilization processes in the region willlargely depend.The strategic objectives are as follows:- At least 4.1 million refugees have equitable access to effective protection,including access to territory.-The most vulnerable refugees are accommodated in organized refugeesettlements.-The most vulnerable host communities benefit from improved access toessential services and access to livelihood opportunities.-The targeting and planning of long-term national aid programs is informed bystructured dialogue and the timely provision of inter-agency assessmentinformation of quality on refugees and host communities.-Refugees will benefit from the early planning for longer-term durable solutionsstrategy in accordance with international law.The RRP will address three target groups: refugees in camps; refugees residingoutside camps; and host communities. More than 4 million refugees and 2.7million people from host communities will benefit from this plan.
Background information on the Netherlands support to the Syrian crisis
The political responseThe European Union (EU) imposed economic sanctions, including an armsembargo, visa ban and asset freeze, against the Syrian regime in May 2011, andhas heightened the sanctions periodically since then. In November 2012 the EUrecognized the National Coalition of the Syrian Opposition as the legitimaterepresentative of the Syrian people, and subsequently released a statementcalling for Assad to step down to allow for political transition in January 2013. InMarch 2013 the EU foreign ministers modified these sanctions, making itpossible for European governments to bypass the ban on providing "non-lethal"supplies to the opposition. On 28 May 2013, the European States effectivelyended the arms embargo on the opposition in Syria and opened up thepossibility to arm anti-government rebels while upholding the arms embargo onthe Assad government. The majority of the remaining EU member-states haveexpressed their concerns that further militarization will only fuel more violence.On 15 March 2014, EU High Representative, Ashton, expressed her concernabout reports which “confirmed the regime's indiscriminate use of murder,torture, rape, hostage-taking, and sexual violence. These are crimes against
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humanity, war crimes and blatant breaches of international human rights andhumanitarian law.”
Dutch contributionsSince the beginning of the crisis in 2011 the Netherlands contributed EUR 83,5million (as per 10th of June), mainly through the above mentioned SHARP (EUR15 million) and RRP (EUR 31.5 million). In November and December 2013additional contributions were made to UNHCR (EUR 17 million) and the WFP(EUR 2 million). In January 2014, the Netherlands committed EUR 6 million atthe Kuwait Pledging Conference. By far the largest contributions are channeledthrough UNHCR which is cluster leader for protection, cash & non-food items,and shelter. Other contributions have been made to UNRWA, WFP and IFRC.Furthermore a subsidy framework has been launched for cross border aid byDutch NGOs (EUR 7 million).The main contributions are recapitulated in the following table:
Main recipients HA Syria crisis 2012-2014 (till June 10)
Programme/organization EURUNHCR 39.0Netherlands RedCross/IFRC 10,5Cross border aid by DutchNGOs 7.0WFP 4.0UNICEF 3,5UNRWA 2,5Others 17,0Total 83,5According to a recent overview of international humanitarian assistance, donorassistance between 2012- and February of 2014 totaled US$ 6,163 million. TheNetherlands ranks 14th in the list of International Humanitarian Country Donorsto the Syria Crisis, 2012-2014 (In this inventory, the Netherlands’ contributiontill February 2014 was US 76.3 million). 443Next to the regionally earmarked contributions non earmarked contributions tothe humanitarian UN organizations and more specifically to CERF and ICRC havealso partly been designated to the crisis in Syria. For 2014 these contributionshave been estimated as follows:
Organization EUR (mil)UN Central Emergency Response Fund(CERF) 40 (app. 10% of the total CERF-budget)ICRC 25WFP 36
443 Margesson, R and Chesser,S. (2014) Syria: Overview of the Humanitarian Response. Washington:Congressional Research Service
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UNHCR 33UNRWA 13
The consultancyAt the end of the assignment, the consultancy is expected to have produced:
1. a country report on the Syrian crisis of maximum 70 pages (excluding annexes)
2. a draft chapter for the overall policy evaluation report of maximum 15 pages that, to a
large extent will be a summary of the country report.
The above products are expected to reflect the answers to the following researchquestions and issues.
Main research questions and issues:
1. What assessment can be made of the relevance of Dutch HA policy
regarding the Syrian crisis?
a) What assessment can be made of the conditions and dilemmas for HA (political,
access and others) and how has the Netherlands responded (also in a broader
context of bilateral and EU political and diplomatic efforts)?
b) What assessment can be made of Dutch HA funding policy regarding the Syria
crisis: what considerations determined the distribution of funds and the choice of
channels and how well was assistance monitored?
c) What assessment can be made of the decision-making process to channel cross-
border aid through Dutch NGOs and the subsidy framework?
2. To what extent did the supported UN HA strategy respond to the main
characteristics and challenges of this crisis and its context?
a) Assessment of the relevance of SHARP and SRP: how did both programs respond
to the main characteristics and challenges of the context/crisis in Syria and
neighboring countries?
b) To what extent were the UN organizations successful in getting access to the
affected population?
c) To what extent did the Humanitarian Response take into account the specific
characteristics and conditions of the target population and was it able to effectively
identify vulnerable groups? What were the quality and timeliness of the need-
assessment system?
3. Have the expected improvements of HA delivery through the multilateral
channel been achieved?
a) What assessment can be made of the coordination arrangements and more
specifically of UNHCR’s role in the response?
b) How has the agenda on HA UN reform (cluster approach, role of Humanitarian
Coordinator and OCHA) been put into practice and how did this influence the
capacity to deliver HA?
c) To what extent did SHARP and RRP achieve their goals to support the timely
allocation and disbursement of donor resources to the most critical humanitarian
needs of Syrian victims of the crisis?
d) What assessment can be made of the alignment of the humanitarian response to
government policy in the neighboring countries?
e) How well were UNHCR and other supported organizations able to adapt their
responses to the rapidly changing situation in Syria and the neighboring countries
and transformation from an acute crisis into a more protracted one?
f) How well were considerations on cost effectiveness and sustainability incorporated
into the response?
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g) Information management/monitoring and reporting: what assessment can be
made of the quality to report and monitor the activities?
4. What assessment can be made of the effectiveness of supported HA
interventions and to what extent did the expected improvements in aid
delivery contribute to (better conditions for) effective HA?
a) To what extent did SHARP and RRP achieve their goals in responding to needs of
the affected population in the fields of protection, shelter and income?
b) To what extent did SHARP and RRP achieve their goals in responding to the
protection of vulnerable groups (women and children)?
c) To what extent were the longer term objectives relating to sustainability and
resilience achieved in the case of RRP?
NB: Due to the difficulty of conducting field work in Syria, an assessment ofSHARP will most likely have to be based on available literature. The focus ofquestion 4 may therefore be on RRP.
5. To what extent did IFRC and the supported Dutch NGOs meet the
expectations as regards to access to specific population groups (cross
border/non registered refugees) and HA effectiveness?
a) What assessment can be made of the effectiveness of the supported programs of
IFRC and the expected advantages of working with the national organizations
affiliated at IFRC?
b) To what extent were the objectives of cross border aid through Dutch NGO’s
achieved? Have these organizations proven to be capable to deliver cross border
aid? How do their capabilities compare to other, international, regional and Syrian
aid providers? Do their activities complement other humanitarian organizations’
efforts?
Evaluation frameworkFor this country-study a more specific evaluation-framework will be developedon the basis of the program description of SHARP and RRP. In the case of IFRCthe objectives of the supported programs will be an important reference and inthe case of the Dutch NGOs this will be the Subsidy Framework for Cross BorderAid.Since the results of the country studies will be integrated into the generalanalysis and final overview report of the Netherlands’ HA policy, it is importantthat the country studies are guided by a common framework.Hence;
a) The ToR for the HA policy evaluation (Appendix 8) includes a list of the minimum
indicators and sub-questions as well as the relevant sources for information which will
also form the point of departure for this study.
b) The consultant contracted for conducting the general literature review and the
overview report (see general ToR – Appendix 9) will make suggestions and comment
on the research proposal as well on the draft report.
Research activitiesTo answer these research questions, the consultant is expected to undertake thefollowing activities.
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For each of the activities a first indication of the amount of time and resources tobe spent has been indicated as a percentage of total resources available.
a) Analysis of Dutch/EU policy as regards to the Syrian crisis (10%)An inventory will be made of the evolution of the Netherlands and the EUpolitical and diplomatic position in the Syrian crisis. The assessment of thepolitical and diplomatic contributions will be done against findings of theinternational literature and discussions on the role of the EU in the Syrian crisis.The main focus of interest is how the political and diplomatic activitiesinfluenced the conditions for HA.Therefore the following activities are envisaged:a) A review of relevant documents and literatureb) Interviews to be conducted with relevant staff officials of the Netherlandsministry and Embassies in the neighboring countries, relevant EU staff membersas well as other key informants.c) Brief paper with main findings and discussion points.IOB will provide the necessary information on the Netherlands’ policy andfacilitate the contacts with relevant ministry staff.
b) Desk study for context analysis (10%)In order to answer the questions on the relevance of the supported UN HAstrategy in the Syrian crisis a desk study will be conducted on the context of thecrisis.The desk study will consist of a comparative analysis of academic and othercurrent literature/information on the region/crisis concerned and the HAstrategy. It will attempt to analyze how the humanitarian assistance respondedto the main challenges and to what extent the assistance is in line with the maincharacteristics of the crisis and situation. Additionally interviews will beconducted with relevant staff members of HA organizations, academics andgovernment representatives in the neighboring countries.
c) Desk study of HA delivery and results of projects and programs funded by the
Netherlands (25%)The desk study will focus on the strategy and results of the main programs thatwere supported by the Netherlands: SHARP and RRP and on the role of UNHCRand OCHA/CERF in the Syria crisis. As stated above, the Netherlands is a majorcontributor to ICRC and therefore a review of the documentation on its role willalso be included.After a first screening and inventory of the available sources an assessmentframework will be developed for the systematic review of current literature,progress reports and evaluation reports. The review approach should include amethodology for assessing the quality of the reports, especially to assess to whatextent the findings have been substantiated.Because of the rapid changes in the situation and the permanent changes in theplanning and programming of the HA, it is to be expected that the available
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documentation and reports will have serious limitations as regards to coverage,data collection and evidence. It is obvious that this will also influence thepossibilities to respond to the evaluation questions.Therefore it is important to observe that almost simultaneously to this study,two evaluations of UNHCR are taking place, which could provide additionalinformation:- The Independent program evaluation of UNHCR and its partners to the on-going
emergency influx of refugees from SyriaThis evaluation will assess the extent to which objectives have been met and theeffectiveness of UNHCR’s protection and assistance programs. Special attentionwill be paid to the coordination arrangements. The purpose of the evaluation islearning and accountability. Key questions to be addressed will be what impacthas been secured for beneficiaries, how effectively allocated funds were spent,and which actors in the project design and implementation led to optimal results.The evaluation will focus on the operations in Jordan and Lebanon. Themethodology to be applied includes a document and literature review of UNHCR’program and protection documentation, interviews with key stakeholders andwhere possible surveys. Two parallel field visits will be undertaken to Jordanand Lebanon. The final draft of the report is expected to be available by August2014.
- UNHCR Development Effectiveness ReviewThe Development Effectiveness Reviews (DER) is a systematic and structuredmeta-synthesis of the findings of a sample of evaluations performed by theorganization itself. In order to limit the burden on the organization underreview, a set of key corporate documents is reviewed and selective interviewsare held with staff at headquarters level. The review of UNHCR will be set up bythe Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the NetherlandsMinistry of Foreign Affairs and the Development Evaluation Division of ForeignAffairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFATD), in close collaboration withUNHCR’s Evaluation Service. The actual work of the DER for UNHCR will beconducted by a team of independent evaluation/development experts contractedthrough competitive bidding. The review will cover the period 2008 – 2014 andentails in essence conducting a systematic synthesis of information from availableevaluations from UNHCR.The review will take approximately four months starting on 1 September 2014until December 2014.Though both studies will not be completed before October/November, it shouldbe attempted to benefit from the intermediate results of both studies as much aspossible for the literature as well as for the planning of the field study.
d) Field study (45%)A field study in Lebanon and Jordan will be conducted with two objectives:
1) To collect complementary information through interviews and consultations on
specific issues resulting from the literature review.
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2) To gather more extensive field-evidence for a limited number of areas and assisted
population.
3) To gather more insight into the relevance and effectiveness of the supported
activities of the IFRC and if possible of the activities of the Dutch NGO’s, especially
in the area of cross-border aid.The approach could involve conducting two case-studies at sub-regional or locallevel in order to make an assessment on how the coordination at that leveldevelops and to evaluate the effectiveness of HA in limited geographical settings.For budget and practical reasons it might be necessary to conduct the two fieldstudies in one single country.The methodology and further specification will be elaborated simultaneouslywith the implementation of the desk-study and is also dependent on the resultsof the necessary consultations with UNHCR and other organizations.It is possible that for the evaluation of the Cross Border Aid of Dutch NGO’s ashort trip to Turkey will have to be included.
e) Writing up: final report and report chapter (10%)
PlanningThe research will be carried out as much as possible in the second half of 2014.It will start with an inception phase (3-4 days) in which a work plan will beelaborated. This work plan will consist of a more detailed overview of theapproach to be followed, activities to be undertaken and the planning.After approval of the work plan by IOB the literature review will be implementedand simultaneously the approach and methodology for the field research will bedeveloped. The field research proposal will also need approval by IOB.The draft final report will be submitted on January 31, 2015.The comments of the organizations concerned, IOB (and the reference group)will be processed in February. A more detailed schedule should be included inthe work plan.IOB realizes that the planning will be dependent on the realistic possibilities ofconducting field work. At all times IOB and the consultant will remain in closecommunication about the planning and any unexpected delays.
OrganizationThe consultant will coordinate his/her activities closely with IOB and possiblechanges in the planning and activities will be presented to IOB for approval.IOB will be responsible for introducing the consultants to the organizationsconcerned and provide them with relevant information on the Netherlandspolicy.
ProductsAs described above, the final products to be delivered by the consultant are:
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a) A country report of maximum 70 pages;b) A draft chapter for the final report according to the report frameworkwhich to a large extent will be a summary of the country report,maximum 15 pages.
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Appendix 2: Partner Interview Tool
Type of UNHCR partner: UN/NGO/INGO/Govt./Private/Other
Sector (include Multi):
Location:
Number of months programming within the RRP framework:
Number of RRP grants:
% of overall budget comes from UNHRC:
Line of Questioning (rating out of 5 and issues)
Programme Effectiveness1. What is the sectoral focus of your programme (activities, objectives)2. Globally, how do you rate the results of your programme? (output/outcome)3. What if any operational standards apply to your programme?4. On a scale of 5: to what extend have you been able to apply them and to what extend arethey achieved?
Coverage5. On a scale of 5: How well does the sector cover all people of concern? ( )6. Can you estimate a percentage?7. What are the issues here? (lack of funding, security etc.)
Needs Assessments and Monitoring8. On a scale of 5: How do you rate UNHRC needs assessments? ( )9. What are the issues here (elaborate on accuracy and usefulness)10. On a scale of 5: How do you rate UNHCR monitoring information? ( )11. What are the issues here (elaborate on accuracy, information sources, usefulness)
Timeliness and predictability1. On a scale of 5: How do you rate the timeliness of UNHCR funds transfers ( )2. What are the issues here? (elaborate administrative reqmnts, system performance, cash-flow issues etc.)3. What if any, are the implications of this for your programme?
Coordination1. In which coordination meetings do you participate?2. Do you participate in the sectoral working group?3. How often do you meet?4. Do all key actors participate? If not, who is missing and why?5. Do all important actors send the right level of staff?6. How do these meetings add value to your programme?7. In what way do they facilitate the achievement of objectives and standards?
Out of 5: How do you rate the usefulness of the coordination meetings? ( )
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Appendix 3: Partner Profiles
Tyre partners
ProtectionThe protection sector covers work in protection monitoring, assistance to people withspecial needs (PWSM), SGBV, Child Protection, mental health, empowerment activities,legal counselling and legal awareness.444 We spoke to three of UNHCR protectionpartners in Tyre: Sheild, Intersos and Mercy Corps.
Sheild is a Lebanese development NGO working in South Lebanon, Biqa’ and Akkar. Itgets direct funding from UN agencies, INGOs and from donors among whom theNetherlands Embassy for some of its development work. It extends support services topeople with special needs, such as the elderly, women headed households, or peoplewith a disability. Sheild also implements an empowerment programme (GBVsensitisation) and an unconditional cash grant, which benefits from its knowledgeacquired in protection work. Staff seem to have a detailed understanding of vulnerablepeople’s locations and their socio-economic challenges.
Intersos is an Italian NGO established in 1992, with an annual turnover of €22 million.Its Lebanon programme is about €1.4 million, mostly funded by the Italian Embassy445.Intersos came to Lebanon with Italian government funding after the 2006 war withIsrael. UNIFIL, the UN monitoring force, is under Italian command and has a substantialItalian contingent on the ground in South Lebanon. Intersos describes itself ashumanitarian organization and specialises in protection work, mainly in empowerment,monitoring, SGBV and child protection. It also participates in the UNHCR coordinatedshelter programme in Tyre.
Mercy Corps is an American NGO with a global operating budget in excess of US$ 320million.446 It works in “places of transition” and in Lebanon since 1993, engaging in awide range of sectors such as shelter, WASH, NFIs, and mental health. In the south itsfocus is on monitoring, child protection and referral to more specialised agencies (e.glegal partners).
ShelterThe shelter sector in the South has collective shelter, upgrading and cash for sheltercomponents447. We spoke to CISP, NRC and Intersos.
CISP was established in 1983, and like Intersos has its head office in Rome. Its 2013global turnover was over €16 million.448 Its origins are in peace work and it partnersclosely with the OVSE, which funds over 50 percent of its costs. It started working inLebanon in 1995 and now implements collective shelter and waterproofingcomponents. CISP also receives substantial direct support from ECHO, but in Tyre isfully funded by UNHCR. It regards itself as an implementer of UNHCR’s grant and itstechnical rehabilitation work seemed a little at odds with its peace and governance corebusiness. During our visit of one the collective shelters in Tyre, we observed that the
444 UNICEF, Lebanon Government and UNHCR (n.d.).445 Intersos (n.d.).446 Mercy Corps (n.d.), Annual Report 2013,http://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/Mercy_Corps_2013_Annual_Report.pdf447 Habitat, Lebanon Government and UNHCR (April 2014).448 Comitato Internazionale Per Lo Sviluppo Dei Popoli (27 May 2013).
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refugees seemed to be more familiar with the UNHCR staffer accompanying us, directingall communication at her. CISP also implements a cash for shelter grant.Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) is a very large Norwegian NGO working in shelter,protection (counselling and legal assistance), education and WASH. It has Offices inBeirut, Qubayat, Zahle, Saadnayel, Tripoli, Tyre, employs 440 staff with a total Lebanonbudget of US$ 27 million,449 funded by DFATD, DFID, ECHO, EU, NMFA, SIDA, UNHCR,UNICEF. Its shelter programme RRP component in Lebanon is US$11.9 million.450 It isthe main provider of shelter solutions to refugees arriving in Lebanon from Syria. NRCupgrades and rehabilitates existing homes and buildings. It also provide heating stoves,fuel coupons and other items to help Lebanese families who are hosting and supportingrefugees. NRC also provides shelter services in Palestinian refugees living in camps and“gatherings.”451 In Tyre it rehabilitates single shelter units, 30 percent funded byUNHCR. It is also the second largest protection NGO and attracts over US$ 4.5 milliondirect RRP funding.
Intersos also rehabilitates single shelter units and its component is 70 percent fundedby UNHCR. It uses its protection expertise by actively identifying vulnerable people in itsshelter programming and refers them to protection activities.
Unconditional Cash Programming partnersWe also spoke to three partners who implement UNHCR’s UCAP pogramme: SOLIDAR,CISP, and Sheild.
Solidar is a Swiss development NGO whose core business is to campaign for betterlabour conditions in 12 countries. It started working in Lebanon in 2012 and establisheda presence in 2013. Its operating budget in Lebanon is CHF 1.2 million,452 US$ 1 millionof which come from the RRP and includes funding for its shelter work. Its UCAP and corerelief items budget in Tyre (and the Biqa’ Valley) is only partially funded by UNHCR (US$330,000 of which direct RRP funding) as the remaining costs are covered by SwissSolidarity and Volkshilfe Austria. It describes itself as implementing “on behalf of”UNHCR.453
Sheild implemented cash for rent and food vouchers in 2013 and changed its approachwhen UNHCR introduced unconditional cash programming in 2014. Like Solidar itbeliefs this has tremendous benefits in terms of efficiency and flexibility for therefugees, empowering them to spent money on items they really need, giving them achoice.
CISP started to implement winterization activities (heater fuel vouchers) through itsshelter activities and like Sheild changed its approach in 2014 to UCAP when thisbecame the agreed modality within the UNHCR funded programme.
Tripoli partnersIn Tripoli opportunities to talk to partners and refugees were limited by securityincidents in the city, which curtailed our movements somewhat. We managed to speakto five partners, four of whom from the protection sector and one participating in the
449 NRC (15 October 2014).450 UNHCR (n.d.) (b).451 NRC (15 October 2014).452 SolidarMed (n.d.).453 http://www.solidar.ch/humanitarian-aid-for-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon.html
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UCAP programme. We also visited a small informal settlement on the outskirts of thecity, where we observed the shelter conditions, accompanied by Save the Children.
UCAP PartnerHandicap International (HI)is an operational UCAP partner in Tripoli, and not funded byUNHCR or through the RRP. Its main donors for Lebanon activities include ECHO, WFP,OCHA, Swiss Development Aid, Swiss Solidarity, CIDA The City of Paris, the region ofRhone Alpes, and the German and French Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Its core businessis (advocacy for) demining and care for the survivors of landmine accidents and otherpeople with disabilities. Handicap International mainly refers is beneficiaries, who areamong the most vulnerable454 to the UNHCR UCAP programme.
Protection PartnersWe spoke to four of UNHCR protection partners in Tripoli: Solidarites, DRC, IRC and IRD.Solidarités International (SI) is a French NGO with a 2013 global budget of just over €77million.455 In Lebanon it is mainly active in the shelter and food sectors. It received atotal of over US$ 5.5 million in 2014.456 However its UCAP activities are funded whollyby ECHO. At the time of the interview they had only just begun to distribute US$ 175unconditional cash per month to 450 families and they are looking to expand activitieswith DfID funding in 2015.Danish Refugee Council (DRC) is one of the most prolific NGOs in Lebanon. It is a (30)member organisation with an overall turn over of DKK 2.2 billion (€295 million) in2013.457 It started to work in Lebanon since 2004 and employs almost as many staff inLebanon as UNHCR; as of April 2014, 572 local and international staff in Beirut, and thefive field offices in Akkar, Tripoli, Baalbek, Zahle, and Tyre.458 Its Lebanon donorsinclude ECHO, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, SDC, World Bank, BPRM and DANIDA. Its overallRRP Lebanon component is US$ 30.8 million, making it the largest RRP funded NGO. Itsprotection activities include monitoring, empowerment of and support to PWSN, genderand SGBV. It is also active in the food security (directly supported by WFP, no RRPfunding), shelter (US$ 2.6 million RRP funding), basic needs (US$ 15.6 million RRP), andsocial cohesion and livelihoods (US$ 3 million RRP) sectors.459International Rescue Committee (IRC) is one of the largest US humanitarian NGOs withglobal operating expenses of over US$ 450 million in 2013.460 It is also one of the majoroperators in Lebanon. Its protection activities include monitoring, legal assistance,empowerment and outreach, PWSN, gender (women’s centres and cash), SGBV. Itsprotection activities are RRP funded to the tune of almost US$ 5.5 million, making it thelargest recipient if RRP protection funding after UNHCR (US$ 69 million) and UNICEF(US$ 35 million).461 It also participates in the RRP funded education, and livelihoodssectors. IRC has recently signed a strategic partnership agreement with Stichting
454 According to a Handicap International/Help Age assessment: 25.9 percent of Syrian refugees have animpairment. Help Age International and Handicap International (2014).455 Solidarites International (n.d.).456 UNHCR (n.d.) (b).457 including CARE Denmark, Amnesty International, UNICEF Denmark458 http://drc.dk/relief-work/where-we-work/middle-east/lebanon/459 UNHCR (n.d.) (b).460 KPMG (30 September 2013).461 UNHCR (n.d.) (b) .
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Vluchteling, from which it receives over US$ 50 million in 2013 for its globalprogramme.462International Relief and Development (IRD) is a US based agency specialising in legalaid and entrepreneurship and began working in Lebanon in 2006, providing assistanceto poor rural households in the south affected by the war with Israel.463 Its protectionactivities within the RRP framework are UNHCR funded and include community basedprotection and empowerment. Birth registration, marriage registration and legalprotection services, including protection from gender-based violence are provided by alegal team in Akkar and Tripoli.
UNHCR partners interviewed in Jordan
Non-camp partners ProtectionThe Family Protection Department of the Government of Jordan, as a policedepartment, falls under the public security directorate. It is a child protection partnerfunded by MoPIC. It follows up on child protection and other family protection issues,when partners refer suspected legal cases.
IRC is one of the largest humanitarian US NGOs.464 In Jordan IRC implements SGBV, childprotection, community empowerment and psychosocial services activities.465 It openeda satellite office in Mafraq in order to be more proximate to the 85% of Syrian whosettled in urban areas near the border. It operates three women's centres in urban areaswhere it provides emotional support, pre- and post-natal care, and tangible aid such asclothing, hygiene supplies, and financial support. It received US$ 9.15 million directlyfrom the RRP, and 50% of the remainder of its funding through UNICEF, making it one ofthe most important protection partners for both UNHCR and UNICEF. It is a large playerin reproductive health (GBV) and other health activities (with over US$ 4 million of RRPfunding). IRC opened in June 2012 two primary health care clinics in Mafraq andRamtha where a combined average of 100 patients visit every day.Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development (ARDD466) is a Jordanian legal aidorganization. It receives no direct RRP funding. 75% of its budget is covered by UNHCRand the rest is funded by ECHO, Embassy of France, CIDA, Oxfam GB and theNetherlands Embassy. ARDD focuses on women and includes a strong advocacy elementin its strategy.
Intersos is an Italian NGO467 who came to Jordan in 2012 and like many of the earlyarrivals started to work in Za’atari. It ended its operations in Za’atari and now focussescompletely on non-camp refugees. Its work includes child protection (psychosocialsupport, recreational activities and therapy, funded by UNICEF and the Italian Ministryof Foreign Affairs and does not have UNHCR funding. It is also involved in shelter andunconditional cash assistance.468
Non-camp Shelter
462 KPMG (30 September 2013).463 http://www.ird.org/our-work/by-region/middle-east/lebanon#sthash.EzGOWIdV.dpuf464 see Lebanon section for more background.465 UNHCR (n.d.) (b).466 See more at: http://ardd-jo.org/mission-and-vision#sthash.HcjGUbLg.dpuf467 See Lebanon section of this report.468 http://intersos.org/en/countries/asia-and-middle-east/giordania/jordan-0
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Premiere Urgence – Aide Medicale Internationale (PU-AMI), although a non-campshelter partner, is a French humanitarian organization that has a strong integratedmulti-sector approach. It operates on a global budget of over €15 million. In Jordan itworks across the cash (RRP US$ 1.9 million), health (RRP US$ 630,000), shelter (RRPUS$ 355,000), NFI (RRP US$ 14,000) food security, and wash sectors in an integratedway. Its shelter work is funded by ECHO and French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. PU-AMIdoes not implement a UNHCR grant.
NRC is the largest Norwegian NGO.469 In Jordan it employs 363 national staff and 19internationals and reaches 370,000 refugees with a total budget of 40,6 million US$(2014); 24.5 million through the RRP. Its donors in Jordan include BPRM, DfID, DFATD,ECHO, NMFA, SIDA, UNICEF, UNHCR. It has offices in Amman, Irbid, Za’atari, Emirati andAzraq camps. Its shelter work includes upgrading, waterproofing, tenancy information,and T-shelters. (US$ 10 million RRP). NRC is the lead actor providing shelter and non-food items (NFIs) in Za’atari and Azraq refugee camps. It distributed more than 4 millionNFIs, erected more than 77,000 tents and built more than 3,500 T-shelters.470 It alsoworks in education (in- and out-of-school and teacher training) and protection (legalaid).
Non-camp Cash
IRC provides cash assistance to female-headed households in Jordan.471 It is also a majorSGBV and child protection partner with a RRP contribution of over US$ 9 million. Itshealth activities are funded through RRP with over US$ 4 million, bring its total RRPfunding to US$13.2 million.472 The cash component is directly funded by DfID and ECHO,as part of regional contracts including its work in other host countries and Syria crossborder. Its strategy is to use its health programmes as an entry-point to SGBVprogramming and campaigning.473International Catholic Migration Committee (ICMC) is another cash partner working inMafraq governate. Its cash for rent programme (US$ 887,000) and NFI components (US$550,000) are RRP funded and its unconditional cash is funded by ECHO and BPRM.Operational in northern Jordan since 2002, ICMC has appealed for revised overall totalRRP funding of over US$ 2,1 million.474
Medair is a Swiss NGO involved in cash for rent, transitioning to unconditional fundedby OCHA (RRP) providing US$ 1.9 million of its UCAP budget.475 Medair selects UCAPbeneficiaries among the most vulnerable beneficiaries from its health, nutrition, shelterand from its WASH programmes, a total of US$ 1.7 million, all funded within the RRPframework. Medair Netherlands has a RfB fundraising certificate476 and has NetherlandsGovernment ANBI status. Its total budget is over US$ 31 million, about 20% of whichwas spent on the Syria crisis in 2013.477 However it is a growing player in the Syria crisisas its RRP funding in 2014 was US$ 8.4 million.478
469 See Lebanon section of this report for further details.470 http://www.nrc.no/?aid=9147814471 http://www.rescue.org/where/middle_east/irc-jordan472 UNHCR (n.d.) (b).473 Interview with IRC representatives in Mafraq.474 UNHCR (n.d.) (b).475 Interview with Medair Country Representative in Irbid.476 http://www.stichting-rfb.nl/477 Medair (n.d.).478 UNHCR (n.d.) (b).
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The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)provides unconditional cash to 2200 families and will have phased this out andtransferred the case load to UNHCR by the end of 2014. However, the beneficiaries willmost likely end up on a waiting list as UNHCR may not have the funding to incorporatethem in their programme.479 Activities are funded through the IFRCs own appeals towhich the Netherlands Red Cross have contributed some if its Netherlands Governmenthumanitarian funding.
IRD Jordan was established in 2003, for the purpose of supporting programmaticoperations in Iraq. IRD began working in Jordan in 2006 and has implemented eightprograms for Iraqi Refugees with funding from BPRM and UNHCR. IRD Jordanimplements a five year Community Mobilization and Education Program in publicschools in Jordan with USAID funding. It has a very substantial outreach network whichit mobilises to implement the ‘home visit project’ which serves as UNHCR's primarydecision-making tool in order confirm the vulnerability profile and eligibility for cashassistance. It assessed 15 to 16,000 refugee households (81,000 people, 17% of the totalregistered Syrian refugee population), the data of which are entered into the RAISdatabase).480 This is one of the most important information management projectsfunded within the RRP.
Camp Protection
IRD also implements protection activities in Za’atari. It mobilises some of its hugenetwork of social workers and follows up on shelter needs and ensures that refugees areinformed about available services and their rights in Za’atari.International Medical Corps (IMC) is a camp protection partner, implementing mentalhealth activities (psychological first aid) focussing on SGBV, early marriages and childlabour. It currently manages 1200 cases in Za’atari and some in Azraq in partnershipwith UNICEF and Save the Children. IMC is a sector lead on mental health. Its RRPfunded protection component amounts to US$ 4 million. Its health sector RRPcomponent receives a further US$ 6 million. IMC also runs a very impressive youthcentre in Mafraq town, where Syrian children of different ages have opportunities toengage in positive learning activities out of school, such as in arts and theatre.
Camp ShelterThe Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH) is the major camp shelter partner. Itdevelops the camp infrastructure and is finally responsible for the physical aspects ofthe camps with a total UNHCR fund of US$ 13.8 million. Its main functions are tenderingand quality control of the implementation of this fund.NRC is a major player in distributing (UNHCR supplied) NFIs to new comers on theirfirst arrival in Za’atari.
479 Interview with IFRC representative in Amman.480 Interview with Head of IRD Jordan in Amman and http://www.nakhweh.org/en/organizations/163-International-Relief-and-Development-IRD-
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Appendix 4: DORCASThe recipient for the non-registered refugee component of the fund is Dorcas, arelatively small faith-based organization based in a village north of Amsterdam. It hadsome previous experience in working in El Meten, a relatively affluent Christian area inMount-Lebanon. During this time it established a network of charity and social workers(community focal points), which it now uses to identify non-registered refugees. Dorcasprovides food parcels (coordinated as a partner of WFP) and works with Lebanese hostcommunities. The Netherlands government grant is used to provide non-food items tothe newcomers and refers them to other agencies for other types of needs.The project is running from 1 April 2014 to 31 March 2015. Due to starting up delaysimplmentation started in 1 July 2015. The target population was initially planned at1400 (175/month), but has been revised upwards to 1580. To date (October 2014) 700newcomers received Dorcas assistance.UNHCR was consulted on the selection of El Meten, and Dorcas participates in NFI andwinterization coordination meetings and Dorcas is in regular contact with UNHCR in ElMeten. Dorcas is also a partner of WFP food parcel distribution.The newcomers are identified by community focal points: social workers, according toour source 70% of whom are Christian church leaders, 8 – 10% are associated with aMosque and the remaining 20% are employed by the municipality. Dorcas does not askbeneficiaries about their religious affiliation and there is no reason to assume that theselection is not needs based. However, working in this particular area and the largenumber of people identified by church leaders will no doubt help church credibilityamong the refugees, a majority of whom is reportedly Muslim.Dorcas has noticed that CFPs are referring less and less newcomers, another indicationthat the border is closing. Another factor is that municipalities are increasingly reluctantto refer to Dorcas. Dorcas has obtained permission to include Iraqi refugees in theirprogramme which is helping them to reach their targets. They would also like to includeSyrian and other refugees who have been in Lebanon for longer and have not yet beenassisted by UNHCR. Dorcas estimates this to a ‘significant number’ of people, without(understandably) being able to give any well founded figures. It notes two reasons forthis already mentioned by other UNHCR partners: fear of breach of confidentiality andretribution and that registration will not lead to assistance anyway.Like many other partners, Dorcas has not yet begun to monitor the outcome of itsproject and focussed strongly on output distribution.Dorcas complies with the tender coordination criterium in two ways:It actively participates in the NFI and sector meetings at El Metten level, therebyavoiding duplication and assuring correct referrals.1. It encourages the newcomers to register with UNHCR. It has knowledge of onlysix or seven of its Netherlands government financed project beneficiaries whohave not done this and an unidentified number of which the status has not yetbeen verified. Further investigations revealed that many of these families haverelatives in operational military units in Syria and are worried aboutrepercussions. Based on Dorcas’ information the question of added value (interms of effectiveness) of direct financing Netherlands based NGOs remainsunanswered.
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2. Effectively Dorcas is a so-called ‘Operating Partner’, albeit a very small one.Dorcas also distributed food parcels with WFP funding and claims to be cheaperthat WFP (USD 79 in stead of USD 105); even if it buys much lower quantities.However, the added value of this 30% efficiency gain is difficult to proof as thereis no coordination on standards. Nevertheless it might be appropriate for DSH toinvestigate WFP efficiency, especially given the recent €8 million donation andthe continuing shortfalls of WFP’s monthly budgets.Part of the rationale of the tender was to work with non-registered refugees,presumably assuming that these were outside the scope of UNHCR’s frameworks.However, UNHCR also works with non-registered refugees. Dorcas claims it has a betterunderstanding of context through the CFPs. However, many UNHCR partners work likethis too and direct financing definitely makes UNHCR’s coordination role moreproblematic. For instance NFI have long been replaced by UCAP within the coordinatedsystem, but Dorcas is still distributing NFIs claiming that refugees: ‘do not always buythe right things with UCAP’481. Dorcas liaised with the Netherlands Embassy on the visitof the parliamentarian who was the conduit for the direct NGO tender, but there is noprogrammatic discussion, as this is within the realm of the DSH in The Hague.
481 Interview with Dorcas Project Manager in Beirut
